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This study is motivated by two questions: To what extent are countries engaged in 
military interventions willing to use force to promote democracy? And what are the 
likely consequences of such actions? Interveners face a dilemma in seeking to impose 
democracy through military interventions: They can either accommodate armed 
factions in the target state by bringing them into a powersharing government with little 
democratic accountability, or they can seek to impose higher-order democracy at the 
risk of violent confrontation. The course of action chosen depends on the interveners’ 
regime types, strategic cultures, and resource constraints. Coalitions dominated by 
committed democracies with militarized strategic cultures have proven vastly more 
successful in promoting democratic change through interventions than coalitions 
dominated by less militarized, less committed, or less democratic states. They do so, 
however, at the risk of provoking international crises and unsustainable escalations of 
violence. These claims are investigated through both a medium-N, fuzzy-set analysis 
of all military interventions in the post-Cold War era and a series of controlled, 
focused comparisons between the policies of the United States, Germany, and Russia 
in interventions in the Balkans and Central Asia. This study has implications for both 
theory and policy. It advances the argument that both rationalist and constructivist 
theories of international relations, taken separately, fail to predict either state behavior 
or the outcomes of states’ policy choices; rather, only by integrating these perspectives 
can we understand patterns of military interventions. These patterns reveal that policy- 
makers must commit to one of three basic models of intervention; pursuing the goals 
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In March 2003 the United States invaded Iraq in what has proven to be a 
disastrous military intervention – the first and very possibly the last “preventive war” 
carried out under the Bush Doctrine in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The 
invasion of Iraq appears peculiar in many respects. It was a preventive war, launched 
without any clear intelligence to suggest that Iraq had the capabilities or imminent 
intent to harm the United States. The Bush administration’s unilateralism was not a 
recourse of last resort but almost a badge of honor proudly displayed as a signal of 
American resolve. It was audacious in its ambition: to remake a large country with a 
substantial military, decrepit public infrastructure, legacy of severe inter-ethnic 
violence, and history of passionate anti-colonialism. Even more peculiar was the 
manner in which the intervention was conducted, without apparent agreement among 
senior decision-makers about the precise ends being pursued or the precise means that 
would be used to obtain them. That the intervention has turned out so disastrously 
should surprise no one.  
The invasion of Iraq and the United States’ subsequent flailing efforts to 
remake the country are indeed peculiar, but more as an extreme instance of a much 
broader trend than as a singular event. Throughout the post-Cold War era both states 
and international organizations have sought to reorganize the domestic politics of 
states in order to produce an international order more to their liking. While the Bush 
administration is well-known for the zeal of its commitment (rhetorically, at least) to 
democracy promotion, it was not the U.S. National Security Strategy but the European 
one that declared, “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the 
governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of 
well-governed democratic states” (European Security Strategy 2003, 10). Nor is the 
United States alone in its resort to unilateralism or its willingness to use force to  
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restructure other governments according to its preferences, although it is certainly 
unique in the frequency and audacity with which it has abandoned multilateralism and 
resorted to force. The European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) joined with the United States in using military force to impose a settlement 
on the Serbian territory of Kosovo, despite lacking a United Nations mandate for their 
action. Australia spurned near-certain UN approval for its intervention in the Solomon 
Islands, preferring to act unfettered by any UN mandate (Bellamy and Williams 2005, 
186).  
What is unusual about Iraq is the preventive nature of the intervention and the 
scale of commitments and risks entailed. Interventions are typically so difficult, 
dangerous, and expensive that they are undertaken only as a last resort; the invasion of 
Iraq was an option of first resort. The decision to invade is puzzling in many respects, 
and scholars may never fully understand the reasons behind American decision-
makers’ choice. Once the decision to intervene had been made, however, the dynamics 
that unfolded in Iraq bear a remarkable similarity to other interventions of the post-
Cold War era, and many who initially opposed the war were placed in the 
uncomfortable position of seeking ways to make it succeed (see for instance Diamond 
2005).  
Nor is Iraq likely to be the last time the United States and other world actors 
intervene militarily to restructure the politics of other states. As both the U.S. National 
Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy acknowledge, failed states are a 
– if not the – leading security threat in the world today. Not only may they harbor 
transnational terrorists, as in the case of Afghanistan, but they also frequently fuel 
regional conflict, transnational crime, destabilizing population movements, and other 
threats to broader peace and stability. Even in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, the 
European Security Strategy did not abandon the concept of using military force to  
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advance state-building. Previous problematic interventions (and non-interventions) 
have also touched off flurries of criticisms and responses, none of which led to either 
the abandonment of intervention as a tool of international politics or to solutions to the 
enduring dilemmas of intervention.  
This study does not seek to explain why or when countries choose to intervene. 
Rather, it examines their choice of strategies once the decision to intervene has already 
been made. In particular, the study is motivated by two questions: To what extent are 
countries engaged in military interventions willing to use force to promote 
democracy? And what are the likely consequences of such actions? Interveners face a 
dilemma in seeking to impose democracy through military interventions: They can 
either accommodate armed factions in the target state by bringing them into a 
powersharing government with little democratic accountability, or they can seek to 
impose higher-order democracy at the risk of violent confrontation. The course of 
action chosen depends on the interveners’ regime types, strategic cultures, and 
resource constraints. Coalitions dominated by committed, militarized democracies 
have proven vastly more successful in promoting democratic change through 
interventions than coalitions dominated by less militarized, less committed, or less 
democratic states. They do so, however, at the risk of provoking international crises 
and unsustainable escalations of violence. Committed, militarized democracies tend to 
pursue high-risk, high-reward strategies. Thus countries such as the United States and 
United Kingdom have been critical to establishing the requisite security environment 
for state-building efforts in missions ranging from the Balkans to Central Asia to West 
Africa. They have also been responsible for fiascoes such as Somalia. Broader 
coalitions, such as those participating in UN-led operations without a lead nation, have 
been less likely to spark international rows or violent opposition to their presence by 
local militias. They have also seldom promoted substantial democratic change.   
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Intervening states seek to influence the regime type of the target state for a 
complex variety of reasons. Often the decision-maker responsible for approving an 
intervention acts on the basis of multiple and potentially conflicting motivations. 
When we examine not simply the decision to intervene but also the manner in which 
an intervention is conducted, a great many more actors with diverse perspectives and 
goals come into play. Regime change may be sought primarily as an end in itself, but 
more often it is a means to some other goal, such as regional stability, alleviation of a 
humanitarian disaster, or promotion of security interests. It may be simply a device 
used to legitimate an intervention to a broader domestic or international audience. 
Thus to argue that democracies generally promote democracy is not to claim that they 
do so all the time or do so whole-heartedly. They often doubt that democracy can be 
effectively promoted in weak and failed states, and they frequently privilege other 
goals before democracy rather than pursuing democracy as an ultimate good in itself. 
But more often than not they return to democracy promotion as at least an element of a 
broader policy because none of the alternatives looks any more attractive than the 
arduous and risky process of building governments that are inclusive and more or less 
responsive to their populations. Democracies are not “good guys” intent on exporting 
“good” institutions to the victims of tyranny. Rather, they are actors that seek to secure 
their own interests under conditions of high uncertainty, and they frequently resort to 
an externalization of their own systems of governance as what they perceive to be the 
least bad option when confronting the dilemmas inherent in stabilizing unstable or 
threatening regions of the world. Thus democracies tend to create conditions more 
favorable to democratic change even if this is not their primary goal.  
These claims challenge much of the political science literature on 
interventions. Other scholars have claimed alternatively that no one truly seeks to 
promote democracy through armed intervention, or that all do, or that the United  
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States uniquely does so.
1 Yet others argue that, regardless of the intentions of 
interveners, democracy promotion in the course of intervention is practically 
impossible in all but the most narrowly defined circumstances (Etzioni 2004; Marten 
2004). Still others have argued that the use of force in higher-intensity enforcement 
missions is typically either ineffective or counter-productive, failing to impose peace 
in states beset by civil wars and unable to foster an inclusive, more democratic 
political order even in those cases where peace is achieved (Doyle and Sambanis 
2000; Fortna 2004).
2 For very legitimate reasons, much of the literature on 
interventions has focused on the circumstances prevalent in the target state rather than 
on the politics of interveners. In doing so, however, large-N studies of the 
phenomenon have generally failed to distinguish among interveners except in the 
broadest of terms, often lumping together interveners as disparate as Syria in Lebanon 
and Australia in East Timor.  
Obviously no single study can examine an issue from every possible 
dimension, and the existing literature has contributed immeasurably to our 
understanding of interventions. This study shall argue, however, that the attitudes and 
politics of intervening countries are critical to understanding what can and cannot be 
achieved in the course of an intervention. In particular, interveners differ in what they 
believe can or should be achieved through intervention and in their attitudes towards 
the acceptability and efficacy of force. By focusing on this variation in the goals 
                                                 
1 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) claim that democracy promotion in the course of interventions 
is at best “window dressing.” Paris (2003) claims that a “global culture shapes the character of 
peacekeeping in fundamental ways – peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to 
develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture,” meaning above all 
liberal democracy and sovereign statehood (442-3). Huntington (1982), Judis (2005), Monten (2005), 
Pickering and Peceny (2006), and others have claimed that the United States is uniquely committed to 
democracy promotion through military interventions. 
2 Note, however, that Doyle and Sambanis later (2006) offered a more equivocal assessment of the 
consequences of UN enforcement actions, claiming that enforcement actions may be necessary, but that 
they alone cannot promote democracy.  
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intervening states pursue and the means they adopt, this study makes three 
contributions to the literature on intervention and state-building.  
First, in many recent assessments of state-building, scholars have focused on 
UN missions or on the combination of governmental, inter-governmental, and non-
governmental organizations operating in “post-modern imperialist” enterprises 
(Fearon and Laitin 2004). These studies have made an important contribution to our 
understanding of these missions. But many of them obscure the underlying conditions 
that make political progress possible. Except in the most benign implementation 
environments, violence or the threat of violence remains the single most important 
arbiter of political outcomes. States, not the UN or NGOs, ultimately control how their 
militaries are deployed and thus the extent to which they can be used to demilitarize 
politics and create opportunities for more inclusive and participatory politics to 
emerge. “Bringing the state back in” thus offers the opportunity to recapture these 
underlying dynamics.  
Second, many analyses originating from comparative politics have assessed the 
ideal institutional designs for regulating domestic conflict or the conditions under 
which transformations to democracy are most likely. Both are clearly worthy 
enterprises. When the lessons of these studies are applied to military interventions, 
however, analysts often forget that institutional design and democracy promotion are 
as much about the domestic political needs and constraints of the intervening states’ 
decision-makers as they are about advancing policies that are most optimal for the 
target state.  
Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of integrating constructivist 
and rationalist variables to develop a more complete picture of international relations. 
Without examining different conjunctions of these variables, theories of military 
interventions commonly are limited in their predictive utility. Realist theories, for  
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instance, generally see the pursuit of ideological ends as a frivolous activity 
undertaken only when national interests are not at stake. The analytical framework 
presented here suggests the opposite is the case, at least in post-Cold War 
interventions: Ideological variation among interveners is more acute precisely when 
national interests are more directly engaged. 
This study consciously makes two intellectual gambles. First, it integrates the 
analysis of military interventions as a whole, from intrusive peace operations to 
counter-insurgencies. One of the fundamental themes underlying this study is that 
interveners face a nearly universal trade-off between inclusion and coercion. They can 
exclude so-called “spoilers” – armed groups who threaten to weaken or undermine the 
preferred political order of the intervener – but they do so at the risk of sparking 
violent confrontation with these groups. Or they can include these groups in 
governance structures, but only at the risk of making political authority structures 
hostage to the preferences of competing armed militias. Such dynamics challenge 
interveners ranging from blue-helmeted peacekeepers to forces of military occupation. 
When former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg, for instance, 
was asked why the United States was not more aggressive in marginalizing 
criminalized paramilitaries in the Kosovo peace operation, he argued that the situation 
was analogous to Iraq: “If intervening states rule out dealing with local armed groups, 
they risk turning them into committed antagonists” (author interview, October 28, 
2005).  
Second, this study focuses on the security dynamics of military interventions at 
the expense of neglecting other important processes, such as economic reconstruction, 
civil society and grassroots politics, or reconciliation and justice issues. Scholars 
studying efforts at democracy promotion have long recognized that the use of military 
force permits an intrusive restructuring of domestic politics that is impossible through  
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less direct means (Whitehead 1986, 3). More fundamentally, however, in the weak and 
failed states in which interventions typically occur, where the state has lost much (or 
all) of its ability to regulate violence, the influence of violent coercion is pervasive, 
whether it takes the form of acts or threats, made by the interveners themselves or the 
armed factions who dominate both the institutions of the state and the “shadow 
institutions” formed by paramilitaries and illicit economies. It provides the context in 
which non-military instruments such as aid and negotiations operate. The restoration 
of the monopoly on the use of force to the state is the necessary prerequisite for 
achieving political stability (Stedman 2001). Outside military forces cannot by 
themselves compel specific political outcomes, much less democracy itself, but they 
can help to provide an environment either more or less conducive to inclusive, 
representative politics. 
By focusing on how intervening states fuse military force with political goals, 
we can correct two opposite but equally misleading understandings of armed state-
building. One strand of the literature ignores the military dynamics of such operations 
altogether, discussing them instead in terms of police and law enforcement – the arrest 
of war criminals, the enforcement of the rule of law, the imposition of liberal 
institutions. Analysts in this camp point out – quite rightly – that, if physical coercion 
is to be exercised at all, it should be used by indigenous police forces whenever 
possible and by international police when necessary. Soldiers tend to be ill-equipped 
for law-and-order missions. While this observation is true, it does not go far enough, 
for the simple reason that the arrest of war criminals, the enforcement of the rule of 
law, and the imposition of liberal institutions all directly threaten large and well-armed 
factions in the target state. We will not be able to understand political outcomes 
without reference to the full spectrum of possible interactions between intervening 
forces and local actors.   
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The opposite tendency is to give too much credit to military forces, blithely 
assuming that they can impose their will if they simply have adequate numbers and 
equipment.
3 In fact, interveners must perform a delicate balancing act between 
confronting indigenous armed actors, thereby risking an explosive backlash, and co-
opting them, thereby strengthening their position and freezing in place political 
dynamics antithetical to the projects pursued by the intervener. Unfortunately, it is 
seldom if ever clear to interveners ex ante where the line between productive and 
counter-productive uses of force lies, and this uncertainty lies at the center of much of 
the analytical framework that is advanced in this study. 
The theory presented here yields two implications for policy. First, the results 
of this study show that military interventions can indeed potentially promote more 
democratic governance, particularly if the intervening country or coalition is 
committed and willing to both accommodate and in some cases confront armed 
indigenous actors. Such efforts, however, will inevitably be lengthy, expensive, risky, 
and uncertain to succeed in any given case. Second, all good things do not necessarily 
go together, as the liberal model would suggest. Because different states possess very 
different preferences in cases of military interventions, effectiveness in promoting 
democracy may frequently conflict with multilateralism. Ideally, coalitions can be 
constructed that combine effectiveness, international comity, and burdensharing. But 
in more difficult intervention environments, the obstacles to realizing this ideal are 
profound.  
The analytical framework provided in this study does not yield an easy 
prescription for interveners. It certainly does not indicate that all interventions should 
become highly militarized in order to overcome the resistance of local factions to 
                                                 
3 John Mueller (2004, 22), for instance, argues that “When a criminal army comes into direct armed 
confrontation with a competent disciplined one, the disciplined one, essentially by definition, will 
prevail.”   
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democratic change. Interventions take place in a myriad of contexts. The extent to 
which local armed factions possess broad bases of popular support should certainly 
influence how an intervener responds to them, as should the level of an intervener’s 
own commitment. This study does indicate that democratic change is possible, that it 
usually requires the sustained commitment of militarized interveners willing to endure 
high risks and costs, and that multilateral comity is often difficult to sustain through 
such an effort. Recognizing the challenges that an intervener will face both on the 
ground and in diplomatic circles is the first step towards designing better models of 
intervention – and refraining from interventions where the costs are too great and the 
chances of success too poor. 
The study proceeds in six chapters. The first chapter provides a theory of 
comparative military interventions, examining how the regime type, strategic culture, 
and interests of the intervening countries shape their intentions and the probable 
outcomes of interventions. The next chapter provides a medium-N overview of the 
empirical record, assessing the outcomes of all 27 interventions of the post-Cold War 
era. The following three chapters are devoted one each to three cases of intervention: 
Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The empirical chapters confirm the utility of the 
analytical framework proposed here. The medium-N analysis reveals that 22 of the 27 
cases of intervention in the post-Cold War era produce levels of democratic change as 
predicted by the theory of this study. When we assess levels of democratic 
achievement (that is, whether the target state becomes at least an illiberal democracy 
during the course of an intervention), the correlation still holds, albeit more weakly. 
The case studies confirm that these outcomes occur for the reasons specified. The case 
studies focus on the intervention behavior of extreme examples of the major types of 
intervening states: militarized democracies (the United States), non-militarized 
democracies (Germany), and militarized non-democracies (Russia). Not only do these  
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interveners behave almost precisely as predicted, but lesser included cases also 
conform to expectations. Thus, for example, not only the United States but also Great 
Britain exhibit tendencies to militarize their efforts to secure relatively more inclusive 
and participatory governance in interventions, while both Germany and Italy display 
much greater reluctance to utilize military force. Finally, the last chapter concludes 














Part I: Overview  
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Chapter 1: 
A Theory of Comparative Military Interventions 
This study seeks to explain how interventions are conducted once the decision 
to intervene has already been made. More specifically, it examines how the cultures 
and domestic politics of intervening states shape the strategies that they pursue and the 
resources that they commit, and it examines the likely consequences of interveners’ 
divergent approaches to intervention. The theoretical framework is presented in five 
steps, beginning with an overview of the argument. I then map the conceptual 
landscape by reviewing the definitions central to an understanding of democracy 
promotion through intervention. Next, I examine the existing literature on how the 
regime type, strategic culture, and national interests of intervening states influence the 
objectives that they pursue and the means that they are willing to use. In a fourth 
section, I demonstrate how these three variables interact with the intervention 
environment to shape the political authority structures of the target state. Finally, I 
outline the study’s research design and preview the empirical results to be presented in 
the following chapters. 
Overview of the Argument 
In the post-Cold War era one of the primary threats to international security is 
the existence of extremely weak and failed states (Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein 
2005; National Security Strategy 2002). Such states typically produce numerous 
negative “security externalities” such as refugee flows, conduits for illegal trafficking 
(e.g., of arms, narcotics, and people), ethnic conflict with spillover or contagion 
effects that endanger regional security, and havens for transnational terrorism. Other 
states affected by these security externalities or spurred to action by the humanitarian  
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consequences of internal chaos have commonly intervened or sought to recruit others 
to intervene to restore stability.  
High levels of uncertainty exist, however, concerning how best to promote 
stability. Although there appears to be considerable evidence that mature democracies 
are the most stable form of government (Hegre et al 2001), scholars are divided 
although often skeptical that democracy can be effectively promoted through armed 
intervention – if indeed it can be promoted from the outside at all.
4 Such uncertainty is 
echoed by policy elites throughout the world, who have stridently debated the proper 
ends of intervention throughout the post-Cold War era. When faced with such high 
levels of uncertainty, decision-makers cannot choose a single, “optimal” strategy but 
instead rely on cognitive short-cuts to guide their decisions. Typically such cognitive 
“short cuts” reflect the culture or personal experiences of the decision-maker, leading 
to divergent strategies among different actors (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). When 
confronted with the uncertainties inherent in attempting to impose political order in 
unstable societies, if intervening states are highly committed to an intervention, then 
they typically seek to externalize their own domestic norms of governance – that is, 
democracies commonly seek to export democracy while autocracies export autocracy. 
In some cases such projects are ideologically driven – that is, they reflect the values or 
beliefs of top decision-makers. More commonly, however, such approaches to state-
building reflect less a coherent strategy than the precarious, internally incoherent 
outcome of numerous bargains struck between different domestic actors in the 
intervening state.  
While interveners usually prefer to externalize their own forms of governance, 
a substantial distance typically separates aspiration and reality. In the post-Cold War 
era military interventions almost without exception take place in environments in 
                                                 
4 This point will be addressed at greater length below.   
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which the major contenders for political power are armed groups. In such 
circumstances interveners can either confront these actors, imposing the intervener’s 
preferred political order to the detriment of the indigenous armed groups’ control over 
political and economic resources, or the intervener can accommodate these local 
actors, constructing a political order that largely reinforces the existing distribution of 
military power. The choice between relatively more accommodating or coercive 
strategies is determined by the intervener’s willingness to risk violent confrontation 
with armed groups in the target state.  
This risk propensity, in turn, is determined by two factors: the intervener’s 
strategic culture and the national interests of the intervener that are engaged by the 
target state. In a world of scarcity, interveners must necessarily accept less desirable 
outcomes when their preferred end-states are too costly. Where an intervener’s direct 
security interests are at stake, its resource constraints tend to be lower, and it can 
commit considerable resources – both soldiers’ lives and financial assets – to realize 
its preferred outcome. Where no significant security interests exist, interveners are 
unlikely to commit to costly state-building projects. Thus security interests are one 
major determinant of whether an intervener will confront local actors in order to 
impose its preferred political order. Yet a second factor is equally significant: the 
strategic culture of the intervener. Countries that have come to believe through past 
experience that the projection of military force can achieve important political 
outcomes – what I term countries with “militarized” strategic cultures – are more 
likely to adopt confrontational as opposed to accommodating strategies vis-à-vis local 
armed groups. Other states have adopted much more circumscribed notions of what 
military force can accomplish (“non-militarized” strategic cultures) and are more 
likely to choose to accommodate indigenous parties rather than risk armed 
confrontation.   
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Taken together, the regime type, strategic culture, and security interests of 
intervening states determine the end-states that they pursue (democracy or autocracy) 
and the strategies that they are willing to use (accommodating or coercive). The 
conjunction of the three variables yields three approaches to military interventions. 
Democracies with militarized strategic cultures and high security interests at stake in 
an intervention tend to pursue a transformation approach in which they seek to impose 
relatively more participatory and inclusive political orders (that is, relatively more 
democratic orders) at the risk of confrontation with armed groups in the target state. 
Non-democracies with militarized strategic cultures and significant security interests 
generally adopt a proxy approach in which they seek to buttress the autocratic control 
of a favored faction in the target state to the exclusion of all others. All other 
interveners – those with non-militarized strategic cultures or with low security 
interests engaged by the target state – typically implement a mediation approach, 
where the interests of all armed groups are accommodated in a power-sharing 
structure which is broadly inclusive but that does not permit effective participation by 
unarmed elements of civil society (that is, lower-order democracy).  
The approaches adopted by interveners do not alone determine the political 
outcomes of a military intervention. In particular, in the most benign implementation 
environments, where violence or the threat of violence is no longer central to political 
contestation, the coercive capacity of intervening forces may be irrelevant, allowing 
even uncommitted or non-militarized interveners to facilitate a relatively inclusive and 
participatory political order.
5 Empirically, in the post-Cold War era, military 
interventions (as defined here) seldom take place in such benign circumstances. 
Indeed, nearly the only instances of such environments are cases in which Cold War-
era civil wars were brought to an end by the withdrawal of the superpowers’ military 
                                                 
5 Doyle and Sambanis (2000 and 2006) emphasize the importance of implementation environments.  
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and financial support and no indigenous source of readily plunderable resources 
existed. Outside of these fortunate circumstances, however, the ability of intervening 
forces to present a credible military deterrent has proven critical to fostering relatively 
more democratic political orders. Moreover, even in a number of apparently benign 
implementation environments, such as Panama, the security umbrella of the intervener 
has proven critical for the new regime’s endurance in the face of armed challenges. 
Defining the Conceptual Landscape 
Studies of forcible democracy promotion frequently stumble on the central but 
elusive concepts of military intervention and democracy, as well as on standards for 
what constitutes “success.” Before outlining my own theory of interventions, 
therefore, I will define each of these terms.
6  
Military Interventions. Two different conceptions of military interventions are 
present in political science: a broader definition in which interventions are 
characterized as any “use of troops or forces to cross borders or the employment of 
forces already based in a foreign country in pursuit of political or economic objectives 
in the context of a dispute,” and a more circumscribed concept referring to “the 
deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of 
determining the political authority structure in the target state.”
7 The two concepts 
frequently differ in scale: the former encompasses even small-scale cross-border 
incursions, while the latter is usually reserved for relatively sizeable and enduring 
military operations. What truly distinguishes them, however, is their object: the former 
definition can refer to uses of military force designed to effect changes in specific 
                                                 
6 More precise operationalizations of each concept will be provided in Chapter 2 below. 
7 The former definition is drawn from Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering (1994, 209). The latter 
definition is borrowed from Finnemore (2003, 9), but it is important to note that Finnemore does not 
accept this or any other single definition for the concept of interventions across historical eras.  
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policies of the target state, but the latter denotes only cases in which outside forces 
seek to change the entire political authority structure of the target. 
It is the objective of uses of force which also distinguishes military 
interventions from war. Whereas wars are traditionally understood as interstate uses of 
force typically waged for territorial acquisition, interventions are usually undertaken to 
determine how a territory is governed rather than to whom it belongs (Jentleson and 
Levite 1992). 
At the lowest intensity such missions as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the 
observation of a ceasefire, or the protection of so-called “safe areas” do not qualify as 
interventions, at least as the term is understood here. At the high end of the coercive 
spectrum, interstate wars such as World War II do not count as interventions, although 
the ensuing occupations of Germany and Japan do. Even with these restrictions, the 
concept still encompasses a wide variety of operations. Indeed, many scholars seek to 
erect a sharp distinction between operations undertaken with the consent or even the 
“induced consent” of the target state – particularly UN-mandated peace operations – 
from aggressive actions such as the American occupation of Iraq. While there are 
certainly a number of compelling reasons to delineate these two sub-categories for a 
variety of research agendas, it is the contention of this study
8 that these two varieties 
of intervention can usefully be understood as extreme ends of a continuum. On the 
bottom end lie relatively robust instances of so-called “Chapter VI-½” UN operations 
in which international forces are mandated to facilitate the creation of elected 
governments in the target state and are authorized to use military force for some 
purposes other than strict self-defense. On the opposite end lie counterinsurgency 
campaigns such as the current ones in Afghanistan and Iraq. By examining the entire 
                                                 
8 And others – see for instance Findlay (2002), Cable (1993), and Cooper and Berdal (1993).  
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spectrum of interventions we can better understand the relationship between force and 
the political orders likely to result. 
Democracy. If the definition of military interventions is contentious, it is not 
nearly so disputed as the definition of democracy. This study draws upon the classic 
conceptualization of Robert Dahl in which democracy (“polyarchy,” in Dahl’s rather 
more precise terminology) is understood as the institutionalization of both competition 
for power among elites and participation by non-elites in the determination of which 
elites shall rule (Dahl 1971).
9 In a contemporary context these two axes of political 
inclusion can be understood to refer to (i) the extent to which all major organized 
political groupings are afforded opportunities to compete for office and (ii) the extent 
to which ordinary citizens are provided channels for effective participation in the 
regular determination of the holders of public office (e.g., not only through exercising 
the right to vote, but also through freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and so 
on).
10 
At the heart of many controversies lies the question of whether to understand 
democracy as a dichotomous or continuous variable – that is, is a country with many 
but not all characteristics of democracy better considered a non-democracy or an 
intermediate case somewhere between democracy and autocracy? If we adopt a 
dichotomous conception, then it is clearly absurd to speak of military interventions 
designed to promote democracy. The targets of military interventions will not look 
                                                 
9 This conceptualization has achieved widespread acceptance. In one recent, widely cited definition, 
democracy is understood as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their 
actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of 
their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). 
10 Many scholars include a third dimension of democracy, often labeled “rule of law” (see for instance 
Munck and Verkuilen 2002). While for many purposes it is important to distinguish this third 
dimension, in this study it is incorporated into the other two components for two reasons: first, for the 
sake of simplicity, and second, because incorporating all (or most) organized political factions into 
political competition and creating political space for the participation of unarmed civil society elements 
and voters is typically a prerequisite of establishing the rule of law in a democratic polity.  
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anything like Switzerland anytime soon, and anyone seeking to create new 
Switzerlands from the rubble of failed states may be justly pilloried. If we adopt a 
continuous conception of democracy (more or less, rather than either-or), however, it 
is less clear that military interventions designed to promote democracy are inevitably 
errant idealism (although they may well be in specific cases). This latter conception of 
democracy is almost certainly the one adopted by Western policymakers launching 
military interventions, who often speak of “inclusive and representative” political 
orders so as not to confuse partial democratization with the creation of mature 
democracies. This study adopts the pragmatic approach recommended by Collier and 
Adcock (1999): The research question should determine the proper conceptualization 
of democracy. Since most policymakers appear to think of democracy promotion in 
terms of more or less rather than either/or, the former framework is adopted here.  
Success. Success in promoting democracy can be understood both in terms of 
the quality of democracy (that is, the extent of democratic change fostered by 
intervention and the level of democracy eventually achieved) and its durability (i.e., 
how long it is able to survive). Ideally, we would examine the targets of military 
interventions ten or even 30 years after an intervention was concluded to assess how 
successfully a new regime had taken root. Unfortunately, since over half of the 
military interventions of the post-Cold War era are ongoing, studies assessing the 
long-term success of interventions have had to draw on military interventions 
conducted over the past half-century or more (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; 
Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Edelstein 2004; Pei and Kasper 2003; Pickering and 
Peceny 2006).  
Many of these studies provide a valuable warning about the inherent difficulty 
of fostering enduring political change in a foreign country. There are at least four  
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reasons, however, why we should treat these findings with some skepticism. First, 
with some possible exceptions, the motives of current interventions are considerably 
different from those of a century ago, when protection of business investments and 
loans were dominant goals (Finnemore 2003). Second, the contemporary environment, 
in which a majority of countries on the planet are at least illiberal democracies and 
democracy as a goal for all humanity has been incorporated into UN documents, is 
much more favorable to democratic transitions than it was in previous eras 
(Huntington 1991). Third, superpowers are no longer funding and arming insurgencies 
and providing them safe havens and diplomatic support. Considering the significance 
that state backing frequently has for insurgencies (Byman et al 2001, especially 104-
106), current nation-building efforts should generally be less threatened by external 
subversion than was the case during the Cold War. Finally, the methods of democracy 
promotion practiced now are in most cases substantially different than in previous 
eras, when interveners tended to rely either on hand-picking a narrow elite without 
broader efforts to make them accountable to their citizenry, or (as was common in 
American practice during the Cold War) half-heartedly promoting economic and 
social policies such as land-reform without broader engagement in civil society and 
political institutionalization (Smith 1994; Carothers 1999, Chapter 2). Concluding that 
military interventions cannot produce enduring, positive changes in the target regime 
on the basis of interventions conducted over the past century may be like concluding 
that foreign assistance can never promote development on the basis of the outcomes of 
the World Bank’s highway- and dam-building projects of decades past. 
The only honest answer to the question of whether current military 
interventions can promote enduring political change in the post-Cold War era is 
simply that we cannot be certain (Paris 2004, 57). Instead of seeking definitive 
answers to this question, we should establish a more modest standard: What are the  
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likely consequences of interventions in the short-term, and are there indications that 
short-term progress made during interventions can be built upon through less intrusive 
instruments (such as aid, diplomacy, and possibly over-the-horizon military support) 
to effect lasting change after external forces have been removed? Military 
interventions almost always take place in highly parlous environments, where central 
authority has lost or loses its monopoly on violence and must begin once more to 
provide public goods while fending off armed challengers. Under such circumstances, 
external interveners will not create new Switzerlands, nor should they try. They may 
hope, however, to create relatively stable quasi-democracies that show strong potential 
to improve gradually, according to an indigenous logic of democracy, once the 
intervening troops have withdrawn. Weak and failed states are some of the most 
complex challenges facing the international community today. We should approach 
these challenges with a healthy dose of pragmatism, recognizing that the least bad 
policy is the best available. 
In this study “success” is defined according to three standards: the extent to 
which democratic change was fostered during an intervention, the level of democracy 
achieved by the last year of an intervention (democratic achievement), and indications 
that this level of democratic achievement may be sustained for the long-term after the 
departure of international troops (democratic sustainability). The first two of these 
standards of success will be assessed through a medium-N analysis based on Freedom 
House data, while all three will be assessed through a series of structured, focused 
comparisons between interventions in Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. 
Literature Review 
With an overview of the argument and definitions in place, we can turn to a 
review of the existing literature on military interventions and the promotion of  
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democracy, the use of force, and the stakes involved in an intervention. These three 
literatures bear on the three variables at the center of this study: the regime, type, 
strategic culture, and interests of intervening states. The literature on each of these will 
be reviewed in two steps, first by examining the probable intentions of intervening 
states and second by examining the likely effect of the specified variable on 
intervention outcomes. 
Democracy 
Intentions. Most of the existing literature on democracy promotion through 
armed intervention claims that no one does it, or that everyone does it, or that the 
United States uniquely does it. Relatively ignored is the simple thesis that all countries 
tend to externalize their own domestic forms of governance – that is, that democracies 
typically prefer to promote democracy while autocracies generally foster autocracy. 
In a recent article Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) claim that no 
states truly seek to create democracies through their interventions. The authors argue 
that, while autocracies have no interest whatsoever in doing so, democratic leaders 
have an incentive to pursue “window-dressing” democratization – that is, democracy-
building projects that give the appearance of promoting democracy while in fact 
allowing autocrats loyal to the interveners to retain power. In so doing they can 
costlessly assuage their public’s preference for building “nice” regimes while at the 
same time fulfilling the narrower demands of the “winning coalition” that backs the 
decision-makers – demands such as the exploitation of foreign countries’ natural 
resources. As evidence of their assertions, the authors provide a large-N analysis of the 
regime type of the targets of intervention long after the interveners withdraw. From 
these outcomes they infer intentions. That is, rather than beginning from the 
assumption that democracy promotion is an extraordinarily difficult enterprise, they  
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assume that interveners are capable of creating whatever regime they choose. Thus, if 
the target states do not become and remain high-functioning democracies, then it is 
because interveners had no intention of creating such.  
Many observers advance a second hypothesis – that the United States is unique 
in its attempts to impose its own political institutions on others and in particular in its 
pursuit of democracy promotion through military interventions. This hypothesis – 
commonly known as “American exceptionalism” – has a lengthy history, going back 
at least as far as Louis Hartz’s (1955) seminal The Liberal Tradition in America. The 
theme was revisited by Samuel Huntington (1982) in the 1980s, and it has seen a 
renaissance under the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Judis 
2005; Monten 2005; Pickering and Peceny 2006).
11 Most of its proponents ground the 
argument in the peculiar religious and political foundations of the early American 
state: The lack of a cohesive ethnic basis for American nationalism forced the 
adoption of a civic nationalist creed based on the Puritanical religious beliefs of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America. As a result American foreign policy is 
premised on the notion that the United States must combat the forces of “evil” in the 
world by promoting its own, superior political institutions.
12 
A third perspective contends that democracy promotion is the result of a 
“global culture” that makes the promotion of democratic, Westphalian states appear to 
be the only appropriate end of military intervention while making the imposition of 
other forms of governance unthinkable (Paris 2003).  
This study takes issue with all three of these perspectives: Democracy 
promotion is neither “window dressing” nor a uniquely American enterprise, but 
                                                 
11 Pickering and Peceny, however, find little quantitative evidence to support their hypothesis of 
American exceptionalism, and they admit that there may be indications that other liberal democracies in 
recent years have also sought to promote democracy through interventions). For a closely related 
argument that the United States tends to view its wars in Manichean terms, see Lipset (1996, 20). 
12 Such a view has often found expression in popular European commentary on the United States, 
particularly since the invasion of Iraq (see for instance Bahners 2004).  
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neither is it universal. It is the result of a general tendency to externalize one’s own 
domestic norms of governance where possible at an acceptable price. Indeed, as will 
be seen in detail below, attempts to externalize one’s own political norms are 
remarkably common in interstate relations over both space and time. Nonetheless, 
given the inherent difficulties of creating a functioning state, let alone a higher-order 
democracy, in the circumstances that typically prevail where interventions occur, the 
real puzzle is to explain the precise conditions under which interveners will invest in 
such an ambitious enterprise. 
Outcomes. According to many studies of democracy promotion through 
intervention, the historical record is hardly inspiring. With the notable exceptions of 
the Allied occupations of the defeated advanced industrialized Axis powers after the 
Second World War, these studies have found few success stories (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Downs 2006; Etzioni 2004; Marten 2004; Pei and Kasper 2003). Successes, these 
authors argue, are generally explained by local circumstances (Carothers 1999, 70; 
Etzioni 2004; Fukuyama 2004), and partial successes can prove most disastrous of all 
in that partial democracies are highly unstable and prone to violence (Hegre et al. 
2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Given these challenges and the risks of premature 
efforts at democracy promotion, many observers have recently argued for democracy 
only as a long-term goal to be pursued after a long period of more-or-less autocratic 
state-building.
13 
Other scholars dispute these findings. Some have found evidence that the 
United States has succeeded in promoting democratization through interventions over 
                                                 
13 Some authors propose that the state-building should take place under international trusteeships (Paris 
1997, 2004; Barnett 2006). Others propose that indigenous actors must themselves create a strong state 
– potentially through a bloody process of state-building on the model of early European state formation 
– before they can be nudged towards greater democracy by the international community (Weinstein 
2005).  
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the decades (Hermann and Kegley 1998; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999; Smith 1994). 
Doyle and Sambanis argue that, while non-UN interventions do not have a good 
record at democracy promotion, UN interventions – particularly the so-called “Chapter 
VI½,” multi-dimensional peace operations that have been prevalent in the post-Cold 
War era – have proven successful (Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and 2006; see also 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005).  
Much of the reason for these widely divergent assessments stems from 
different standards and time frames for assessing the dependent variable.
14 Doyle and 
Sambanis, for instance, set a very low threshold for success in promoting what they 
term “participatory peace” – i.e., peace with elements of democratic participation. 
They require only that target states two years after an intervention score a 3 out of a 
possible score of 20 (again, using Polity data) in order to qualify as a democracy. By 
this standard, the Soviet Union and nearly all of the countries of Eastern Europe 
consistently counted as “participatory” polities after the death of Stalin, as have the 
large majority of African states.
15  
Beyond the problems of differing standards, however, their work suffers from 
overly broad conceptual categories for their independent variables and units of 
analysis. Doyle and Sambanis’ work, for instance, disputes the contribution of non-
UN interventions to the construction of participatory (relatively more democratic) 
peace. But within this category they include numerous operations such as Russia’s 
support for secessionist regions in Georgia – interventions that were never intended to 
                                                 
14 Others have disputed the underlying theoretical and methodological choices made by the authors. See 
for instance the Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) response to the criticism of King and Zeng. 
15 The former Yugoslavia (after the Second World War) and all of its successor republics, as well as 
Soviet successor republics such as Azerbaijan, have all consistently met or exceeded Doyle and 
Sambanis’ cut-off value of 3. Such countries as Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have never 
fallen below a value of 3.  
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promote democracy in any way.
16 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs’ work differentiates 
between the actions of democratic and non-democratic interveners, but within their 
unit of analysis they include interventions ranging from the provision of a handful of 
unarmed military observers to the U.S. war in Vietnam.
17  
Many of the analyses discussed above have contributed substantially to our 
understanding of interventions and peace operations; Doyle and Sambanis’ empirical 
work in particular is an impressive achievement. In general, however, they fail to 
examine empirically both the motivations of intervening states and the tools through 
which these states pursue their objectives. Thus, when interveners fail to promote 
democracy or promote only an extremely low level of democracy, we often do not 
know whether democracy promotion was even attempted or how the major actors 
involved pursued such a goal. This study seeks to combine an analysis of the 
intentions of interveners with the means they have at their disposal.  
Military Enforcement  
Intentions. The existing literature on military interventions generally treats 
interveners as indistinguishable from one another, at least as regards the use of force. 
This is particularly true of quantitative examinations of the effectiveness of 
intervention forces, which typically measure overall numbers of deployed troops or 
the ratio of troops to population or territory (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006; Quinlivan 2003). Some works have distinguished between highly 
capable military forces (usually those of the advanced industrialized countries) and 
less capable ones (typically from developing countries) (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Howe 1996/97; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). Even in this latter literature, 
                                                 
16 On Russia’s intentions in Georgia, see for instance the work of Felgenhauer (2004), King (2001), 
Malashenko (2000), Shenfield (1995). 
17 The work of Hermann and Kegley (1998) and Meernik (1996) distinguishes between different 
intensities of intervention.  
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however, interveners differ from one another in terms of their material capabilities and 
troop discipline rather than in terms of their intentions and perceptions. Although these 
latter studies have found that the militaries of more developed countries correlate with 
higher levels of success, there remains considerable empirical variation within this 
category. As will be seen in the empirical sections to follow, while Britain and France, 
for example, possess similar levels of military capabilities, they tend to approach 
military interventions differently. Although Germany has a very high level of overall 
military capacity, it has a force structure and follows rules of engagement that tend to 
limit its effectiveness in interventions. 
Outcomes. Some are skeptical that military enforcement actions can contribute 
to promoting even peace and order in a target state (Fortna 2004), others are skeptical 
only that enforcement can promote more democratic political orders (Marten 2004),
18 
while still others believe that UN enforcement actions can be successful in promoting 
more inclusive politics but that non-UN enforcement operations have failed in this 
regard (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005).
19 On the 
other end of the spectrum, some observers believe that enforcement actions against the 
criminalized paramilitary bands that have predominated in cases of post-Cold War 
state failure are almost certain to be successful at low cost, at least if conducted by 
competent militaries.
20 Still others have argued for much more intrusive state-building 
missions in which local actors are subordinated to an international protectorate, 
                                                 
18 Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argued that enforcement operations failed to promote more participatory 
peace, but they later qualified this argument (2006) to claim that enforcement without broader, civilian 
capacity-building operations failed.  
19 For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that both of these studies adopt a narrow 
operationalization of non-UN operations. 
20 John Mueller (2004, 22), for instance, writes, “When a criminal army comes into direct armed 
confrontation with a competent disciplined one, the disciplined one, essentially by definition, will 
prevail.”  
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without ever directly addressing how armed groups who are removed from positions 
of power are likely to react (Paris 1997; Paris 2004).  
Four issues lie at the heart of these differing assessments concerning the 
importance and likelihood of success of military enforcement: the nature of target state 
actors, the nature of the interveners, the high levels of uncertainty inherent in any use 
of force, and the likelihood that positive (non-coercive) inducements can bring about 
decisive political change.  
One line of argumentation contends that military enforcement may be 
appropriate and even necessary in certain environments while counter-productive in 
others. Stephen Stedman’s well-known concept of “spoilers,” for instance, 
distinguishes between “limited” spoilers (to whom positive incentives for cooperation 
should be offered), “total” spoilers (who must be coerced), and “greedy” spoilers (with 
whom interveners should adopt a combination of positive and negative inducements) 
(Stedman 1997). Doyle and Sambanis distinguish between interventions into 
“coordination games,” where interveners need only provide the coordination point and 
transparency local actors need to realize mutually beneficial political arrangements, 
and “cooperation games,” where interveners must alter the relative costs of 
cooperation and conflict for local parties, potentially through the use of military force 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Such clear distinctions tend to break down in practice, 
however, as these authors themselves recognize (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 51), 
suggesting that they are often better understood as poles of a continuum. When these 
concepts are used to explain the conditions under which outside interveners can bring 
peace to war-stricken countries, there may well be numerous empirical instances of 
pure coordination games (or limited spoilers), because war exhaustion may induce the 
local parties to seek peace, so long as their basic interests are accommodated in a post- 
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war political order.
21 When these concepts are applied to external attempts to bring 
about regime change, however, there are likely to be few empirical instances of pure 
coordination games, for the simple reason that regime change by definition directly 
threatens the political interests of some local actors. Armed actors who expect to lose 
free and fair elections are likely to oppose such elections, and no positive inducements 
– short of a guarantee of political prerogatives proportionate to the party’s armed 
strength – are likely to sway these parties towards cooperation. Thus the use or threat 
of armed force is likely to exercise a pervasive influence on the outcomes of 
interventions designed to promote substantial change towards either autocracy or 
democracy. This is not to say that military enforcement actions will necessarily be 
successful, but they will at the least be highly relevant in the vast majority of cases.  
Much of the literature also fails to make sufficiently clear a second important 
distinction – that between UN and non-UN interventions. The UN, many scholars 
argue, has a comparative advantage in interventions derived from its perceived 
legitimacy, its administrative capacities, and its institutional checks that aim to prevent 
any single intervener from realizing narrowly self-interested goals at the expense of 
the target state (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). Often there is considerable 
overlap between missions initiated by the UN and those initiated by particular powers, 
and quantitative analyses have difficulty in disentangling the effects that may be 
attributed to the UN.
22 Indeed, often the coding decisions used in quantitative analyses 
obscure more than they elucidate. Studies by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and by 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005), for instance, code as a UN operation any 
intervention that “took place in the context of a UN mandate.” Thus the post-Dayton 
intervention in Bosnia is coded as a UN intervention, not one undertaken by the 
                                                 
21 The classic statement on war exhaustion and “ripeness” for war termination is Zartman’s (1985). 
22 A point acknowledged by Pickering and Peceny (2006, 553), who call for in-depth qualitative studies 
of these cases.  
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United States and its allies. This coding choice was made despite the fact that the 
drafters of the Dayton accords sought to keep the UN at arms-distance from any 
significant role in Bosnia, leaving the world body with only highly circumscribed 
duties in unarmed police monitoring and assistance in refugee resettlement, while the 
use of military force, the provision of reconstruction assistance, and the exercise of 
quasi-trusteeship political powers were all authorities retained by coalitions of states 
outside of the UN system. 
More fundamentally, if the use or threat of force is as omnipresent in efforts to 
promote regime change as was suggested in the discussion above, then a focus on the 
UN misses much of the underlying dynamics even within UN-flagged operations. 
When it comes to using force, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in UN missions 
overwhelmingly operate on a national basis, retaining the right to interpret a mission’s 
mandate and rules of engagement and the right to refuse participation in any activities 
deemed unacceptable. Moreover, it is states that vote on a UN mission’s mandate in 
the first place, and it is states that determine the troop and funding levels available to 
pursue that mandate. This basic point was highlighted by the single most authoritative 
study on the subject of UN peace operations, conducted by the UN itself – the so-
called Brahimi Report (“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” 
2000). Thus, studies may be technically correct in ascribing failures of UN peace 
operations to “inappropriate mandates” or inadequate levels of material support. But 
these failures themselves are usually best understood through an examination of states’ 
policies. 
This study therefore focuses on the motives, perceptions, and interests of 
states. Such a perspective not only sheds light on the outcomes of missions led by 
states outside of a UN framework, it also reveals much about the variation in outcomes 
among UN operations as well.  
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The role of uncertainty in the use of force is yet a third point concerning the 
likely success of military enforcement actions that is obscured by much of the existing 
literature. Some scholars within a single work criticize both the use of force and the 
non-use of force, without ever specifying ex ante the conditions under which force is 
appropriate or the manner in which it should be exercised. Other scholars dismiss the 
utility of force altogether, but for certain exceptions – which, again, remain 
unspecified. Thus Bellamy and Williams (2004, 200) for instance write that “there are 
always ‘better’ (more efficient in terms of financial and human resources and more 
effective in addressing the causes of violence and human suffering) ways of promoting 
order, human rights and welfare, preventing war and resolving violent conflict than 
resorting to military force. That said, force may be necessary in exceptional 
circumstances.” The reader is often left with the impression that uses of force that 
succeed are good, while those that fail are bad.  
Undoubtedly there is much to be said about ways in which military 
enforcement actions could be performed better and about the circumstances in which 
they are appropriate at all. At the same time, the ambiguity of many authors may 
derive less from the weaknesses of their specific analyses and more from the nature of 
the subject itself. Carl von Clausewitz, one of the founders of modern strategic 
thought, is famous for his argument that even discrete uses of force tend to have 
unpredictable consequences (Clausewitz [1832] 1976). More recent academic studies 
of military operations in general and interventions in particular have commonly made 
the same point (Betts 2000, Brown 2003, Kupchan 1992, Garofano 2002). While the 
likely outcomes of uses of force may be predictable at some level, this study begins 
from the empirical fact that there is a high level of uncertainty associated with military 
instruments. Higher-intensity uses of force may be an inherently risky proposition, 
associated with both inspiring successes and spectacular failures. Given this level of  
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uncertainty, different interveners are likely to reach divergent assessments of the 
utility of force. 
Finally, much of the existing literature fails to make clear that both coercive 
and non-coercive instruments have their inherent risks. The obvious risk of military 
enforcement is that it will spark spirals of violence that exceed an intervener’s 
commitment to the intervention. Yet relying on positive inducements risks political 
stagnation and even the strengthening of predatory elites. Proponents of less coercive 
tactics commonly argue that the cooperation of warlords must be secured in the early 
phases of state-building in order to restore peace and order, but over time politics will 
evolve (nudged forward by international actors) towards greater representativeness 
and accountability as all parties become more secure and the benefits of cooperation 
more visible. While such an outcome is certainly possible, two powerful dynamics 
work against it. First, much of the literature on democratic transitions stresses the path 
dependence of democratization and the tendency of the institutions in place at the time 
of “founding elections” to become highly resistant to change (especially O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986). Consequently, paramilitarized factions are frequently able to 
“lock in” their initial advantages, preserving institutions that favor powersharing 
among an elect oligarchy over efficiency in producing public goods (Rothchild and 
Roeder 2005; Bunce 2005, especially 22-23). Second, to the extent that armed factions 
retain both their paramilitary capabilities and control over illicit economies, they are 
able to maintain powerful patronage networks and extragovernmental enforcement of 
their oligarchic privileges. This combination of dysfunctional governmental 
institutions and over-functioning illicit networks may endure indefinitely (King 2001). 
In the meantime, the paralysis of government encourages both economic stagnation 
and a culture of corruption, while those young and able typically flee for better 
opportunities overseas. Both democracy and democrats are discredited by their failure  
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to produce public goods (Diamond 1999, Chapter 5). And the balance of power among 
the dominant factions remains highly fragile and susceptible to relapse into violent 
conflict (Rothchild and Roeder 2005), subject as it is to disruption by exogenous 
shocks such as a decisive shift in the population ratios of different ethnic groups, a 
change in leadership of one of the parties, or a change of government in a potentially 
meddlesome neighboring country.  
This review of the literature on military enforcement suggests four important 
conclusions for understanding the role of force in interventions. First, there is an 
intimate relationship between force and political authority in the circumstances in 
which military interventions occur, and thus the use or threat of force is likely to 
exercise a pervasive effect on political outcomes in the course of an intervention. 
Second, while the UN and NGOs are effective administrators of capacity-building 
programs, states are still the actors that deploy the military forces necessary to shape 
the underlying political dynamics of target states. Thus we must understand the 
motives, perceptions, and commitment of intervening states to understand the range of 
political outcomes likely to result from an intervention. Third, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty inherent in the use of force, and this uncertainty means that various states 
will behave differently when facing the decision to confront or co-opt target-state 
actors. Finally, both the use of force and the non-use of force exercise a profound 
impact on the outcome of interventions. Focusing on catastrophic uses of force, such 
as UNOSOM II in Somalia, without recognizing the risks inherent in the non-use of 
force skews our overall understanding of interventions.  
National Interests 
Intentions. Quantitative studies of democracy promotion through intervention 
have generally assumed that intervening states pursue identical strategies regardless of  
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the circumstances in which they are intervening. Failure to promote democracy in any 
instance has been read as evidence against the intention of ever doing so (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs 2006). Such an assumption flies in the face of both the empirical 
literature on interventions and the theoretical literature on democracy promotion. The 
empirical literature on peace operations, for instance, has repeatedly made the point 
that Africa receives vastly less diplomatic attention and fewer material resources than 
such regions as the Balkans that are of particular interest to wealthy great powers (for 
instance Bellamy and Williams 2004b, 196-7). The theoretical literature makes clear 
why intervening states are likely to pursue different strategies at different levels of 
commitment. First, democracy promotion is both a difficult and hazardous enterprise. 
While relatively consolidated democracies appear to be more stable than autocracies, 
transitional states tend to be highly unstable (Hegre et al 2001; for a contrasting view, 
see Ghandi and Vreeland 2004). Consequently, even if an intervening state’s first 
preference might be the promotion of democracy, if it is unwilling to dedicate 
substantial resources to the enterprise, it may choose to abandon the democratic 
project altogether. Second, as discussed above, intrusive efforts to reorient the politics 
of other states are likely to provoke violent confrontations with parties in the target 
state who benefit from the status quo. Without some substantial degree of national 
interest at stake, decision-makers in the intervening country may be highly reluctant to 
risk escalating a conflict, even though doing so will prevent the realization of the 
decision-makers’ first-order preferences.  
Outcomes. Just as recent quantitative analyses have ignored the relative 
importance of the target state to the intervening power when assessing the motives of 
interveners, they have also ignored them in assessing outcomes. This choice is a 
peculiar one for a number of reasons. First, as discussed immediately above, the stakes  
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influence the approach that an intervener adopts and the resources an intervener brings 
to bear, both of which should influence the outcomes of an intervention. Moreover, 
these resources cannot be understood simply in terms of soldiers deployed or dollars 
spent on aid. More important than such numbers is what is done with them. Do 
soldiers aggressively pursue their mandate, or are they primarily engaged in self-
protection? Is aid spent to bolster a faltering autocratic regime, or is it disbursed with 
stringent conditionality requirements incorporating good governance principles? 
Beyond the question of how an intervener acts, there is also the question of how it is 
perceived to act. In previous studies of extended deterrence, scholars contended that 
third parties were more likely to deter an attack on an ally when such an attack would 
threaten significant interests of the deterring state (Huth and Russett 1984). Similarly, 
in interventions armed factions in the target state are more likely to be deterred from 
attacking an intervener if they believe that the intervener has significant interests at 
stake in the mission. Otherwise, target-state actors are more likely to calculate that the 
intervener is a paper tiger, unwilling to absorb significant costs – measured 
particularly in soldiers’ lives – to impose its preferred political institutions.  
Existing studies of military interventions have provided a wealth of theoretical 
concepts and empirical information from which we can better understand military 
interventions. Relatively few, however, have looked at how the perceptions, motives, 
and domestic political constraints of intervening powers interact to shape the strategies 
that they adopt and thus the outcomes that are relatively more likely to emerge. With 
an understanding of the prior literature and its limitations, we can now turn to an 
integrated theory of comparative military interventions.  
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A Theory of Interventions 
High levels of uncertainty lie at the heart of military interventions. It is easy to 
be skeptical of ambitious attempts to impose democracy in foreign states. Yet the two 
other major regime types, anocracy and autocracy, are equally problematic: As 
numerous scholarly studies make clear, anocracy may well be the least stable of all 
regime types, while autocracies are likely more stable than anocracies but less stable 
than democracies and more prone to bloody repression of politically excluded groups 
(Hegre et al 2001). Outside powers may instead adopt less ambitious goals that do not 
seek to shape the political authority structures of the target state – goals such as the 
amelioration of human suffering or the containment of a conflict within the borders of 
a single state. Yet such goals also often prove to be highly problematic (Betts 1994). If 
the decision is made to intervene at all, then an intervener faces a dilemma in the true 
sense of the word, where all alternatives are unattractive and the least bad option is the 
best available. When confronting this dilemma, different intervening states adopt 
different approaches to intervention based on three variables: the regime type, 
strategic culture, and interests of the intervening state or states. Various conjunctions 
of these three variables determine which of three broad approaches interveners choose: 
the transformation, mediation, and proxy models of intervention. These approaches, in 
turn, profoundly influence the outcomes of intervention. The remainder of this section 
will proceed in three steps, examining first the preferences of interveners, then the 
structure of intervention strategies and their ramifications for the politics of the target 
state, and finally predictions about the approaches chosen by interveners and the 
concomitant range of intervention outcomes that is more or less likely as a result.  
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Independent Variables: The Sources of Intervener Strategies 
Given the dilemmas posed by interventions, how do different interveners 
respond? In general countries tend to externalize their own political and military 
cultures. Democracies commonly think that democracy is both feasible and the best 
long-term means of stabilizing unstable regions. Countries that have come to believe 
through past experience that the projection of military force can achieve important 
political outcomes are more likely to use force to secure their preferred outcome. Thus 
democracies with militarized strategic cultures are more likely to use force to 
marginalize “spoilers” and attempt to promote higher-order democracy. Actors in 
autocracies and quasi-democracies, on the other hand, tend to view democracy 
promotion with extreme skepticism, seeing it either as misguided idealism or as cover 
for the pursuit of geopolitical and economic interests (for instance Kosachev 2004). 
Similarly, those in non-militarist states often perceive the use of force to promote 
democracy as a form of irrationality inspired by domestic political psychoses or 
Manichean worldviews (for instance Bahners 2004).  
Regime Type. The notion that countries tend to externalize their own domestic 
norms of governance is a common one, appearing in the normative strain of the 
democratic peace literature (Doyle 1983a and 1983b; Russett 1993; Owen 1997; 
Weart 1998), in studies of foreign aid and international law (Lumsdaine 1993; 
Nadelmann 1990; Reus-Smit 1999), and in theories of alliance formation and armed 
intervention (Lang 2002; Owen 2002; Walt 1987). More recently a broad empirical 
study has found that democracy assistance (both technical and diplomatic support) is 
strongly correlated with the regime type of the state providing assistance (Herman and 
Piccone 2002). Thus it should come as no surprise that democracies tend to promote  
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democracy while autocracies generally undermine the potential for democratic change 
abroad. 
At the same time, the relationship is not so simple. Many leaders are skeptical 
that targets of intervention have the social prerequisites for democratic change, or they 
may believe that democracy is highly vulnerable to foreign subversion (for instance 
Kirkpatrick 1979). Institutions and bureaucracies may be highly averse to taking on 
the risks of regime change (Western 2002). And populations may shy away from the 
costs of democracy promotion or regime change (Holsti 2000; Jentleson 1992; 
Jentleson and Britton 1998). Rather than seeing democracy promotion as a monolithic 
strategy invariably pursued from the highest levels of the state, it is better to 
understand it as a contingent but probable outcome, one emerging from the interaction 
of top policy-makers, institutions and bureaucracies, and general populations (Peceny 
1995). In some cases decision-makers may strongly believe in democracy promotion. 
In other instances top leaders may not believe that democracy is a realistic goal but 
may be pushed towards promoting more representative government as a condition for 
gaining domestic support for a foreign policy, such as occurred during the Reagan 
Administration’s domestic battles over its Central American strategy (Carothers 1991; 
Karl 1996). In yet other cases policymakers may find themselves dependent on 
organizations with pro-democracy mandates – such as the UN or NGOs – to 
implement their plans. Thus a “concatenation” of causal pathways and mechanisms 
(Gambetta 1998) is responsible for the pro-democracy tendencies of interventions 
undertaken by democratic states. 
This is not to say that democracies always seek to promote democracy. In 
many instances they are daunted by the challenges of democracy-building in 
underdeveloped regions of the world, or they are unable to marshal the resources 
necessary for such an enormous task, or they have built cooperative relationships with  
40 
unpalatable regimes for security reasons. Where the available resources for promoting 
democratic transitions are low, the challenges are great, and the risks of alienating 
existing elites are high, democracies commonly jettison any qualms they may have 
about cooperation with autocratic regimes. Where democracies intervene in small-
scale or covert operations, where public scrutiny is minimal and the resources to 
manage a dangerous transition are limited, democratic interveners also act in very 
undemocratic ways. But where the resources expended are great, offering substantial 
sources of leverage over the target state’s politics and requiring public justification for 
the risks and costs endured, democracies tend to externalize their own systems of 
governance. 
The tendency of non-democracies to undermine the opportunities for 
democracy abroad is an equally complex and probabilistic phenomenon. In some cases 
non-democracies such as the Soviet Union actively seek to propagate non-democratic 
political institutions for ideological reasons. More often, however, and particularly in 
the post-Cold War era, non-democratic elites simply do not value democracy (a 
principled belief, to borrow again from Goldstein and Keohane), or they do not believe 
that it is achievable except in certain narrowly defined circumstances (a causal belief). 
The latter view is particularly common among transitional or “hyphenated” states – 
that is, those that cannot be considered mature democracies but that also are not closed 
autocracies. Such states may value democracy and may aspire to become democracies 
themselves, but precisely because they occupy an intermediate position, they 
recognize the enormous difficulties inherent in democratic transitions. Moreover, the 
same mechanisms that constrain decision-makers’ latitude for action in mature 
democracies do not operate in non-democracies. In particular, while elites in 
democracies may not favor democracy promotion, they are typically constrained by 
checks and balances within the system. Although public opinion and legislatures only  
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imperfectly constrain executive action, there is a political price to be paid in 
democracies for militarily supporting repressive dictatorships (Peceny 1995). As will 
be seen in the case study of Russian interventionism in the following chapter, such 
mechanisms do not operate in non-democracies. Thus, when non-democratic elites 
confront the daunting challenges of restructuring another state’s political authority 
structures, they are less likely to believe that promoting a relatively more democratic 
system is possible, and they are highly unlikely to be constrained from supporting 
less-than-democratic regimes abroad. 
Strategic Culture. Different countries clearly think about military force in 
different ways. This is not to say that opinion is unified within a country; obviously, 
decisions about when and how to use force are commonly the subject of bitter 
domestic debate between political parties and between different branches of the 
government (Avant 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Rathbun 2004). But numerous scholars 
have found relatively consistent patterns of divergent beliefs about the efficacy of 
force among states in the contemporary era, whether judging by behavior or public 
opinion. By a variety of metrics such countries as the United States, United Kingdom, 
Israel, India, Pakistan, and Russia typically rank among the most prone to use force, 
while postwar Germany, postwar Japan, Belgium, and New Zealand are among those 
least likely (Asmus, Everts, and Isernia 2004; Maoz 2004; Müller 2004).  
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Beginning with the work of Jack Snyder (1979),
23 scholars have explored the 
concept of “strategic culture” to explain why states adopt such divergent patterns of 
behavior. While the concept has evolved considerably over the years, the term is 
perhaps best understood to indicate “an integrated system of symbols (i.e., 
argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the 
role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem 
uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston 1995, 36, emphasis added).  
Although useful, such a definition may still encompass a wide range of 
approaches to the subject. In this study I adopt a broad and empirical understanding of 
strategic culture, without seeking to make a definitive statement about its origins or 
nature. Strategic cultures are doubtless influenced by such factors as a country’s level 
of development, the timing of its development (i.e., early or late), regime type, prior 
experience with war, military bureaucracies, and the contingent outcomes of domestic 
political debates (Merom 2003; Snyder 1991; Cederman 2001; Kier 1997; Katzenstein 
1996). Here, however, it is sufficient to know that various states have internalized 
                                                 
23 It is important to note that Snyder subsequently came to express considerable reservations about the 
utility of the concept, arguing that, “[a]s a rule, culture is an explanation of last resort,” and that 
“culture,” as he used the term, was simply an expression of the phenomenon in which rational solutions 
to a given set of material circumstances become “locked in” and resistant to change even after those 
initial material circumstances change (1990, 4). Snyder’s later misgivings notwithstanding, the concept 
of strategic culture remains a valuable one for the purposes of this study. First, many others have 
developed the concept and found it useful in explaining a variety of otherwise puzzling political 
phenomena, ranging from European warfighting doctrine in the World Wars to continuities in Chinese 
strategic throught over several centuries. Second, although this study does not seek to provide an 
account of the origins of divergent strategic cultures, it may well be that these cultures evolved very 
much in the terms that Snyder describes – that is, as rational adaptations to a given set of material 
circumstances that over time become resistant to change. It is notable that the least militarized countries 
in this study – Germany and Italy (and Japan, although it has not deployed enough combat troops to 
qualify as an “intervener”) suffered traumatic defeats in World War II, while the most militarized 
countries – the United States and Britain – have never in recent memory suffered military defeat on 
their home soil. France, an intermediate case, was both a victor and victim of World War II, and it 
suffered the traumatic loss of part of its “home” territory in Algeria. Thus the strategic cultures of 
interest here may indeed have evolved much as Snyder might expect – originally as rational adaptations 
to traumatic defeats in war.  
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patterns of thinking – both at the level of policy elites and in the public as a whole – 
that make the use of force seem relatively more or less efficacious and acceptable as a 
policy instrument for shaping international politics. In reality, of course, strategic 
cultures are vastly more nuanced than can be expressed by a simple more-or-less 
dichotomy. States may be relatively more prone to use force in certain contexts, such 
as within a UN-mandated, multilateral peace operation, while being vehemently 
opposed to the use of force in other contexts, such as a unilateralist invasion. Strongly 
pacifist groups and militarists may (and in fact often do) co-exist within a single 
polity, with institutions or triggering events playing key roles in determining the 
relative influence of each on policy outcomes. Finally, strategic cultures are not fixed, 
but evolve over time in response to both historical events and the manner in which the 
lessons of those events are internalized (Katzenstein 1996).
24 This study makes a 
conscious gamble, sacrificing intention for the sake of extension (Sartori 1970, 1044). 
By simplifying strategic cultures into a single axis of comparison (more or less 
militarized), we can understand many disparate intervening states’ broad orientations 
towards the use of force while acknowledging more subtle variations in the case 
studies to follow. Such orientations do not determine how a country will act in any 
given instance, but they make the resort to force more or less likely.  
The extent to which an intervener’s strategic culture is militarized influences 
the conduct and outcomes of interventions in two ways: through what it does and 
through what target-country populations expect it will (or might) do. Wherever 
possible it is preferable to maintain order during an intervention through indigenous 
police. When they are unable or unwilling to enforce the laws, international police 
with executive authority may be necessary. But in cases of state failure, indigenous 
                                                 
24 Once internalized, however, these strategic cultures tend to be relatively resistant to change, at least 
in the medium-term (one or more generations) and absent a traumatic national event that precipitates 
public reflection, and they exercise powerful effects beyond the context in which they initially evolved.   
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groups frequently possess vastly more numbers and firepower than the police. In such 
cases the police operate only to the extent that they are tolerated (or co-opted) by these 
local militias – unless an external intervening military has made it clear that they will 
respond to any attacks on the police and will enforce those laws so threatening to 
various paramilitary groupings that the police do not dare to do so. Militarized 
interveners are more likely to use their forces so as to maintain order against 
paramilitaries, at least in those interventions which are a priority for the intervener. 
They are also more likely to be perceived as able and willing to do so, thus deterring 
many indigenous armed groupings from directly challenging the intervening state or 
coalition. In such cases a militarized intervener’s greatest contributions to maintaining 
order may be invisible – but no less effective (indeed, perhaps more so) for operating 
only in the background. 
The measurement of strategic culture will be discussed at length in the next 
chapter. Here, however, it is important to note that strategic culture and military 
capabilities are distinct concepts. In some countries such as the United States powerful 
capabilities and a highly militarized strategic culture coincide. In numerous other 
cases they sharply diverge. Germany, for instance, has substantial military capabilities 
but a strategic culture generally opposed to force projection, while Nigeria has 
relatively meager capabilities but a heavily militarized strategic culture, as may be 
seen in its leadership of regional peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. While 
capabilities certainly matter, they are less significant than strategic culture. Australia, 
for instance, led an aggressive and highly successful military intervention in East 
Timor, despite possessing modest military means. Britain and France possess 
comparable capabilities, but Britain ultimately proved willing to lead an international 
military response to the provocations of the warlord Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone,  
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while France has typically adopted a more laissez faire approach.
25 As will be seen 
below, these differences in national style are highly consequential; outcomes are 
influenced more strongly by strategic cultures than by capabilities. 
National Interests and Resource Constraints. While the regime type and 
strategic culture of an intervener reveal much about its preferences for constructing 
order through military interventions, states are not always able to act upon their first-
order preferences for lack of resources. Military interventions are costly. They require 
the investment of considerable money, political capital, and frequently soldiers’ lives. 
As a result decision-makers must prioritize where they will expend scarce resources, 
and they typically use their rough estimates of “the national interest” as a guide. 
Indeed, the American academic literature over the past two decades has been replete 
with warnings of “imperial overstretch” and the need to limit American involvement 
in peripheral conflicts so as to preserve resources for critical priorities, be they the 
domestic economy or rising potential competitors (Art 2003, 232-3; Carter and Perry 
1999; Clarke and Halper 2004; Gaddis 1982; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Kupchan 
1994). In general, resource constraints will force interveners to adopt less costly forms 
of intervention in cases where their national interests are not engaged, while more 
costly alternatives will be feasible in target countries of higher priority. Such an 
assumption underpinned a number of studies on extended deterrence during the Cold 
War, with would-be deterrers significantly more likely to intervene on behalf of their 
                                                 
25 France is a rather peculiar case. According to the measurements described in detail in the next 
chapter, France is an intermediate case – much less militarized than the United States or United 
Kingdom, but much more militarized than Germany, France, or Belgium. Rather than having 
“intermediate” preferences, however, France seems to have conflicting preferences. In general French 
society has rejected high-intensity uses of force in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The 
French military, chastened by its experiences in Algeria and Indochina, is typically skeptical of 
intrusive interventions, although it is willing to undertake more limited uses of force. The president and 
the offices reporting directly to him (potentially “her” in the near future) have typically been more 
interventionist, particularly in Francophone Africa, but the executive is usually constrained from 
undertaking large-scale, high-risk operations by other French political actors (Moisi 1984).  
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client states when tangible and intangible interests were at stake (Huth and Russett 
1984, especially 503).  
Specifying the “national interest” ex ante is of course difficult (Wolfers 1962, 
especially 147). Yet scholars have nonetheless found that the willingness to bear the 
costs associated with force projection can be predicted. Huth and Russett’s (1984) 
analysis of extended deterrence, for instance, was premised on the notion that 
deterrent threats would be more credible when the would-be deterrer had significant 
interests at stake in the target state; otherwise the threatening country would be 
unconvinced of the deterrer’s willingness to pay the price for defending the target. 
Although more precise operationationalizations of interests will follow in the next 
chapter and in the appendices, it is worth noting that Huth and Russett (1984) use as 
proxies such variables as military bases, formal alliances, and volume of trade. In the 
post-Cold War era, similar interests – such as maintaining the vitality of the NATO 
alliance and preventing an exodus of costly refugees – frequently influenced the 
willingness of intervening states to commit substantial resources to an intervention. 
Specifying these interests ex ante rather than inferring them from behavior in the 
course of an intervention is of course necessary to avoid logical circularity. 
The correlation of interests and committed resources is imperfect. There are 
some instances, such as Somalia in the early Clinton administration, where intervening 
states have been much more aggressive than might have been expected given the 
limited interests at stake. In other cases, such as Afghanistan in the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, interveners have committed far fewer resources 
than observers expected. In general, however, such divergences from the predicted 
level of commitment tend to be self-correcting over time, at least in part. Following an 
aggressive pursuit of the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, the United States 
suffered 18 fatalities in a single firefight in Mogadishu and rapidly recalibrated its  
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intervention, hunkering down in bunkers for a few months before a planned 
withdrawal. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the Bush administration ramped up its 
commitment to the country after two years of a minimalist intervention, more than 
doubling the soldiers and money committed to the Central Asian state and making it 
one of the largest interventions in the post-Cold War era.
26 Thus, although the 
correlation of interests and resource commitments is imperfect, the exceptions suggest 
that the overall relation is quite strong. 
The conjunction of these three factors – the regime type, strategic culture, and 
resource constraints of the intervening state or coalition – determine the broad outlines 
of the strategies pursued and the outcomes that are more probable in the course of the 
intervention. 
Dependent Variables: The Structure of Political Authority in Target States 
Three Models of Intervention. Interventions in the post-Cold War era have 
almost uniformly been undertaken to restore order to weak and failed states (Bunce 
2005). In the case of the one major exception, Iraq, the intervention quickly created an 
extremely weak or failed state.
27 In such cases, where the state has lost its former 
                                                 
26 Even after doubling the resources committed to Afghanistan, the Bush administration was faulted by 
many observers for what was perceived as its inadequate support, particularly in comparison to the Iraq 
war and on a per capita basis to the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the resources committed to Afghanistan were indeed much less 
than the need. But when one compares, for instance, absolute numbers of soldiers deployed or fatalities 
endured, the only intervention that clearly exceeded the commitment to Afghanistan was Iraq, while 
only Bosnia received comparable numbers of soldiers or claimed a similar magnitude of intervening 
soldiers’ lives. 
27 Other possible exceptions include the American invasion of Panama, the ongoing Turkish occupation 
of Northern Cyprus and the Russian interventions in the break-away republics of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and Transdniestr. Panama was also not a weak or failed state before the American invasion, 
and the United States was successful in imposing a new political order relatively quickly. The Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus was undertaken not so much to restore order as to protect ethnic Turkish 
Cypriots and secure strategic advantage against Greece. The Russian interventions were undertaken 
with mixed motives. For some powerful actors in Moscow the interventions were motivated by the 
desire to keep Georgia and Moldova weak and subject to Moscow’s control, although others acted on 
the basis of more positive motives (Lynch 2000; Shenfield 1995).  
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monopoly on violence and anarchy predominates, armed factions quickly become the 
dominant actors. Unarmed actors for the most part are either cowed into irrelevance by 
the threat of violence, or they develop their own paramilitary capabilities. Meanwhile, 
throughout the course of fighting, armed groups strengthen their position by 
intensifying intra-group loyalties and by developing their control of illicit economies 
in order to purchase both the materiel with which to fight and the loyalty of the cadres 
to do the fighting (Kaldor 1999). Even when armed factions come to favor an end to 
fighting – whether because of a hurting stalemate, war exhaustion, or some other 
mechanism – they are unlikely to relinquish the privileged political status that they 
have acquired during the period of anarchy. Thus international interventions designed 
to promote political stability must reckon with the dominant position of these factions. 
Intervening powers may hypothetically pursue one of four strategies, 
depending on the extent to which both armed and unarmed actors in the target state are 
included in political authority structures. On the one hand interveners can accept the 
predominance of paramilitarized factions as a given and do relatively little to 
strengthen the position of unarmed groups in the politics of the target state. In such a 
case the intervener can adopt one of two strategies, either strengthening a single 
faction so that it can impose its rule against all challengers (the proxy model of 
intervention), or the intervener can incorporate all armed factions into a single 
powersharing arrangement or “government of national reconciliation” (the mediation 
model of intervention). On the other hand interveners can attempt to weaken the 
position of these armed factions. They can do so, in the words of William Zartman, 
either by making the powerful legitimate (that is, by making armed factions into 
political parties accountable to unarmed elements of civil society and the electorate as 
a whole) or by making the legitimate powerful (that is, by marginalizing 
paramilitarized groups and ensuring that political groups drawn from civil society  
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become the custodians of a democratic state wielding a monopoly over violence) 
(Zartman 1995, 270). The strategy of making the powerful legitimate may be termed 
the transformation model of intervention in that it transforms the nature of the 
dominant political actors. While it is also hypothetically possible to make the 
legitimate powerful, in practice intervening states in the post-Cold War era have 
almost uniformly avoided such an approach.
28 Each of these approaches to 
intervention has implications for both the level of democracy promoted within the 
target state and the likelihood of violent confrontation between local factions and 
intervening forces, as may be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: Approaches to Intervention 
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Democracy. Democracy ultimately involves the demilitarization of politics. 
Thus, ideally interveners would marginalize armed actors while incorporating broadly 
representative unarmed groups in political authority structures. Again, however, 
                                                 
28 The major possible exception might be the American invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration 
attempted to marginalize nearly all armed actors in Iraq in the early stages of the intervention, most 
notably by decommissioning the entire Iraqi military. According to public statements, at least, the Bush 
administration was also committed to empowering unarmed actors through the creation of democracy in 
Iraq. Indeed, the singular approach of the Bush administration in the early days of the intervention 
might in part explain the horrific outcomes of the ambitious enterprise. In practice, however, the United 
States relatively quickly came to an accommodation with the various Shiite and Kurdish paramilitaries 
and sought to reach accommodation with many of the Suni factions as well, making the intervention a 
case of (thus-far failed) transformation.  
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interveners in the post-Cold War era have almost universally shunned such an 
approach – usually for very practical reasons. In the circumstances which prevail 
during interventions, when the state has temporarily lost its monopoly on violence, 
armed groups are typically too well entrenched in social and political structures to be 
marginalized easily. Beyond their military potential, they commonly have come to 
dominate illicit economies and may garner substantial popular loyalty through the 
patronage networks funded by such economies and through their role as armed 
protectors of constituent sub-populations. Thus interveners seeking to promote 
democracy have typically opted for a second-best option, including the existing armed 
factions whenever possible, but attempting to make them accountable to the 
population at large through the development of effective means of political 
participation, including the organization of civil society groups and the empowerment 
of the electorate through meaningful elections. In time such a strategy may transform 
the armed groups themselves through electoral competition and opportunities for 
sharing in legitimate political power (Manning 2004).  
The mediation approach may facilitate some degree of democratization, but it 
subordinates the goal of democracy to the creation of structures fostering peaceful co-
existence among existing armed factions. The precise content of such arrangements 
will differ somewhat depending on the context, although they have typically taken the 
form of consociationalism in multiethnic contexts or “reserved powers” for ancien 
regime military forces in transitions from authoritarian regimes. The fundamental 
bargain in either of these situations is the same: the sacrifice of some degree of 
external control over government in order to accommodate all political elites with the 
potential to militarily threaten the stability of the state.
29 
                                                 
29 The literatures on both forms of elite accommodation are enormous. The classical statement on 
consociationalism is Lijphart’s (1977); for a recent criticism of consociationalism, see Roeder and 
Rothchild (2005). The foundational work for much of the literature on transitions from military 
dictatorship is O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; see also Yashar 1997.  
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Finally, the proxy model of intervention almost uniformly causes the 
autocratization of a state. Not only are unarmed elements of civil society excluded 
from participation in governance, but so are most armed groups. The intervening state 
seeks to buttress a single armed party (or coalition of parties) at the expense of others, 
thus creating a government with a narrow base of support that depends for its 
continued survival on the forcible repression of all challengers. 
Violence. Each of these models also has implications for the level of violence 
targeted at intervening forces. Rationalist theories of politics almost universally begin 
from the assumption that office-holders seek to retain office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003). Whatever the limitations of such an assumption in the context of relatively 
stable, democratic polities, it proves a highly accurate description of the vast majority 
of elites in extremely weak and failed states, where loss of political power very 
commonly means not only loss of prestige and economic opportunities, but also 
potentially physical elimination by hostile factions (Walter 1999; Walter 2002) or 
arrest and trial by international war crimes tribunals. We should thus expect to see 
armed factions resist direct threats to their continued hold on political power. Such 
threats may originate from either armed or unarmed sources: either from defeat by 
other armed factions or from removal from office through loss of democratic elections. 
An intervener may minimize violence directed at its own forces by guaranteeing 
political power to armed factions in proportion to their relative military capabilities.
30 
The mediation model follows such a logic, accommodating armed elites so as not to 
trigger a violent backlash. The other two models of intervention, however, threaten 
armed factions’ continued political preeminence: the proxy model, by threatening non-
favored factions with military defeat by the intervener’s preferred faction, and the 
                                                 
30 This is the baseline assumption of Fearon’s (1995) work on rationalist explanations of war.  
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transformation model, by threatening armed factions which cannot transform 
themselves with defeat at the polls. Consequently, all else being equal, interveners 
adopting the proxy and transformation models should face higher levels of violent 
confrontation with armed target-state actors than interveners adopting the mediation 
model. 
It is important to note that none of these models is inherently superior. Many 
observers have advocated the proxy model, believing that it offers the swiftest and 
surest route to political stability, with the potential for gradual evolution towards a 
more inclusive and representative polity in the longer term (Regan 1996; Regan 2000; 
Weinstein 2005). Among the risks inherent in this model, however, is the violent 
subjugation – even genocide – of defeated sub-populations. The transformation model 
promises the inclusion of all major political groupings in the target state. If democracy 
promotion is successful, it may well form the most promising foundation for political 
stability and economic growth. On the other hand, such an approach is the most 
ambitious and may easily provoke escalations of violence beyond what an intervener 
is willing to endure. Finally, the mediation model offers the possibility of promoting a 
more modest level of political stability and improvement without triggering a violent 
backlash by target-state actors. By accommodating armed factions with anti-
democratic preferences in a fragile power-sharing arrangement, however, it also risks 
consolidating political and economic stagnation.  
Predictions: Divergent Strategies and Multilateral Tensions 
Faced with these dilemmas of intervention, where all policy options are 
problematic, interveners’ approaches to intervention can be explained through the 
conjunction of the interveners’ regime types, strategic cultures, and national interests.  
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Interveners’ first preference is to externalize their own domestic norms of governance. 
Countries with non-militarized strategic cultures or with few national interests at stake 
in the target state, however, are unlikely to be willing to accept the costs inherent in 
imposing political change on armed parties in the target. Thus, the conjunction of the 
three independent variables yields the following predictions: (i) Militarized 
democracies with significant interests at stake in an intervention (and thus lower 
resource constraints) are likely to pursue higher-order democracy through the 
transformation model of intervention; (ii) militarized non-democracies with significant 
interests at stake in an intervention are likely to support a preferred proxy in the target 
state, thus helping to consolidate its autocratic control of the target; and (iii) all other 
types of interveners are likely to pursue the mediation model of intervention in order 
to minimize the likelihood of violent confrontation, thereby promoting at most a very 
modest amount of democratic change. The predicted pattern of outcomes is illustrated 
in Table 2.  
Table 2: Predicted Approaches of Intervening States 
   Inclusion of Armed Actors 
 






























Militarized democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom are 
more likely to pursue high-risk, high-reward strategies in which higher levels of 
political participation by unarmed elements of civil society and the electorate are  
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likely, but at the risk of higher levels of violence. The policies of such countries 
sometimes also display greater inconsistency than non-militarized democracies 
because militarized democracies may alternate between two different models of 
intervention, the transformation and mediation models, based on perceptions of how 
much risk can be accepted given the national interests at stake.  
Non-militarized democracies, in contrast, typically maintain greater 
consistency in their approach, with a consistent preference for the mediation model. 
They are also less likely to touch off escalating spirals of violence such as were seen 
in Somalia. They may make substantial contributions to peace and stability, 
particularly in less challenging intervention environments. Such states, however, risk 
being all but irrelevant in more difficult environments, and their dependence on 
mechanisms such as persuasion and inducement risks strengthening armed, autocratic 
elements in the targets of intervention by legitimizing them and helping them to 
maintain patronage networks as international aid is disbursed to purchase their 
cooperation.  
In weak and failed states where democracies have refused to intervene, 
militarized non-democracies have made significant but problematic contributions to 
peace and order in what may be termed a “regional sheriff” approach to policing 
unstable regions of the globe. Strong arguments can be made that Russia and Syria 
each were critical to the brokering and implementation of the Moscow Agreement and 
Ta’if Accords that ended the civil wars in Tajikistan and Lebanon respectively (Akiner 
2001; Barak 2003; Zahar 2005); a weaker argument can be made on behalf of 
Nigeria’s contribution to stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebajo 2002; Howe 
1996/97). In each of these cases non-democratic or quasi-democratic interveners 
brokered powersharing agreements and elections to help end fighting in neighboring 
countries. Unfortunately, the two instances in which the peace deals proved successful  
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– Tajikistan and Lebanon – may be examples of an “obsolescing bargain.”
31 In both of 
these cases the intervener initially sought to support a particular faction’s efforts to 
gain undisputed control over the government and exclude other factions (the proxy 
model). Only when the costs of supporting a single faction in an interminable war 
exceeded the intervener’s resource constraints did the intervening state adopt a more 
inclusive approach (the mediation model). But as the situation stabilized in the target 
countries, both Russia and Syria gradually began to backslide on their commitments 
and continued to support their favored faction over other contenders. After initial 
movement towards greater political inclusion in the wake of the peace agreements, 
both Tajikistan and Lebanon slid back towards autocracy while Moscow and 
Damascus still retained sizable military presences.
32  
The divergent preferences of different types of intervening state pose 
substantial challenges to multilateral cooperation in high-stakes interventions taking 
place in challenging circumstances. Multilateralism is unproblematic for non-
militarized states or those facing high resource constraints. In such cases interveners 
seek to minimize the risk of confrontation with armed factions in the target country by 
relying on their cooperation as much as possible, even if this weakens the prospects 
for promoting the intervener’s preferred form of government.  
Multilateralism is more problematic for committed, militarized interveners, 
whether democratic or undemocratic. In some cases there may be multilateral 
agreement to legitimize the intervention of a regionally powerful non-democracy – the 
“regional sheriff” approach described above – particularly in regions of little interest 
to other major powers. Such regional sheriffs are problematic, however. When they 
possess the resources to be most effective, they typically seek to impose autocratic 
                                                 
31 The term is used by David Lake (1991, 61), following Raymond Vernon (1971). 
32 Under strong international pressure Syria was eventually forced to recognize the “Cedar Revolution” 
in 2005 and withdraw its military and security forces from Lebanon. It remains unclear in which 
direction Tajikistan will head.  
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solutions to local instability, while they are more likely to accept more inclusive 
conflict regulation strategies in precisely those cases where resource constraints limit 
their commitment to the intervention. Militarized democracies, on the other hand, 
more commonly seek to use military force to marginalize “spoilers” who threaten 
democratic transitions, but the risks and costs of such an approach often prove 
unacceptable to broader coalitions, leading to considerable international tensions. In 
the NATO airstrikes over Kosovo, for instance, Germany placed a higher premium on 
seeking a negotiated solution to the crisis than did the United States. Consequently, 
Berlin was much more forward-leaning in seeking Russia’s collaboration in efforts to 
secure Serbian President Milosevic’s acquiescence to the stationing of an international 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Washington, on the other hand, was more skeptical of 
including Russia in diplomatic efforts at an early stage in the airstrikes, fearing that 
Russia would demand so many concessions on behalf of its client Serbia that either the 
resulting governmental structures for Kosovo would be completely stalemated and 
dysfunctional, or the province would be de facto partitioned. Thus, while always 
desirable, multilateral cooperation may be most achievable in precisely those 
interventions that are least likely to promote substantial democratic change. 
Research Design 
The following chapters provide the empirical substantiation for the analytical 
framework presented above. Recognizing that various research methods each have 
characteristic strengths and weaknesses, I rely on a combination of methods (Tarrow 
2004).  
In the next chapter I assess all instances of military intervention in the post-
Cold War era using fuzzy-set logic. Pioneered for the social sciences by Charles 
Ragin, fuzzy-set logic relies on set-theoretic relationships to make probabilistic claims  
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about the necessity and sufficiency of causal arguments (Ragin 2000; also Goertz 
2006). It is ideally suited for analyzing patterns of complex causation, including 
conjunctural causality and equifinality, among an intermediate number (medium-N) of 
cases where traditional statistical methods would lack sufficient data points to make 
statistically significant claims. By studying the entire universe of cases in the post-
Cold War era, I can avoid selection bias. By using a medium-N research design, I can 
make probabilistic and generalizable claims with clear and uniform standards.  
Fuzzy-set methods alone, however, are inadequate to substantiate causal 
arguments; they must be combined with case studies. In Chapters 3 through 6 I 
investigate the behavior of three intervening states – the United States, Germany, and 
Russia – in three cases of military intervention: Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. 
In order to avoid bias and observe the widest possible range of behavior, I chose cases 
with extreme values on the independent variables: The United States is a highly 
militarized democracy, Germany a highly non-militarized democracy, and Russia a 
highly militarized non-democracy.
33 The fourth potential type of intervener, a non-
militarized non-democracy, exists, but in practice such states play only very modest 
roles in military interventions.  
By examining the behavior of the same three intervening states in two very 
different circumstances – peace enforcement missions in the Balkans and counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency missions in Central Asia – we can combine what 
Przeworski and Teune (1970) term “most similar” and “most different” research 
designs. The Balkan and Central Asian interventions differ in almost every respect 
except the identities of the intervening states: the two regions are characterized by 
vastly different levels of development, cultures, political histories, and strategic stakes 
in the contemporary era. Thus, by studying the behavior of the same intervening state 
                                                 
33 On selecting cases based on extreme values for the independent variables, see King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994 and Gerring 2007. The measurement of variables will be addressed in the next chapter  
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in the radically different circumstances of the two regions, we can determine whether 
a particular intervener adopts a characteristic orientation towards interventions 
undertaken in highly dissimilar contexts. At the same time, in looking at the behavior 
of three very different outside powers in the same intervention, we can hold constant 
the effect of most exogenous variables – such as the level of development and ethnic 
heterogeneity of the target state or the strategic context – to observe how different 
actors behave in the same (or highly similar) conditions.
34  
These cases also prove useful in assessing the importance of the independent 
variables specified in the theory above relative to the many exogenous variables that 
might be said to account for observed outcomes. A variety of factors, such as levels of 
development, hostile neighbors, prior experience with democracy, ethnic 
heterogeneity, and others have been found to exercise significant effects on the 
likelihood that a state will democratize. Nearly all of these factors would suggest that 
both Bosnia and Afghanistan are “least likely cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 121-
122) for democratic change, so if we observe democracy promotion in these two 
instances, we should have relatively more confidence in these qualitative results.
35 
                                                 
34 Of course, we cannot “control” for all variables besides the regime type and strategic culture of the 
interveners. Perhaps most importantly, the United States and Germany could intervene in regions such 
as the former Yugoslavia without worrying that their behavior set a precedent for other countries to 
intervene militarily in their own affairs. Nor did they fear that Russia’s intervention in Tajikistan would 
provide Russia a base from which to extend its military influence up to their own borders. Russia, on 
the other hand, was very much concerned about the implications of American and NATO interventions 
for its own domestic security. These and other dissimilarities in strategic context will be noted and 
incorporated into the analysis of the case studies to follow. 
35 According to George and Bennett, “least likely” cases are those in which the independent variables of 
the theory being tested are only weakly present, or the independent variables of rival theories are 
strongly present. Bosnia and Afghanistan are least likely cases in this latter sense. The United States is 
an extreme example of a militarized democracy and thus would be expected to promote democracy, 
particularly in the post-Cold War era. The chances of successfully promoting democracy in Bosnia and 
Afghanistan, however, were not considered high prior to intervention, and thus even an actor biased 
towards democracy promotion might well decide that discretion is the better part of valor when 
confronting such a daunting task. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) characterize Bosnia as an extremely 
difficult implementation environment, and it receives Stephen Stedman’s (2001) highest difficulty 
score. More colloquially, Warren Christopher famously described Bosnia as “a problem from hell.” 
Even more daunting than Bosnia, Afghanistan represents as great a challenge to would-be democracy-
promoters as anywhere in the world.  
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Given the context of Bosnia – an intervention into a state on the European periphery in 
the post-Cold War era – it is perhaps not surprising that Western actors sought to 
promote democracy. According to existing theories, however, it would be surprising to 
see evidence of substantial democratization in such a difficult implementation 
environment – one characterized by high levels of economic devastation and inter-
ethnic tensions resulting from the war. While Bosnia represents a hard case for the 
successful promotion of democracy, Afghanistan represents perhaps the least likely 
case that could be imagined in the post-Cold War era, both for the success of the 
democracy-promotion enterprise and even for the intention to do so. By nearly every 
measure Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world. 
It is extremely ethnically heterogeneous, is burdened by more than two decades of 
devastating warfare, suffers from hostile neighbors and an ecology uniquely suited to 
narcotics production and trafficking, and faces daunting geographical challenges to the 
creation of a physical infrastructure linking the country both internally and to the rest 
of the world. Moreover, the American-led intervention into Afghanistan was not 
motivated by humanitarianism but by the goal of destroying terrorist networks, and it 
occurred under a president who had explicitly campaigned against “nation-building.” 
In short, even modest evidence of democracy promotion in Afghanistan would count 
as evidence in favor of the theoretical framework presented here.  
In order to make the similarities and differences between the cases as clear as 
possible, I adopt the method of “structured, focused comparison” in the studies to 
follow (George 1979; George and Bennett 2005). More specifically, I will interrogate 
each case with a uniform set of questions that draw out the different approaches of the 
three intervening states and their consequences. The questions may be grouped 
according to four categories: (i) attitudes, (ii) policy alternatives, (iii) structure of the 
intervention, and (iv) outcomes. The full list of questions is provided in Table 3.   
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Before becoming immersed in the details of individual cases, however, it is 
useful to understand the broad patterns apparent in the military interventions of the 
past 15 years. The following chapter examines all 27 cases of military intervention in 
the post-Cold War era. It reveals that intervening coalitions dominated by democracies 
with militarized strategic cultures and low resource constraints have typically been 
able to promote significant democratic change in targets of intervention, while 
coalitions of states with substantial resource constraints or non-militarized strategic 
cultures tend to produce relatively little change, and committed autocracies usually 
contribute to the further autocratization of the countries in which they intervene.  
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Table 3: Questions for Structured, Focused Comparison 
•  Attitudes 
• Democracy 
•  Population: What are popular attitudes towards democracy and its promotion 
abroad? Is public opinion on these issues a significant factor in influencing 
policy in interventions? 
•  Elite: What are elite attitudes towards democracy and its promotion abroad? 
What policies (if any) have been enacted to influence the regime type of states 
abroad? 
• Military 
•  Population: What are popular attitudes towards the use of force abroad? Does 
the population believe military force can achieve important political objectives 
besides self-defense? Is the population willing to endure and/or inflict 
casualties in military operations? Is public opinion on these issues a significant 
factor in influencing policy in interventions? 
•  Elite: What are elite attitudes towards the use of force abroad? Do “veto 
players” exist who can effectively prevent the use or escalation of force? Do 
players exist who can militarize the state’s foreign policy even without a 
broader consensus behind the use of force? 
•  Structure of Intervention 
• Military 
•  Scope: How many troops (and with what equipment) were deployed? 
•  Deployment: Where were troops deployed? Were deployments dispersed so as 
to maximize overall coverage, or were they concentrated in particular areas 
(e.g., in the capital, at particular borders) and, if so, for what purposes? 
•  Mode: How did military units actually function? Did they actively patrol or 
remain in barracks? What were their rules of engagement? Did they 
aggressively target “spoilers”? 
• Civilian 
•  Aid: Was aid disbursed broadly among competing sub-populations in the target 
country, or was it concentrated among actors within a single faction? Was aid 
distributed to civil society actors (bottom-up approach), or was it concentrated 
among elites (top-down)? Was aid conditioned on certain performance 
objectives related to democracy-promotion?  
•  Diplomacy: What institutional design for the target state government did the 
intervening country advocate (if any)? If a powersharing arrangement was 
brokered, did the intervening state publicly urge all parties in the target state to 
meet their obligations under the agreement? What other diplomatic actions 
were taken to encourage compliance? 
•  Policy Options and Counterfactuals 
• Democracy: Was the promotion or acceptance of autocracy (democracy) a 
reasonable alternative to the policy the intervening country actually chose? What 
specifically would such an alternative have looked like? What would have been the 
likely outcome of such an alternative? Did policymakers actively consider such an 
alternative, and if so, why was it rejected? 
• Military: Was a non-military (military) approach a reasonable alternative to what the 
intervening country actually chose? What specifically would such an alternative 
have looked like? What would have been the likely outcome of such an alternative? 
Did policymakers actively consider such an alternative, and if so, why was it 
rejected?  
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Table 3 (Continued) 
•  Outcome of Intervention 
•  To what extent did political authority structures become more inclusive – that is, 
exhibit higher degrees of competition and participation – during the course of the 
military intervention? 
•  How significant were coercive instruments – both police and military – in disrupting 
informal political authority structures and concentrating power in inclusive state 
institutions? 
•  For those interventions that have concluded, are there indications that the political 
authority structures promoted by interveners proved durable? For those 
interventions that have not concluded, what indications, if any, exist that suggest 




Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Interventions 
This chapter applies fuzzy-set logic to the study of interventions. Fuzzy-set 
logic is an empirical method which applies set theory to the analysis of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. The first section of this chapter will explicate the logic of fuzzy-
set analysis, while the second section explains the measurement of the relevant 
variables, and the third discusses the empirical results of the investigation. 
Before explaining fuzzy-set logic in detail, it is perhaps worth clarifying why 
this method provides the best tool for assessing interventions in the post-Cold War era. 
Fuzzy-set analysis combines the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods 
when assessing medium-N phenomena. Case studies and the comparative method 
provide nuance, context, and a close fit of data to theory, but they are nonetheless 
subject to a number of criticisms. They provide an uncertain basis for generalizability, 
they commonly lack clear standards of interpretation or comparison with cases outside 
of the analysis, and they provide no estimates of the probability that a given cause (or 
conjunction of causes) will produce the hypothesized effect nor an estimate of the 
reliability of an investigator’s findings. Statistical analyses offer a useful tool for 
addressing precisely those areas – generalizability, standards of evidence, and 
probability and error estimates – where qualitative methods are weak. But besides 
lacking the strengths of qualitative methods – nuance, context, and close fit of data to 
theory – they also have difficulty coping with complex patterns of conjunctive 
causation (interaction effects) in universes of only an intermediate number of cases 
(medium-N).  
By combining fuzzy-set logic with the comparative method, we can derive 
many of the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Such a tool is 
perfectly suited to the study of military interventions in the post-Cold War era, where  
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the number of cases (27) presents considerable challenges for traditional statistical 
analysis.
36 More specifically, we can assess interaction effects that would rapidly 
exceed the degrees of freedom that traditional statistical analysis would permit with 
such a universe of cases. The intermediate number of cases also allows us to make 
qualitative comparisons across the entire universe, using the fuzzy-set findings to 
structure brief assessments of the divergent outcomes of the 27 cases. 
Fuzzy-Set Methods 
Necessary and sufficient conditions are well known to those who use 
qualitative methods, even if arguments are not necessarily formulated in precisely this 
language. Necessary conditions are those in which a given cause must always be 
present in order for an outcome to occur. Robert Pape (2003), for instance, has 
recently argued that military occupations are a necessary cause of substantial suicide 
terrorism campaigns, although they are not by themselves sufficient – else we would 
expect to see Serbs ramming truck bombs into NATO targets in Kosovo. Sufficient 
conditions are those in which the outcome must always be present whenever the cause 
is present. Proponents of the democratic peace, for instance, argue that whenever we 
see two democratic countries, we also will see peace (the hypothesized outcome) 
between them. These relationships can be expressed in terms of set theory: In 
relationships of necessity, the set of cases in which a particular outcome is present is a 
subset of instances in which the hypothesized cause is present, while in relationships 
of sufficiency, the set of instances of a particular cause is a subset of the set of 
instances in which the hypothesized outcome is present. These relationships are 
represented graphically in Figure 1. 
                                                 
36 Such scholars as Pickering and Peceny (2006) acknowledge the difficulties of using traditional 
statistical methods to examine democracy promotion in military interventions. They have a total of 
three positive cases for the United States, for instance, and five for the United Nations, making 
statistical inference problematic.  
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Figure 1: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
Necessity and sufficiency have thus far been described in dichotomous terms: 
A given cause or effect is present or absent. Fuzzy-set logic simply makes these 
concepts scalable, with 1.0 representing complete membership within a set, 0 
representing complete absence of membership in a set, and .5 representing the 
dividing line between cases more “out” than “in.” Przeworski and Limongi, for 
instance, argue that a high level of development is a sufficient condition for the long-
term survival of democracy. While they find that no countries with per capita income 
above $6055 have slid back into autocracy after becoming democracies (i.e., perfect 
sufficiency), they also find that very few countries with incomes near $6055 have 
experienced democratic reversals (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Thus we could 
scale both the cause and the outcome: Survival rates for democracy (the hypothesized 
outcome) are very high where income levels are very high (i.e., possessing fuzzy-set 
membership scores closer to 1.0), while survival rates are low where income levels are 
low (i.e., possessing fuzzy-set membership scores closer to 0). The United States and 
other advanced industrialized countries would score 1.0 for both the cause (national 
income) and the effect (democratic survivability), while most desperately poor 
countries would score close to 0 on both. 
Effect 
Effect  Cause 
Cause 
Necessary Conditions  Sufficient Conditions  
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In fuzzy-set terms relationships of necessity and sufficiency can thus be 
expressed succinctly: The value for an outcome variable should always (or at least 
usually) be less than or equal to the value for the causal variable in instances of 
necessity (that is, the cause should be “at least as present” as the effect), while the 
value for an outcome variable should always (or usually) be greater than or equal to 
the value of the causal variable in instances of sufficiency (that is, the outcome should 
be “at least as present” as the cause). In a standard scatterplot with the dependent 
variable represented by the y-axis and the independent variable represented by the x-
axis, all data points for necessary relationships should fall on or below the identity 
line, while all data points for sufficient relationships should fall on or above the 
identity line. With an intermediate number of cases, we can make probabilistic 
assessments about the likelihood that a given cause or conjunction of causes is either 
necessary or sufficient depending on the proportion of cases that fall to the 
hypothesized side of the identity line. 
Social phenomena are seldom so accommodating, however, as to present social 
scientists with monocausal relationships. Fuzzy-set logic uses fuzzy algebra similar to 
Boolean algebra – particularly the functions of logical “and” (Boolean multiplication) 
and logical “or” (Boolean addition) – to describe relationships among numerous causal 
variables. Fuzzy multiplication represents the intersection of various sets and is 
mathematically expressed by the minimum value for a particular case across all of the 
variables included in the multiplication function, while fuzzy addition represents the 
union of various sets and is mathematically expressed as the maximum value for a 
particular case across all of the variables included in the addition function. In the 
example of the democratic peace, for instance, the hypothesized outcome (peace) will 
only occur if both countries in a given dyad are relatively democratic. If one country is 
perfectly democratic (scoring 1.0 on the scale of membership in the set of democratic  
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countries) while the other is highly autocratic (perhaps scoring a 0.2), we would 
expect their membership in the set of peaceful dyads to be as low as 0.2 because in 
fuzzy terms 1.0 × 0.2 = 0.2. Their membership in the set of peaceful dyads might be 
higher – for instance, if the two countries are minor powers on different continents and 
have never had the opportunity to come into conflict – but we would not expect their 
membership in the set of peaceful dyads to be 1.0 just because one of the countries 
receives a 1.0 democracy score.
37 
Using these methods we can make probabilistic assessments of necessity and 
sufficiency across an intermediate number of cases – assessments that would be 
impossible using either traditional qualitative or quantitative methods. It is important 
to note, however, that the results of fuzzy-set analysis are sensitive to the scaling of 
membership scores in a given set as well as to the operationalization of variables. 
While membership scores are grounded in both theory and the investigator’s 
substantive knowledge, different analysts can derive different scales and 
operationalizations, yielding substantially different results. Fuzzy-set logic should 
therefore be understood as a tool for interpretation in conjunction with case studies 
rather than as an instrument of “proof” for causal inference (Ragin 2000, Chapter 11).  
Operationalizing Military Interventions 
This section provides a brief overview of the manner in which the theories of 
the preceding chapter were translated into measurable variables and the sources of 
data used for each. More in-depth explications of the fuzzy-set scoring system may be 
found in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
37 Adding additional variables such as these can be easily accommodated by fuzzy-set logic, and indeed 
Ragin (2005) recommends a procedure that often entails using additional variables to minimize the 
distance between data points and the identity line.  
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The Universe of Cases 
As discussed in the previous chapter, military interventions are defined here as 
the deployment of troops across international borders for the purpose of shaping the 
political authority structures of the target state. On the basis of this definition, five 
more precise criteria guided the determination of what counts as a case of intervention. 
First, only instances in which the troops of a sovereign state are deployed on the 
territory of another recognized sovereign state may be included as cases. Second, 
covert deployments of forces are not eligible to be included as cases. Third, at least 
1000 armed troops must be deployed. Fourth, troops must have been deployed for at 
least three months during the post-Cold War era (for convenience, this period is 
assumed to have begun in January 1990) and the intervention must have begun by the 
first of January 2004. Fifth, troops must have authorization to use force to ensure the 
success of the mission (thus distinguishing military interventions from observer 
missions). And finally, the mission must include a substantial governance component 
that encompasses the target country as a whole (thus distinguishing military 
interventions from humanitarian missions such as the provision of relief supplies or 
the protection of safe havens for civilians).
38 Twenty-seven cases meet all of the 
criteria, including a handful of cases in which the purpose or means of an intervention 
changed substantially, in which case it has been coded as two or more successive 
interventions. The complete list is provided in Appendix 2. 
Rules of Aggregation 
The framework for analysis presented in this study claims that the 
characteristics of intervening states determine much about how an intervention is 
                                                 
38 Note that Kosovo is included as a case despite the fact that the NATO-led mission does not 
encompass the entire country of Serbia-Montengero. It is included, while other regional missions such 
as UNTAET in Croatia were not, because the independence of Kosovo has been the issue at stake and 
because it has been governed de facto as a sovereign entity.  
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structured and its likely consequences. Obviously, however, in cases of multilateral 
interventions – the norm in the post-Cold War era – some formula must be derived by 
which the characteristics of individual member states can be aggregated into a 
composite “intervener.” This task is complicated by the fact that there are numerous 
models of multilateral intervention, and each participant state is likely to exercise 
different degrees of influence on how the intervention is conducted. The United States, 
for instance, will inevitably carry much more weight in determining how an 
intervention is run than Burkina Faso. At the same time, no matter how powerful the 
state participating in an intervention, the provision of soldiers offers considerable 
opportunities to shape a mission, both at the diplomatic level (e.g., by threatening to 
withdraw troops) and at the level of execution (e.g., how patrols are conducted, the 
rules of engagement followed by soldiers, how a mandate is interpreted and how 
aggressively military forces seek to pursue that mandate, etc.). For the purposes of 
simplicity I follow four rules of selection and aggregation. First, in cases of 
multilateral interventions, for a country to be considered as one of the interveners it 
must provide at least a light battalion (roughly 400 troops) and be among the top five 
troop contributing countries (TCCs) in an intervention.
39 Second, where a single 
country provided more than half of all troops (the “lead nation” framework), the 
characteristics of that lead nation are taken as representative of the intervention as a 
whole. Third, where no single country provided more than half of all troops (the 
“broad multilateralism” framework typical of UN missions), each TCC is given equal 
weight and the characteristics of all TCCs are averaged to determine the 
characteristics of the “intervener.” Finally, where two missions share a common 
                                                 
39 There are two exceptions. First, in MINURCA in the Central African Republic the entire mission was 
comprised of company-sized contingents (100-150 soldiers) from numerous countries. In this case all of 
those countries providing at least a company were included. Second, in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, the 
United States, United Kingdom, and France divided the country into three political-military 
administrative units (multi-national divisions, or MNDs); in this case, only these three “lead nations” 
were included as interveners.  
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purpose and run simultaneously or consecutively but are integrated (so that one 
mission “hands off” responsibilities to a follow-on operation), each operation counts 
for half of the characteristics of the “intervener.” These rules of aggregation are 
somewhat mechanistic, but they provide an objective approximation of different 
intervening coalitions and take account of different frameworks for multilateral 
cooperation. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable can be understood in three ways: as the amount of 
democratic change promoted during intervention, the level of democratic achievement 
to take place during the intervention, and the durability of the democratic change 
promoted. I assess the first two using Freedom House’s Freedom in the World scores, 
measuring change as the difference in Freedom House scores from the last year before 
an intervention took place to the last year of the intervention and achievement as the 
absolute level of democracy achieved in the target state by the last year of the 
intervention.
40 Since competitive oligarchy is the expected outcome in most 
interventions due to resource constraints or domestic limitations on the use of force, I 
expect that small increases in democratization are common regardless of the 
                                                 
40 The Freedom House dataset is not without flaws (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Unfortunately, no 
other database provides a superior alternative for the analysis being conducted here. The principle 
alternative, the Polity IV dataset, has a number of drawbacks. First and most importantly, it does not 
provide democracy ratings for years in which countries are experiencing intrusive military 
interventions, undergoing major transitions, or experiencing substantial internal disorder, thus 
eliminating a large proportion of the cases of interest in this analysis. Second, it only extends to 2002 
and thus provides no information on recent interventions (such as those in Iraq or Cote d’Ivoire) and 
excludes two years out of the fifteen in the post-Cold War era. Third, its data is based on formal 
democratic institutions and not on actual democratic performance – a particular problem for assessing 
“success” in military interventions. The World Bank’s Governance Indicators provide another possible 
dataset on which to test the hypotheses presented here. The indicators only begin in 1996, however, thus 
eliminating interventions in the first years after the end of the Cold War from consideration. Moreover, 
they are only compiled every two years, leaving odd-numbered years out. Consequently, it is difficult to 
determine how much change in the indicators occurred in the year prior or subsequent to an intervention 
in those cases where an intervention began in an even-numbered year or concluded in an odd-numbered 
year. Thus, despite the limitations of Freedom House data, it provides the best possible dataset with 
which to assess the consequences of interventions.  
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characteristics of the intervener. Substantial movement towards autocracy or 
democracy, on the other hand, should only occur in the exceptional cases described 
above – when militarized interveners face low resource constraints. Because such a 
large percentage of post-Cold War interventions are either ongoing or only recently 
concluded, broad assessments of democratic durability cannot be made reliably using 
quantitative data. Instead, I assess interventions’ ability to promote durable change 
qualitatively and on a case-by-case basis, with brief references in the qualitative 
overview of results in this chapter and more extended discussions in the case study 
chapters to follow.  
Independent Variables 
Regime Type. The regime type of each intervening state was determined by 
taking the average of all of its Freedom House scores in the post-Cold War era, 1990-
2004.  
Militarization. The degree of militarization of each intervening state’s strategic 
culture is more difficult to operationalize. As discussed in the preceding chapter, I 
define the concept simply as the extent to which the foreign policy elite and general 
population of a country believe that military force can be used to achieve politically 
desirable ends in foreign affairs. Nearly all people accept the use of force for territorial 
defense; the citizens of more militarized countries believe that force can be projected 
to secure a variety of foreign policy goals. I use two indicators to measure the extent to 
which a country’s strategic culture is militarized: defense spending as a proportion of 
gross domestic product and national responses to World Values Survey questions 
regarding the priority that should be accorded national defense and the willingness of 
citizens to fight for their country (see Appendix 1 for more detailed information). The  
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intersection of the intervener democracy and militarization variables produces a 
typology of interveners as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Typology of Intervening States
41 
  Democracies  Quasi-Democracies and Autocracies 
Highly 
Militarized 
  Egypt        Syria 
Ethiopia    Turkey 
Pakistan   Zimbabwe 
Russia  
Militarized  India 




Malaysia       
Morocco       
Nigeria 
Neutral  Australia     South Africa 
France       
Poland  
Portugal 






Brazil       Netherlands     













The measures used to assess “militarization” are only rough proxies for the 
underlying concept, much as the Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of 
National Capabilities (CINC) provides only a rough proxy for the concept of national 
“power.” A handful of countries – most obviously Indonesia – are doubtlessly 
                                                 
41 For inclusion a state must have been among the top five largest contributors to at least one of the 27 
military interventions selected in this study and must have provided a total of at least 1000 armed 
troops. Degrees of militarization are based on the quintile into which a country’s militarization score 
falls; see Appendix 2 for a more detailed explanation. To be included as a democracy a state must 
receive a Freedom House score of at least 3.5. 
42 Note that the United States is on the borderline between “militarized” and “highly militarized.”  
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misplaced according to the measures of militarization used here.
43 A comparison of 
the militarization scores presented here with the results of other scholars, however, 
suggests that the measures used in this study more or less accurately capture the 
concept of a militarized strategic culture. In their study of Cold War-era interventions, 
for instance, Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering (1994) find that the United States, 
Britain, France, the then-Soviet Union, Syria, Egypt, and India were the leading 
intervening states of the Cold War.
44 On the basis of Militarized Interstate Dispute 
(MID) data, Maoz (2004) labels Pakistan, India, Syria, the United States, South Korea, 
Russia, France and the United Kingdom “fightaholics.” And Asmus, Everts, and 
Isernia (2004) find in their study of North Atlantic community public opinion that the 
United States and Britain have substantially more “hawks” than most continental 
European countries, while Germany and Italy have the fewest. Despite using very 
different metrics, all of these studies yield results which correspond quite closely to 
the militarization rankings provided here. This correlation suggests that we can have 
relative confidence in the overall index, even though some individual countries’ 
strategic cultures are not accurately captured by the proxies and the proxies 
themselves are dictated in part by the availability of data rather than by achieving the 
most precise correspondence between empirical proxies and underlying concepts. 
National Interests and Resource Constraints. The resource constraints of 
intervening states are based on the realist assumption that available resources depend 
on the degree of threat posed by a given crisis. Thus intervening states’ resource 
                                                 
43 The most common source of error in a country’s militarization score was a lack of World Values 
Survey (WVS) data. Many countries which participated in post-Cold War military interventions were 
not included in the WVS. In such instances the country’s militarization score was based entirely on its 
defense budget as a proportion of GDP. In practice the consequences of this missing data were 
minimized by the fact that nearly all of the major troop contributing countries for interventions also 
participated in the WVS.  
44 Along with China and Israel, two states not included in the analysis here, and South Africa, although 
obviously the end of apartheid would account for its rapid demilitarization.  
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constraints are scored on a five-point scale, where the highest value was given to cases 
of total war and their aftermath (such as the military occupations of Germany and 
Japan in the wake of the Second World War) and the lowest given to cases in which 
the outside state had no interest whatsoever. In the post-Cold War era, in reality scores 
ranged among the three intermediate values, with responses to direct threats (such as 
terrorism) gaining the second highest score; responses to indirect threats (such as 
massive refugee flows, alliance credibility, etc.) receiving an intermediate value; and 
no or almost no threats (such as in the typical UN peacekeeping mission) receiving the 
next-to-lowest score. Such a scoring system avoids circularity by calculating interests 
independently of interveners’ behavior in interventions,
45 and the use of a simple 
ordinal scale reflects the imprecision of the underlying concept. The indicators of 
national interest are ones that appear commonly in the literature on interventions and 
extended deterrence.
46 Although this variable cannot predict when an intervention will 
be launched, it does help us to understand how an intervention is conducted after the 
decision to intervene has already been made. 
                                                 
45 Of course, the independent variable of national interests can be in part endogenous to the dependent 
variable of intervener behavior if intervener behavior creates threats that did not exist before. Such 
endogeneity is obviously at play in the Iraq intervention. More generally, by the very act of intervention 
an intervener places a certain amount of its prestige or reputation at stake, thus creating interests where 
none existed previously. Such feedback mechanisms clearly exist, so it is impossible to separate these 
variables entirely. So long as the interests created by states’ interventionist behavior remain less 
significant than the interests that exist independent of interventionist behavior, however, this element of 
endogeneity does not compromise the validity of this study’s findings. Of the 27 cases included in the 
empirical analysis here, only the case of Iraq has substantial elements of a feedback effect – that is, 
American interventionist policies significantly contributed to threats against the United States (a 
positive value on the dependent variable contributed to a more positive value on the independent 
variable). And even in the case of Iraq the United States had substantial interests in the country before 
the intervention. Thus, while these elements of endogeneity cannot be dismissed, they also are not 
responsible for the broad causal patterns identified in this study. 




To assess alternate theories and complex patterns of conjunctive causation, a 
number of control variables were included in the fuzzy-set analysis. Realist theories 
emphasizing military capabilities were tested using variables to estimate intervening 
countries’ military potential (soldiers in uniform, military expenditures, and level of 
development) and forces deployed (total troop deployments into the target country, the 
ratio of intervening forces to the target state’s population, and the duration of the 
intervention). Liberal and critical theories emphasizing legitimacy, persuasion, and 
inducement were tested using such proxies as whether an intervention had a UN 
mandate, the number of countries in the intervening coalition, and the amount of aid 
disbursed to the target country. Finally, characteristics of the target countries 
themselves were included in the analysis: the target’s level of development, ethnic 
heterogeneity, and prior experience with democracy. Many of these variables play a 
role in shaping the ultimate outcomes of an intervention. In a few cases variables 
related to the intervention environment can be so conducive to successful democracy 
promotion that relatively high levels of democratic change and achievement occur 
even when an intervention is not anchored by committed, militarized, democratic 
interveners (Namibia stands out as such a case). For the most part, however, these 
other variables play a significant role, if at all, in conjunction with the characteristics 
of the interveners. 
Military Expenditures. Realist perspectives on military interventions would 
expect outcomes to be correlated with differential military capabilities among the 
intervening states. Military expenditures (annual military budgets) are one of the 
standard measures of states’ military capabilities, included in the widely used National 
Material Capabilities (NMC v. 3.02) dataset (Singer 1987). In this study the variable  
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was measured using the average annual military expenditures for each intervening 
country in the period 1990-2003 (the most recent year for which data was available), 
using data from the NMC 3.02 dataset. 
Military Personnel. The number of soldiers a state keeps in uniform is another 
measure of capabilities included in the National Material Capabilities database. Like 
military expenditures, this variable was measured using the average annual soldiers in 
uniform for each intervening country in the period 1990-2003.
47 
Intervener Level of Development. Fearon and Laitin argue that level of 
development may serve as a proxy for military discipline; less developed countries, 
these authors argue, are less likely to possess troops who follow orders and are held 
accountable for indiscriminate uses of force. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further argue 
that it is lack of disciplined troops that prevents countries from conducting effective 
counter-insurgency operations. Thus interveners’ level of development was also 
included in this analysis, using World Bank data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Online dataset.  
Composite Military Capability Score. Since each of the above variables 
capture an aspect of military capability, a composite score (similar to the Composite 
Index of National Capability of the NMC dataset) was also used, based on the average 
values of the three above variables. 
                                                 
47 Other indicators of national material capabilities included in the NMC dataset such as urban 
population and energy consumption were not included here because they represented military potential 
rather than deployable military assets.  
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Troops Deployed. Troop deployments provide yet another measure of the 
military capabilities brought to bear in an intervention. Unfortunately, the number of 
troops deployed in a military intervention are in constant flux depending on strategic 
requirements and rotation schedules, making it difficult to assess accurately the 
number of troops deployed at any one time, even with the best of information. 
Complicating matters further, in many instances intervening states have incentives to 
disguise the number of troops they have deployed, such as was the case for Syria in 
Lebanon. This variable was based on the maximum number of troops deployed during 
an intervention, but all figures are rough estimates. Data were drawn from official 
sources (such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ database) wherever 
possible. 
Force Ratios. James Quinlivan (2003) argues that the appropriate metric for 
assessing troop requirements for an intervention is neither absolute numbers of troops 
(per the variable above) nor other ratios such as the number of troops per unit of 
territory or per potentially hostile combatant. Since the objective of interventions is to 
secure the loyalty of the population at large to the target regime, Quinlivan argues that 
the proper yardstick is the ratio of intervening troops to the population of the target 
state, using the ratio of police officers to populations in advanced, stable countries as a 
minimum baseline. In this study the data for the variable was drawn from troop 
deployments (above) and the WDI Online dataset’s population figures. 
Duration. Many scholars have argued that interventions must last longer to 
have a hope of accomplishing more ambitious goals such as the promotion of 
democracy (Paris 1997). This variable was operationalized as the number of years for 
which an intervention was conducted (or until the end of 2004 in the case of ongoing  
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interventions). The median duration for interventions in the post-Cold War era, 
however, was a mere 2.3 years, and two-thirds of interventions did not last as much as 
four years. 
Civilian Aid. Those theories emphasizing cooptation over coercion typically 
argue that aid provides a critical source of leverage in interventions. Unfortunately, 
there is no database that documents all aid transfers. This variable thus refers to 
average annual non-military aid per capita for target states from OECD countries, with 
data drawn from WDI Online. Ideally we would want the variable to reflect aid 
payments from non-OECD countries as well, such as transfers from Moscow to the 
Rakhmonov regime in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, the amount of many such transfers 
are simply unavailable to the public – and often perhaps even to government officials 
in the countries concerned. Using only figures for OECD transfers, however, actually 
biases the data against the argument made in this study because it makes it easier to 
ascribe any correlation between an intervener’s regime type and democratic change in 
the target country to differential capabilities (i.e., democracies’ relatively greater 
wealth and thus ability to “purchase” preferred outcomes with aid) rather than to 
different worldviews, as argued in the previous chapter.  
UN Mandate. Theories which emphasize non-coercive instruments for use in 
military intervention typically emphasize the importance of international legitimacy 
and especially an explicit mandate for intervention from the United Nations Security 
Council. A UN mandate signifies greater transparency in the motives of the 
interveners, greater moral weight for efforts at persuasion, and international consensus 
for diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks aimed at securing local parties’ 
cooperation in initiatives for peace and democratization. This variable was coded on  
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an interval scale, with UN-led missions receiving the highest score, UN-mandated 
missions the next highest, those with mandates from regional organizations but not the 
UN lower still, and unilateral missions lowest of all. 
Number of Coalition Members. Another proxy for international legitimacy is 
the number of states participating in the intervening coalition.
48 Global coalitions with 
large numbers of troop contributing countries (TCCs) were ranked highest, while 
unilateral interventions were ranked lowest. 
Ethnic Heterogeneity. Numerous authors have argued that high levels of ethnic 
heterogeneity is deleterious to democratic development in general (an argument made 
most forcefully by Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) and efforts to promote democracy 
through military interventions in particular (Kaufmann 1996; Pei and Kasper 2003). 
This variable was operationalized using the “ethnic fractionalization” index (Alesina 
et al. 2002). 
Target State Level of Development and Prior Experience with Democracy. The 
membership scores for nearly every target state were so low on both of these variables 
that they were essentially irrelevant. Only six target states received a non-zero score 
for level of development (i.e., only six were not defined as “low income” by the World 
Bank, with average annual incomes per capita less than $736), while only one 
(Panama) had more than ten years of prior experience with democracy (defined 
extremely generously as a Polity IV score of at least 5). Consequently, these variables 
were omitted from the analysis.
49 
                                                 
48 The invasion of Iraq, of course, demonstrates the weaknesses of coalition size as a proxy for 
international legitimacy. 
49 Variables for which nearly all scores lie extremely close to either 1 or 0 produce distorted results in 
fuzzy-set logic. Inclusion of these variables, for instance, would have led to the conclusion that poverty  
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Analysis of Results 
All of the above variables
50 were analyzed for conditions of necessity and 
sufficiency. Necessary conditions, again, are those in which a particular cause is 
present whenever a given outcome is present. Relationships of necessity can be 
represented mathematically as those in which the membership score for the outcome is 
less than or equal to the membership score for the cause in every (or nearly every) 
case in a given universe. Graphically, the data points in a scatterplot will fall below the 
identity line where the causal condition is plotted on the x-axis and the outcome on the 
y-axis. Sufficient conditions are the mirror image of necessary ones: They express 
relationships in which the outcome is present when a given causal conjunction is 
present (that is, when the outcome membership score exceeds the causal membership 
score), and they are represented graphically as a scatterplot in which the data points 
fall above the identity line. Arguments that fulfill both of these relationships – where a 
given variable is both necessary and a central component of sufficient conjunctions – 
are relatively rare, and they are powerful explanations of social phenomena. 
Analysis of cases of autocratic change is complicated by the fact that there 
were only four instances in which an intervention led to greater autocracy: the Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon and the Russian interventions in Abkhazia (a province of 
Georgia which won its de facto independence with Russian military assistance), 
Transdniestr (a province of Moldova which, like Abkhazia, secured de facto 
independence with the support of the Russian military), and Tajikistan. All four 
                                                                                                                                              
and lack of experience with democracy are necessary conditions for democratic change in the course of 
an intervention. 
50 As explained above, target state level of development and prior experience with democracy were 
omitted due to the extremely large percentage of scores falling on or near 0. In the summary data to 
follow, the three components of military capability – military expenditure, military personnel, and level 
of development of the intervener – were consolidated into the composite military capability score. 
When included as separate variables, none of them came close to achieving statistical significance as a 
necessary condition. Some were elements of statistically significant sufficient conjunctions, although 
combining them into the “higher-order construct” of military capability greatly simplifies analysis 
without loss of important information. On higher-order constructs, see Ragin 2000 (321).  
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instances of autocratic change were cases in which highly militarized, non-democratic 
interveners propped up loyal factions in nearby countries experiencing civil wars. 
Unfortunately, four cases are too few to exclude the null hypothesis as an explanation.  
Two different models were utilized to assess necessary and sufficient 
conditions for democratic change, both of which incorporate a .05 fuzzy adjustment 
factor (equivalent to shifting the identity line up .05 for necessity analyses and down 
.05 for sufficiency analyses). In the first model only the variables were used for which 
complete data was available, so that no cases were eliminated. As can be seen in Table 
5, in this specification only two of the variables described above qualify as “usually 
necessary” conditions for substantial democratic change in the course of an 
intervention: the extent to which an intervener is democratic and possesses a 
militarized strategic culture. In more mathematically precise language, these are the 
only two variables for which we can predict with relative confidence (p < .05) that the 
score for the outcome will be less than or equal to the causal score in 65 percent of 
cases of intervention. In this specification of the fuzzy-set analysis no conjunctions of 
variables proved sufficient for democratic change.  
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Table 5: Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency, Model 1 
 
Model: DC = D + M + R + B + S + W + C + T + F + P + U + N  
  
Cases Read:      27  
     Valid:      27  100.0%  
   Missing:       0    0.0%  
  
 
*** NECESSARY CAUSE ANALYSIS ***  
  
Number of Cases Tested (Outcome > 0): 19 ( 70.4% of Total)  
Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion:  0.65  
             *p < 0.05  
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05  
  
            N Cause    Observed   Binomial  
Variable  >= Outcome  Proportion         p  
==========================================  
d               10        0.53  
D               18        0.95     0.003*  
m               11        0.58  
M               17        0.89     0.017*  
r               14        0.74     0.297  
R               10        0.53  
c               13        0.68     0.481  
C               11        0.58  
t               10        0.53  
T               13        0.68     0.481  
f               14        0.74     0.297  
F                8        0.42  
p               13        0.68     0.481  
P               10        0.53  
u                6        0.32  
U               15        0.79     0.150  
n                7        0.37  
N               16        0.84     0.059  
==========================================  
  
2 Necessary Cause(s) Included in the Analysis  
  
*** SUFFICIENT CAUSE ANALYSIS ***  
  
Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion:  0.65  
              p < 0.05  
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05  
  
*** FUZZY-SET SOLUTION ***  
 
No sufficient causes found satisfying necessary conditions  
 
 
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the effects of the regime type 
and strategic culture of the intervener. Very few data points fall above the identity 
DC = Democratic Change 
D = Democracy 
M = Militarization 
R = Resources 
C = Composite Capabilities 
T = Troops Deployed 
F = Force Ratios 
P = Period (Duration) 
A = Aid 
U = UN Mandate 
N = Number of Coalition  
     Members 
L = Level of Development  
     (Target) 
E = Ethnic Heterogeneity 
 
 
Lower case letters indicate 
negation (e.g., d = 1 – D)  
83 
line, representing the fact that the membership score of the cause (democracy and 
militarization) almost always exceeds that of the effect – that is, the cause is almost 
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Figure 2: Necessity of Intervener Democracy and Militarization 
The analysis of democratic change was run a second time, using all variables, 
including those for which only incomplete data was available (see Table 6). 
Unfortunately, by doing so, we exclude five cases from analysis: Abkhazia, 
Afghanistan, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, and Transdniestr. Consequently, assessment 
of causal necessity is not as reliable as with the first model. Analysis of causal 
sufficiency, however, is greatly improved by the inclusion of the two highly relevant 
variables of aid and ethnic heterogeneity.  
 Democracy 
 Militarization  
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Table 6: Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency, Model 2 
 
Model: DC = D + M + R + C + T + F + P + A + U + N + E  
  
Cases Read:      27  
     Valid:      22   81.5%  
   Missing:       5   18.5%  
  
*** NECESSARY CAUSE ANALYSIS ***  
  
Number of Cases Tested (Outcome > 0): 16 ( 72.7% of Total)  
Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion:  0.65  
             *p < 0.05  
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05  
  
            N Cause    Observed   Binomial  
Variable  >= Outcome  Proportion         p  
==========================================  
d               9        0.56  
D              15        0.94     0.010*  
m               8        0.50  
M              14        0.88     0.045*  
r              12        0.75     0.289  
R               7        0.44  
c              12        0.75     0.289  
C               8        0.50  
t              10        0.62  
T              10        0.62  
f              13        0.81     0.134  
F               6        0.37  
p              12        0.75     0.289  
P               8        0.50  
a               9        0.56  
A              10        0.62  
u               5        0.31  
U              13        0.81     0.134  
n               6        0.37  
N              14        0.88     0.045*  
e               8        0.50  
E              13        0.81     0.134  
==========================================  
 
*** SUFFICIENT CAUSE ANALYSIS ***  
  
Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion:  0.65  
              p < 0.05  
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05  
3 Necessary Cause(s) Included in the Analysis  
  







DC = Democratic Change 
D = Democracy 
M = Militarization 
R = Resources 
C = Composite Capabilities 
T = Troops Deployed 
F = Force Ratios 
P = Period (Duration) 
A = Aid 
U = UN Mandate 
N = Number of Coalition  
     Members 
E = Ethnic Heterogeneity 
 
 
Lower case letters indicate 
negation (e.g., d = 1 – D)  
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The two conjunctions identified as sufficient to produce democratic change in at least 
65 percent of cases are both long (D·M·T·P·A·N·e + D·M·R·C·T·P·A·N), but 
interpreting them is not difficult. The first conjunction refers to interventions in target 
states characterized by low ethnic heterogeneity (e). In such circumstances militarized 
democracies must deploy substantial numbers of troops (T) for an extended period of 
time (P) and should maximize their co-optive power through the disbursement of large 
amounts of aid (A) and their persuasive power by rallying large coalitions (N) to 
contribute both troops and diplomatic clout. Where militarized, democratic interveners 
structure their interventions in this way, their chances of producing substantial 
democratic change in relatively homogenous states are relatively good, at least based 
on the record of the last fifteen years. In more ethnically diverse targets of 
intervention, the intervening states must meet all of the above conditions, but they 
must also possess substantial military capabilities (C) and face relatively low resource 
constraints (R). 
It is worth noting that although a large intervening coalition becomes a 
statistically significant necessary condition in the second model, a United Nations 
mandate is neither necessary nor an element of a sufficient causal conjunction in either 
model.  
Adding these additional elements of explanation creates a more robust and 
more nuanced account of success in military interventions than the parsimonious 
causal conjunction described in the previous chapter. Although the conjunction of 
intervener democracy, militarization, and resource availability (D·M·R) is not 
identified as sufficient by itself to produce democratic change, there are strong 
indications that this conjunction lies at the heart of success in interventions – or, at a 
minimum, in interventions which take place in challenging environments where 
spoilers contest the creation of a new, more inclusive political order.   
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Standard fuzzy-set procedures in fact under-represent the causal strength of the 
D·M·R combination because they assume a linear relationship between causal 
conjunctions and outcomes. Causal conjunctions with high membership scores on the 
causal conjunction (e.g., .8) are expected to produce outcomes with high membership 
scores (.8 or higher), while causal conjunctions with low membership scores (e.g., .3) 
are expected to produce outcomes with low membership scores (.3 or higher). 
Applying fuzzy-set logic to democratic peace theory helps to show why this 
assumption is problematic. While it may be true that two imperfect democracies, each 
of which has a .8 membership score in the set of democracies, may experience high 
but not complete levels of peace (.8) with each other, it does not follow that two 
electoral autocracies (with .3 membership scores in the set of democracies) should 
experience partial peace (.3) with one another; indeed, they may well experience total 
war (0). Causal conjunctions with membership scores beneath the breakpoint (that is, 
less than .5) may behave radically differently from those above, generating a bimodal 
distribution of outcomes. 
Interventions are also characterized by such a bimodal distribution of 
outcomes. While relatively democratic countries (those with membership scores in the 
set of democracies above .5) are expected to prefer democratic outcomes, relatively 
more autocratic countries (those with scores below .5) are expected to prefer autocratic 
regimes in the targets of their intervention. Thus an electoral autocracy with a 
democracy score of .3 is not necessarily expected to produce some democratic change 
(.3 or higher) in the targets of its interventions; in fact, whenever the autocratic 
intervener is committed and possesses a militarized strategic culture, we would expect 
to see autocratic change in the target (a “democratic change” score of 0). According to 
standard fuzzy-set procedures, such a case would provide disconfirming evidence of 
the sufficiency of the D·M·R combination because its causal score exceeds that of its  
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outcome. Similarly, anti-militaristic intervening states may privilege peace over 
democracy, so that they would not be expected to pursue democratic change if doing 
so threatened to unravel a peace among armed factions. Consequently, a highly anti-
militaristic intervener (with a membership score of .2 in the set of militarized 
countries) may well produce no democratic change at all – again, a case that would be 
considered disconfirming for the sufficiency of the proposed D·M·R conjunction.  
Instead of interpreting the D·M·R conjunction by assessing the number of cases 
that fall on or above the identity line, it is more useful to dichotomize the concept 
space, creating four quadrants that correspond to high and low membership scores on 
both the causal and outcome variables, as pictured in Figure 3.
51 Because fuzzy 
algebra models causal conjunctions using the minimum score for each variable in the 
conjunction, the x-axis represents the minimum value of an intervener for democracy 
(D), militarization (M), and resource availability (R). The y-axis represents democratic 
change achieved by the last year of an intervention (or 2004 in the case of ongoing 
interventions), with all instances of negative change coded as zero.
52 As can be seen in 
the figure, more than 80 percent of all cases fall within the two quadrants that we 
would expect based on the theory presented here: Where the scores for the conjunction 
of D·M·R are high, scores for the outcome (democratic change, DC) are also high, and 
where scores on the causal conjunction are low (d·m·r), outcome scores are also low 
(dc). Six of the nine cases of substantial democratic change (change of at least .5 in 
fuzzy-set terms or at least 1.5 on the Freedom House scale) occurred in the presence of 
the D·M·R conjunction, and all three cases of extremely high democratic change 
(change of at least .67 in fuzzy-set terms or 2.5 on the Freedom House index) occurred 
                                                 
51 As with the analysis of necessary conditions, a .05 adjustment factor has been incorporated to 
compensate for imprecise measurement, so that breakpoints occur at .45 instead of .50. On adjustment 
factors, see Ragin 2000 (223-6). 
52 Negative democratic change – that is, autocratization – is assessed separately. Detailed coding rules 
are available in Appendix 1.  
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where the D·M·R conjunction was high. In the eight cases where D·M·R was high 
(seven if the highly questionable case of Cyprus is excluded), six evidenced high 
levels of democratic change. In contrast, in the 19 cases where at least one element of 
the D·M·R conjunction was low, only three evidenced significant democratic change.  
In Figure 3, all of the data points that fall within the upper right-hand 
quadrant and the lower left-hand quadrant – 22 out of 27 cases – correspond to the 
predictions of the theory presented here. Each of the quadrants will be reviewed in 
turn, beginning with the two quadrants which correspond to the predictions of the 
theory, followed by an assessment of those cases which do not behave as predicted. 
The Upper-Right Quadrant (D·M·R = DC). The six cases in this quadrant 
represent those instances in which committed, relatively militarized, democratic 
interveners succeeded in producing substantial democratic change (an improvement in 
Freedom House scores of at least 1.5 – 2.0 points). The cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan will be treated at length in the chapters to follow. The remaining cases of 
intervention – in East Timor, Haiti, and Panama – are all notable for having been led 
by two countries, the United States and Australia, with relatively militarized strategic 
cultures and a relative willingness to commit to stabilizing neighboring states. The 
American commitment to Haiti was obviously highly qualified, and the country 
descended once again into chaos within years of the departure of American and UN 
(UNMIH) troops. Both East Timor and Panama, however, have been able to sustain 
the democratic changes initiated under foreign intervention, and both now score 
relatively highly on Freedom House’s index of democracy, with scores of 3.0 and 1.5 
respectively. These scores place East Timor on a par with Turkey today and nearly as 
high as such relatively democratic countries as Romania and Thailand, while Panama 
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The Lower-Left Quadrant (d·m·r = dc). Because a case’s score for a causal 
conjunction is its lowest score for any one of the variables included, this quadrant 
actually represents seven different causal conjunctions, where one or more of the 
causal variables receives a score below the breakpoint (represented by a lower-case 
letter): D·M·r, D·m·R, D·m·r, d·M·R, d·M·r, d·m·R, and d·m·r. These cases can be 
placed into three groups, depending on which of the three variables is lowest. 
Cases of non-democratic interveners (d) are notable for almost uniformly 
producing autocratic change, such as Syria in Lebanon and Russia in Abkhazia, 
Tajikistan, and Transdniestr. Nigeria during the days of its military dictatorship is an 
exception, having produced modest but notable democratic change in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. It is important to note, however, that democratic solutions were usually 
not Nigeria’s first preference (or first strategy attempted), and even where Nigeria did 
back elections and a negotiated solution among warring factions, its desire to make 
itself an indispensable partner to such powerful democracies as the United States 
played an important role (Adebajo 2002). 
Cases of low resource availability (r) are generally UN peacekeeping missions 
in which no country or coalition had a substantial national stake in the outcome, 
including Angola (UNAVEM III), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Sierra Leone 2 (UNAMSIL), and Somalia (UNOSOM II). 
In relatively more challenging environments these missions frequently collapse unless 
supported by a significant, militarized power, as was the case with Britain in Sierra 
Leone (ICG 2004a). In relatively beneficent intervention environments (e.g., 
Mozambique at the end of the Cold War) they commonly facilitate modest democratic 
change.  
Cases of low intervener militarization (m) are more difficult to evaluate. 
Interestingly, although non-militarized countries are roughly as common as militarized  
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countries among the most significant interveners in this study (Table 3), there are few 
cases of intervention in which anti-militarized countries dominate. This fact in itself 
suggests that anti-militarized countries tend to play a supporting role in interventions, 
leaving the leadership to more militarized states. The two interventions in which 
relatively anti-militarized states dominated – the Italian-led intervention in Albania 
(Operation Alba) and the French intervention (Operation Licorne) alongside UN 
forces (UNOCI) in Côte d’Ivoire – are both marginal cases.
53 In Albania the Italians 
and other members of the multinational force did not have a mandate to pursue longer-
term, more intrusive political change, nor did Rome pursue such a mandate (Greco 
1998; Kostakos and Bourantonis 1998). In Côte d’Ivoire, France’s role is complicated 
by its colonial and post-colonial history in the country, making a more aggressive 
French effort potentially counter-productive (International Crisis Group 2004b).
54 A 
more extensive assessment of the consequences of non-militarized strategic culture 
will be pursued in-depth in discussions of Germany in the chapters to follow.  
The Upper-Left Quadrant (d·m·r = DC). The five outlying cases are as 
revealing as those which fall within the predicted quadrants. Three cases fall within 
the upper-left quadrant, where democratic change exceeded expectations: Cambodia, 
Liberia 2, and Namibia. Cambodia and Namibia were both UN peacekeeping missions 
(UNTAC and UNTAG respectively) in conflicts that were grinding to a close with the 
end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa. While the UN played a valuable 
role in both cases, the UN’s work was considerably simplified by the fact that the end 
of the Cold War and apartheid removed the causes of conflict or the sources of support 
                                                 
53 With a fuzzy-set militarization score of .43, France falls within the middle one-fifth of the range of 
militarization scores, although it is slightly below the break point of .50. France’s strategic culture thus 
scores within the intermediate band (countries with scores between .41 and .60), although it is towards 
the bottom end of this band.  
54 France is also close to the borderline between militarized and anti-militaristic states, scoring a .43.  
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for the warring parties (or both). Liberia 2 was also a peacekeeping mission (UNMIL), 
although it operated in a considerably more challenging environment. The fact that it 
has endured and contributed to the stabilization of Liberia is encouraging, although it 
is important to note that Nigeria and the United States played important roles in 
preparing the country for the arrival of UNMIL, with Nigeria leading an ECOWAS 
vanguard force and the U.S. positioning an amphibious group of 2000 marines 
offshore in support of the ECOWAS mission.  
The Lower-Right Quadrant (D·M·R = dc). Finally, two cases fall in the lower-
right quadrant: Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus and the American invasion of 
Iraq. Northern Cyprus tells us very little. Turkey itself lies on the exact dividing line 
between relatively more democratic and more autocratic countries (with a Freedom 
House average score of 4.0 for the period 1990-2004), making predictions 
indeterminate. Moreover, Cyprus in the early 1970s, before the attempted coup by 
Greek loyalists and the Turkish invasion that followed, was already a relatively 
democratic country (a 2.5 Freedom House score), making it nearly impossible for 
Northern Cyprus to make substantial democratic progress under Turkish control.  
Iraq, on the other hand, is a much more important case, both substantively and 
theoretically. In the final chapter Iraq will be treated at greater length, but a brief 
discussion of the case is warranted here. As a highly militarized democracy facing 
relatively low resource constraints, the United States should have been able to impose 
considerably more democratic change, according to the theory proposed here. The 
theory presented in this study, however, is probabilistic. There are two major reasons 
why a few cases – and Iraq in particular – do not behave as predicted: (i) the difficulty 
of the target environment and (ii) the manner in which an intervention is conducted. It 
is hard to imagine a case in which both of these factors could exercise a more  
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intensely negative influence on the outcome of an intervention than Iraq. Although a 
number of control variables were introduced to account for difficult intervention 
environments (level of development, ethnic heterogeneity, prior experience with 
democracy), none of these comes close to capturing the hubris required to believe that 
invading Iraq was anything less than an extraordinary gamble. Iraq is an enormous 
country. Its civil society had been crushed by decades of brutal dictatorship, leaving 
nothing but clerical hierarchies upon which to base a new political order. Its three 
major ethnic groups were divided by memories of near-genocidal acts perpetrated by 
the former regime. Its citizens’ expectations of the wealth that should flow from its oil 
reserves in no way reflected the realities of the country’s antiquated infrastructure and 
explosive population growth rate. These expectations combined with colonial legacies 
to fuel enormous suspicions of neo-colonial expropriation of the country’s oil wealth. 
And finally, the United States faced considerable suspicion and hostility as the country 
which, more than any other, had insisted on an economic sanctions regime which had 
contributed to a devastating economic decline over the 15 years before the invasion 
(Cordesman 2003). The United States exponentially increased the difficulties of an 
already daunting task by failing to plan properly for the occupation of Iraq. The U.S. 
failed to provide for public order in the weeks and months after the invasion, failed to 
identify legitimate representatives of the major Iraqi political communities, and – 
perhaps most important of all – failed to heed one of the clearest lessons of post-
conflict interventions over the past 15 years, the need to incorporate former 
combatants (in this case, former Baathists) into the new political order. Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine a worse handling of nation-building (Bunce 2005; Phillips 2005).  
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Democratic Change and Achievement 
Ultimately, what is of interest to interveners is not simply the ability to 
promote democratic change, but the ability to promote sufficient change to create at 
least an “electoral democracy” – a country which includes all major political interests 
in institutionalized political contestation, even if political liberties and the rule of law 
are not as strong as in a liberal democracy. The strongest test of the conjunction of 
intervener democracy, militarization, and resource availability is the extent to which it 
can promote both democratic change and achievement. 
The outcomes of interventions are summarized in Table 7 using the minimum 
membership score an intervention achieved on both the dependent variables of 
democratic change and democratic achievement.
55 “High change and achievement” 
are those cases in which substantial democratic change was promoted (a gain of at 
least 1.5 points out of a possible improvement of 6.0 on the Freedom House 
democracy scale) and at least electoral democracy (a score of 3.5 or better on the 
Freedom House scale) was achieved, so that a .5 or higher membership score was 
achieved on both the scales of democratic change and democratic achievement. 
“Moderate change and achievement” are those cases in which the minimum 
membership score for the two dependent variables was .33 (a change of at least 1.0 
points and the attainment of a score of at least 5.5 – that is, at least competitive 
oligarchy). The category “low or no change and achievement” represents cases in 
which the minimum was either 0 or .17 (no more than a 0.5 point improvement in 
democracy scores or no higher than a 6.0 rating on the Freedom House scale – that is, 
                                                 
55 As with all previous analyses, a .05 adjustment factor was used to determine which cases counted as 
“high” or “low” presence of a given independent variable, so that .45 is the breakpoint. Northern 
Cyprus was excluded from the table because, as discussed before, it is essentially irrelevant to the 
discussion here.  
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closed autocracy) but where no negative change (autocratization) took place.
56 Finally, 
“Autocratization” designates those cases in which the targets became more autocratic 
during the course of an intervention. 
Table 7: Democratic Achievements in Military Interventions 
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The table demonstrates a clear trend: Where an intervening state or coalition 
combines both high resource commitments and a militarized strategic culture 
(“Militarization ∩ Resources”), it is vastly more likely to externalize its regime type 
successfully. Where either militarization or resource commitments are low, target 
states are likely to remain “warlord democracies.”
57 All four cases of autocratization 
involved militarized, committed, non-democratic interveners. Three of the four cases 
of substantial democratic change and achievement were instances in which committed, 
                                                 
56 Note that the term “failure” applies to the extent to which an intervener promoted democratic change 
and achievement. Interventions that rank as failures on this count may well be successes by other 
standards, such as the restoration of public order. 
57 As discussed above, there are unfortunately no alternative indices for the dependent variable that are 
suitable for “robustness checks” of the analysis performed here. It is noteworthy, however, that the four 
cases of intervention identified above as “successes” also register as among the best performers on the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators of Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, and 
Rule of Law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). On all three of these indices, the four cases 
identified here as “successes” were among the top six highest scoring countries in 2004 from among all 
of the targets of intervention included in this study.   
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militarized, democratic interveners led the intervention. Thus, seven of the eight 
extreme outcomes correspond precisely to the predictions of the theory presented here. 
Certainly, committed, militarized democracies often do not succeed in helping target 
countries to become at least illiberal democracies; indeed, they succeeded in just under 
half of all attempts. But there is only one instance (Iraq) in which committed, 
militarized democracies did not promote at least moderate levels of change and 
achievement, whereas in the 19 interventions conducted by other types of interveners, 
only four resulted in moderate change and achievement, and only one yielded high 
levels of change and achievement. 
Conclusion 
The pattern highlighted in Table 7 is repeatedly visible in interventions over 
the past 15 years. Before any militarily capable state was willing to intervene in Sierra 
Leone, the international community invited the warlord Foday Sankoh (best known for 
his troops’ practice of amputating the limbs of civilian victims) into the government of 
the country. He subsequently repudiated the peace deal, took hundreds of UN 
peacekeepers hostage, and marched on Freetown to seize power. When Great Britain 
inserted several hundred elite troops into the country, with considerable offshore 
firepower available to support them, Foday Sankoh’s forces were repulsed and Sierra 
Leone today is more stable (albeit tentatively so) than it has been in years. Similarly, 
Australia’s willingness to confront paramilitaries in East Timor was an essential 
prerequisite for the success of the UN mission in that fledgling country. Without the 
presence of American airpower, observers agree, warlords in Afghanistan would 
quickly return to fighting, whereas the present government of Hamid Karzai has 
brought greater opportunities to consolidate a central state than Afghans have known 
in decades. In short, militarization carries substantial risks – as can be seen in Iraq and  
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Somalia – but also is usually an important element of successful democracy promotion 
in interventions. Anti-militarism also carries risks: the likelihood not that violence will 
be avoided but rather that its power will be ceded to warlords intent on shaping 
political authority structures in ways destined to promote continued violence and 
instability. 
Three caveats, however, should substantially temper anyone’s enthusiasm for 
promoting democracy through military interventions. First, militarized interveners can 
provide a sense of security to the general population of a target country, and they can 
challenge paramilitaries for control of state and shadow institutions. They can also, 
however, overly militarize an intervention – that is, they can place too much emphasis 
on military as opposed to other instruments (probably the case with the current 
American presence in Afghanistan), or they can militarize an intervention beyond the 
level of their commitment (for instance, the American performance in UNOSOM II in 
Somalia), provoking unnecessary bloodshed in either case. Second, promoting 
substantial democratic change is not the same as successfully promoting democracy. 
Few of the target states of interventions in the past 15 years achieved even the level of 
illiberal democracy (if they did not begin there already). Nor have enough 
interventions concluded for us to know in what percentage of cases positive 
democratic change can be sustained after the intervener withdraws. Finally, there are 
some cases in which a variety of factors – including the size of the target state, its 
ethnic heterogeneity, its lack of suitable civil society “partners” for the intervener, a 
history of hostile relations with the intervener, and an overwhelmingly hostile 
international environment, among others – makes intervention ill-advised no matter 
how it is structured. Iraq is almost certainly such a case. 
Recommending that would-be interveners be aware of these caveats, however, 
is not the same as recommending against interventions in general or against the  
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promotion of democracy as a goal of interventions. The record remains clear that 
democratic change can be promoted. As discussed above, six of the eight cases in 
which coalitions were dominated by committed democracies with militarized strategic 
cultures produced substantial democratic change in the target country.
58 If democracy 
promotion is difficult, or if there have been relapses towards authoritarianism, these 
outcomes may well suggest not that doing “less is more” for interventions, as Etzioni 
claimed, but rather that interveners must commit to the long haul, to challenging 
spoilers, and to strengthening civil society, and observers must compare the targets of 
intervention not against Switzerland but against what would have happened in the 
absence of intervention.  
                                                 
58 Again, the record is even better – six of seven – if the highly questionable case of the Turkish 


















In June 1997 an alliance of Tajik Islamist parties signed a peace accord with 
the government of Tajikistan, ending a civil war that had lasted five years and killed 
up to 100,000 people. The agreement between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and 
President Emomali Rakhmonov is considered by many a triumph of Russian 
diplomacy. Indeed, Russia played a critical role in brokering the settlement in which 
the various opposition parties were guaranteed a proportion of Cabinet positions and 
the chance to participate in democratic elections. For several years previously, 
however, Moscow had one-sidedly supported the government of Rakhmonov against 
the opposition. How then are we to understand Russia’s championing of the 1997 
peace accords for Tajikistan – an agreement which corresponds to the dominant post-
Cold War norm of peaceful conflict resolution through inclusive, democratic 
government – despite Russia’s radically different behavior in other times and places? 
A complete explanation, of course, would require considerable attention to 
differences in the context of the conflicts in the two regions. A more parsimonious 
explanation, however, may be found in the framework presented in the previous two 
chapters. After an initial period of internal decision-making chaos, Russia ultimately 
adopted a policy consistent with its norms of governance, its strategic culture, and its 
resource constraints. Although quasi-democratic at home in the 1990s, Russia’s own 
tumultuous experience with its democratic transition had discredited many Russian 
democrats and convinced many Russians that democratic transitions were difficult 
enough in Russia, let alone in a war-torn, impoverished Central Asian republic. 
Moreover, for much of the 1990s Russian foreign policy towards other states of the 
former Soviet Union was controlled by some of the least democratic forces in 
Moscow, the Ministry of Defense and the military. Political inclusion in military  
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interventions, therefore, was not a policy adopted by conviction but rather by the force 
of circumstances.  
Russian political elites and, to a lesser extent, the Russian people were willing 
to use force where necessary to protect Russian interests. Given the magnitude of 
Russia’s domestic problems, however, very few were willing to devote substantial 
resources to policing the conflicts that had erupted along Russia’s southern rim in the 
wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. In Tajikistan Russia faced a situation with some 
parallels to the West’s experience with both the Balkans and Afghanistan. Similar to 
Western interests in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Russia feared refugee flows 
and a loss of its own credibility and that of the alliance it had painstakingly created, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Similar to Western stakes in 
Afghanistan, Russia feared that Central Asia would become a conduit into Russia for 
both radical Islam and criminality (especially trafficking in drugs, but also in people 
and weapons). At the same time, Moscow decision-makers confronted similar 
constraints as those faced by Western leaders in the Balkans: Order was to be restored, 
but without enduring significant casualties.  
The result was a profoundly ambivalent policy. After an initial period of policy 
disarray, Moscow decided to back the faction in the Tajik civil war that seemed to best 
protect Russian interests: the former communists friendly to Moscow, rather than the 
alliance of opposition parties which were taking an increasingly Islamist direction as 
the conflict escalated. When it became clear that limited Russian support could not 
guarantee the victory of its clients, and indeed that Tajikistan was becoming an 
increasingly dangerous failed state, Moscow played a key role in brokering a peace 
agreement premised on a government of national reconciliation that brought the 
opposition into government and that conformed with global norms of conflict 
resolution. The Moscow-backed, incumbent government of Emomali Rakhmonov,  
102 
however, quickly failed to live up to its democratic commitments, but with the civil 
war over and the immediate crisis past, Moscow did very little to ensure the agreement 
it had brokered was honored by its client. Thus, the democratic provisions of the peace 
accords turned out to be largely hollow. Russia contributed to peace in Tajikistan in 
the short term while doing nothing to lay the groundwork for an inclusive political 
order that will be sustainable over time. In the terms of this study, Russian policy 
migrated from the proxy model in the first several years of its intervention to an 
uncommitted mediation model, as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Russia’s Intervention Policy toward Tajikistan 
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The rest of this chapter will proceed in four steps. First I provide a brief 
narrative of the war in Tajikistan and Russian efforts to stabilize the failing state. 
Next, I examine the conflict through the framework for structured, focused 
comparison that was presented in the first chapter. I then briefly review alternative 
explanations for the outcome in Tajikistan, and I conclude with a discussion of the 
relevance of the case of Tajikistan to the broader phenomenon of military 
interventions by non-democratic regional powers.  
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An Overview of the War and Peace in Tajikistan 
Descent into Conflict 
As with all cases of state failure and civil war, the causes of the bloody conflict 
in Tajikistan are complex. The proximate cause of the country’s disintegration was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the loss of central Soviet subsidies, which 
had constituted roughly half of Tajikistan’s economy (Dadmehr 2003, 250). The roots 
of the conflict, however, lay much deeper, in the artificiality of the Tajik state and its 
boundaries, the weakness of a cohesive Tajik identity vis-à-vis the much more 
localized identities prevalent in the mountainous republic, and the structural 
weaknesses of its economy. When social tensions mounted in the 1970s and 1980s as 
a result of a rapidly declining economy and burgeoning birth rate, they were 
frequently expressed in terms of regional or “clan” grievances (Akiner 2001; Dadmehr 
2003; Rubin 1998). Because the Soviet state never deeply penetrated into Tajik 
society, Communism in the republic became grafted onto traditional social relations. 
The patronage networks common to the Soviet economy were often cemented through 
intermarriage and similar practices, so that alliances within the Communist Party took 
on many aspects of extended kinship structures. The Communist party elites from the 
province of Leninabad – known both as the Leninabadi and Khojandi “clan” – 
dominated Tajikistan’s politics throughout most of the Soviet era. When social 
discontent turned violent in the 1990s, therefore, it adopted both ideological forms (as 
a conflict between privileged former Communists and an alliance of democrats and 
Islamists) and regional forms (as a struggle between the formerly dominant 
Leninabadis and the Pamiris, Gharmis, Hissaris, and Kulyabis, as well as between 
groups within each region vying for dominance) (Akiner 2001; Rubin 1998). 
Following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the tensions 
that had been smoldering in Tajikistan erupted in May 1992 into armed violence  
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between the (mostly Leninabadi and Kulyabi) supporters of Tajikistan’s Communist 
President Rakhman Nabiev and those of the democratic and Islamist opposition.  
By far the largest and most capable fighting force in Tajikistan at the time was 
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st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – a formerly Soviet unit that now belonged 
to Russia but was filled with large numbers of Tajikistani recruits, particularly in the 
enlisted ranks. Russia’s initial involvement in Tajikistan’s civil war was thus entirely 
unintentional and, indeed, unwilling. In 1992 Russia was a newborn state, still without 
effective diplomatic representation in the other states of the former Soviet Union and 
with vastly more pressing matters requiring the attention of Moscow than an internal 
conflict in a Central Asian backwater. To the extent that they paid any attention at all 
to events in Central Asia, much of Russia’s foreign policy establishment – then 
dominated by Western-oriented, liberal “Atlanticists” under Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev – sought to distance Russia from the autocratic, economically backward 
region (Dubnov 1996; Gretzky 1997; Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000, Chapters 2 and 3; 
Malcolm et al 1996; Orr 1998; Polikanov 2003; Raevsky and Vorob’ev 1994; 
Sagromoso 2003; Stepanova 2003b; Trenin and Malashenko 2004, 7-8; Wilhelm 
1998). Consequently, in the initial months of the war Russian policy towards 
Tajikistan was incoherent, made de facto by officers in the field. In some cases that 
policy was highly constructive. In other cases particular Russian units probably 
contributed to the fighting by providing weapons and support to allies among the 
Tajikistani combatants, while in yet other cases the Russian officers simply lost 
control of their units entirely (Gretzky 1997, 14; Orr 1998, 152-3; Schoeberlein 2002, 
476; Serrano 2003, 166; Stepanova 2003; Wilhelm 1998).  
By the fall of 1992, however, some in Moscow were becoming increasingly 
concerned by developments in Tajikistan. The Islamist elements in the coalition 
government formed in May 1992 gained the upper hand in the Tajikistani capital of  
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Dushanbe, supported by paramilitary gangs. At the same time criminalized 
paramilitaries loyal to the government were responsible for massacres in opposition 
strongholds. With violence rapidly escalating, those Russian officials paying attention 
to events in Central Asia saw numerous threats emerging from the chaos in Tajikistan: 
the rise of radical Islam, the spread of criminalized economies throughout the region, 
the spillover of ethnic violence into the rest of Central Asia and potentially into Russia 
itself, and a power vacuum that would invite intervention by a range of outside powers 
into Russia’s strategic southern rim (Beissinger 1997; Jonson 1998; Kasenov 1998).  
The war took a critical turn in November-December 1992, when the head of 
the coalition government and Islamist-democratic alliance, Akbarsho Iskanderov, was 
displaced by an armed alliance of Leninabadis and Kulyabis, militarily backed by 
Uzbekistan. Various accounts differ concerning the role that Russia and the 201
st 
MRD played during this period, ranging from benign neglect to acquiescence to active 
support. What is clear is that the Kulyabi leader Emomali Rakhmonov and his 
paramilitarized political party, the Popular Front, won control of the government of 
Tajikistan by December 1992. With the Islamists out of power and a government of 
former communists friendly to Moscow in power, Russia quickly lent its support to 
the new regime and attempted to marginalize the Islamist armed opposition, even 
while calling its military presence a “peacekeeping” mission and sponsoring 
diplomatic talks between the warring parties (Dubnov 1996; Gretzky 1997; Lynch 
2000; Serrano 2003). 
Russian support to the Kulyabi regime of Rakhmonov took a number of forms 
– military, economic, and diplomatic. The Russian military presence consisted of both 
the 201
st MRD and the Border Forces. The Border Forces were in fact comprised of 
Tajik recruits with a Russian officer corps. While these forces were to be funded by 
both Dushanbe and Moscow, in fact Rakhmonov’s cash-strapped government  
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consistently failed to provide its share of the funding, making them almost exclusively 
Russian-funded. The Border Forces were deployed along the border between 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan, while the 201
st MRD was headquartered in Dushanbe, 
with regiments in the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube regions near the Afghan border. The 
deployment locations for the Russian forces reflect their missions: to deter any direct 
attacks on the Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe and to interdict not only drugs but also 
all forms of support for the Tajik Islamist forces that seeped across the Tajik-Afghan 
border. Although the Russian forces in Tajikistan generally suffered from low morale, 
corruption, and inadequate support from Russia, they were nonetheless the clearly 
predominant military force in Tajikistan. Whenever possible they sought to achieve 
their ends through mere deterrent presence, although at times they participated in 
direct combat operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment of the 
opposition’s military bases in Afghanistan (Panfilov 1996a). They clearly were not 
designed for what is understood traditionally as peacekeeping: Rather than being 
deployed throughout the territory of Tajikistan, they were based in government 
strongholds and as an interdiction force along the border that provided the 
opposition’s main sources of supply (Jonson 1998, 13-14; Orr 1998, 155-9; 
Sagromoso 2003, 14-15, 23-27; Serrano 2003, 174-5; Trenin and Malashenko 2004, 
11). 
Financially, there was relatively little that Moscow could do to support the 
Rakhmonov regime, given Russia’s own economic problems. Nonetheless, given the 
absolute destitution of Tajikistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union, relatively 
small amounts of assistance yielded considerable influence. The government of 
Tajikistan owed Russia over $600 million. Moscow also provided a substantial part of 
the government’s (admittedly miniscule) annual budget, with many reports claiming 
that Russian funds accounted for up to two-thirds of the Central Asian state’s annual  
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budget (Rubin 1998). Finally, Russia provided the lion’s share of funding for the 
Border Forces which were ostensibly an entity jointly funded by the two governments. 
While there are some accounts of humanitarian assistance being provided by Russian 
forces, all indications are that nearly all Russian aid
59 was directed towards the 
support of the Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe, which in turn used the aid to 
perpetuate its patronage networks (Atkin 2002, 109-110; Atovullo 1996; Gafarly 
1996; Georgiev 1997; Mlechin 1995; Nazarov 1996). 
At the same time Russia used its diplomatic weight one-sidedly on behalf of 
the Rakhmonov regime, helping it to legitimate itself and to place the opposition at a 
disadvantage in peace negotiations. In 1994, for instance, Rakhmonov sought to 
bolster his regime’s domestic support by orchestrating a referendum on a new 
constitution and holding presidential elections – thus violating a Joint Declaration that 
he had signed with opposition leaders in which he promised not to organize elections 
without opposition participation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev 
reportedly stated that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had ordered the elections 
(Jonson 1998, 10), and the Russian commanders of the “peacekeeping” force in 
Tajikistan openly endorsed Rakhmonov during the campaign (Atkin 1997, 303). 
Although the United Nations flatly stated that the elections lacked even “the 
semblance of democracy,” Chernyshev proclaimed the elections to be legitimate, and 
the Russian government welcomed the elections as a milestone in Tajikistan’s 
progress towards democracy (Atkin 1997, 303; Lynch 2000, 165). These elections 
were then used as a tool to delegitimate the opposition in peace negotiations (Abarinov 
1996a; Jonson 1998, 19). 
                                                 
59 Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any published numbers on the amount of assistance provided 
to Tajikistan by Moscow. Given the extremely high levels of both inflation and corrupt diversion of 
official funds in these years, any figures on assistance that did exist would be largely meaningless. I am 
grateful to Eugene Rumer for a discussion on this point.  
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The Turn to Power-Sharing 
Throughout the period from 1993-1996, Moscow’s support for Rakhmonov 
and the Kulyabi faction was far from absolute. Moscow foreign policy-makers 
recognized that the president was a flawed leader with a narrow support base and a 
regime held together through the distribution of state spoils. Russian political elites 
also had much more pressing issues than Central Asia on their agenda, and they 
primarily sought to keep Tajikistan from disintegrating while minimizing Russian 
resource commitments to the country. As a result, Moscow’s policy was always 
somewhat equivocal, combining elements of peacekeeping and mediation between the 
Kulyabi faction of Rakhmonov and the increasingly Islamist United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO): Russia “organized a dialogue between both parties, while providing support to 
only one of them. Russia’s military commitment [was] not sufficient to resolve the 
conflict by force, and yet [was] too one-sided to act as an impartial ‘peacekeeper’” 
(Lynch 2000, 160). 
By 1996 Russia came to resolve these contradictions in its policy in favor of a 
more even-handed approach towards the warring factions. The reasons for this shift in 
policy are many, and analysts disagree about the relative priority of these various 
factors. Rakhmonov’s hold on power was becoming increasingly tenuous. The 
economic situation in Tajikistan was declining, sparking food riots and mutinies. 
Meanwhile, the Kulyabis increasingly concentrated all political power and wealth in 
their own hands, thus narrowing their base of support and antagonizing other clans and 
warlords (Atovullo 1996; Jonson 1998, 11-12; Lynch 2000, 163-6; Serrano 2003, 
174). Many in Moscow thus came to doubt the wisdom of continuing one-sided 
support for a besieged regime. At the same time as Rakhmonov’s position was 
weakening, the risks posed by a complete collapse of order in Tajikistan grew 
exponentially with the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul in 1996. With a radical Islamic  
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government in power in Afghanistan, many in Moscow felt the need to shore up 
Central Asian governments – and especially Tajikistan – as a bulwark against the 
spread of Islamic radicalism and instability (Abarinov 1996a and 1996b; Atkin 2002, 
110; Gafarly 2000).  
Thus, while Russian policy-makers did not believe in democracy as a formula 
for conflict resolution, they ultimately played a critical role in brokering a peace 
agreement for Tajikistan that included provisions for democratic elections and a 
power-sharing formula which guaranteed the opposition 30 percent of cabinet seats in 
a transitional government in exchange for opposition forces’ disarmament and 
demobilization. The final two rounds of negotiations were held in the capitals of the 
two states that were most influential in brokering the peace deal: The penultimate 
round was held in Tehran, while the General Agreement on the Establishment of 
Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed in the presence of Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on June 27, 1997. Until elections could be held for 
the presidency and parliament, a Commission on National Reconciliation, with equal 
representation from parties loyal to Rakhmonov and the United Tajik Opposition, was 
responsible for overseeing the safe return and reintegration of refugees; developing 
laws regulating political parties and the media; and working with the president to 
develop amendments to the constitution, a new election law, and a Central Election 
Commission (Akiner 2001, 55-6; Smith 1999, 244; Zoir and Newton 2001, 3-4).  
After the signing of the Moscow Agreement and considerable back-and-forth 
over the details of the transition, the United Tajik Opposition forces ultimately 
disarmed in exchange for governmental positions and new elections. Both sides of this 
exchange, however, were flawed: Disarmament and demobilization have been more 
nominal than real, while formal political inclusion of the opposition has been highly 
partial and offered on terms extremely favorable to Rakhmonov. Participation in  
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presidential elections, held in 1999, was effectively limited to a single candidate, 
President Rakhmonov, who won 97 percent of the vote. Rakhmonov’s party also won 
the vast majority of seats in the parliamentary elections held several months later, 
while the opposition won only a token number in elections which the UN and OSCE 
declared had failed to meet even minimum international standards. Murders of 
journalists and official censorship have declined since the war, although independent 
media outlets remain limited. Opposition parties are now legal, and indeed in many 
ways there is more political pluralism in Tajikistan now than in the rest of the former 
Soviet Central Asian republics. Because opportunities for formal political participation 
have been so limited, however, much political inclusion occurs at the informal level, 
with Rakhmonov offering rival warlords or faction leaders positions in government 
and access to patronage resources in exchange for some degree of loyalty. And 
numerous opposition leaders who did hold formal political authority were later 
removed from office or have been found dead (Akiner 2001, 59-65; Atkin 2002, 106-
110; Dadmehr 2003; Schoeberlein 2002, 476-7; Zoir and Newton 2001). 
A Focused Examination of Russian Policies in Tajikistan 
With the broad outlines of Russian involvement in Tajikistan established, we 
can turn to an evaluation of Russia’s policy choices using the same questions by which 
we will evaluate American and German behavior in the Balkans and Afghanistan. By 
using a uniform framework to evaluate the three countries’ intervention policies, we 
can better determine the causes and consequences of the choices they made. In this 
section I will review what was at stake for Russia, its attitudes towards democracy and 
the use of force, the policy alternatives available to Moscow, the structure of the 
Russian intervention, and the consequences of Russian policies. In subsequent sections  
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I will examine alternative explanations for Russia’s behavior and the implications of 
the Tajikistan case for a broader understanding of military interventions. 
National Interests and Attitudes 
National interests (and concomitant resource constraints), regime type, and 
strategic culture form the framework proposed by this study for understanding the 
conduct and much of the outcomes of interventions. Russia is clearly willing to use 
substantial force to ensure its preferred form of order prevails in regions of critical 
strategic concern (e.g., Chechnya), but it is highly skeptical that democracy is the form 
of political order that can or should be promoted. In the case of Tajikistan the absence 
of critical national interests explains the ambiguities and reversals that characterized 
Russian policy – in particular, the shift from one-sided (albeit qualified) Russian 
support for Rakhmonov to instrumental (and half-hearted) support for powersharing 
and “democratic” elections. 
Democracy. Russia is neither a liberal democracy nor a closed autocracy. 
Rather it is a transitional regime which for many years during the 1990s possessed 
many of the attributes of a democracy before slipping once again towards autocracy 
under the administration of Vladimir Putin. Both the country’s political culture and its 
institutions played a role in shaping its policy towards Tajikistan. As citizens of a 
country that was only beginning the transition towards democracy, Russians in the 
1990s had not fully internalized the norms of democracy. Moreover, democratic 
governmental institutions in Russia were still highly tentative in the 1990s. In 
particular, much of the security and defense apparatus operated without strong civilian 
oversight. Because these were the institutions most responsible for Russian foreign 
policy in the so-called “near abroad,” the institutional checks on foreign policy that we  
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might expect to operate in democracies functioned poorly or not at all. The result was 
initially a preference for the proxy model of intervention, although Russia turned to a 
mediation approach when it found that it could not successfully implement the proxy 
model within existing resource constraints.  
Russians’ attitude towards democracy is highly conflicted, in large part 
because of their own experience with a turbulent and economically devastating period 
of transition from Soviet rule. Russians have observed first-hand the many difficulties 
of democratic transitions. If a country with Russia’s relatively developed economy, 
state institutions, and educational system has struggled to establish a stable and 
prosperous democratic order, then, most Russians assume, there is very little hope for 
regions such as Central Asia. While Russians generally support democracy in 
principle, they are vastly more likely than citizens in mature democracies to believe 
that “democracy is not very good for the maintenance of order” (Zimmerman 2002, 
49). Opinion among Russia’s foreign policy elites is highly skeptical of democracy 
promotion as a goal of foreign policy, commonly seeing it as errant sentimentality or 
empty rhetorical cover for policies driven by geopolitical imperatives (Bordachev 
1998; Dorenko 2003; Lo 2003, 100-101). Interestingly, even in the writings of 
relatively liberal academics, references to democracy as an instrument of conflict 
resolution are almost non-existent (for instance Kremeniuk 2001; Lebedeva 2000; 
Stepanova 2003).  
The actual makers of Russian policy towards the former Soviet Union are even 
less inclined to experiment with democracy as a means of stabilizing Russia’s 
periphery. Particularly for the first several years after the fall of the Soviet Union (the 
period of Tajikistan’s civil war), Russian policy towards its “near abroad” was 
dominated by the military and Ministry of Defense – the most illiberal bastions of the 
Russian foreign policy establishment (Lo 2003, 21-22, 34-5; Lynch 2000, 10;  
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Sagromoso 2003, 17, 24-27; Zimmerman 2002, 55). These elements of the foreign 
policy establishment were dominated by personnel who demonstrated considerable 
continuities with the Soviet era, and they frequently operated without any transparency 
or effective civilian oversight.  
The limits of Russia’s own democratic transition thus tended to be externalized 
in its relations with its neighbors. Russian public opinion was ambivalent about 
democracy when it was confronted with challenges to public order. Russian siloviki 
(Defense, Interior, military, and intelligence elites) were even more skeptical, and they 
were often able to exercise their illiberal preferences without effective check by 
civilian leaders or the public more generally. Consequently, Russia tended to support 
loyal autocrats over unstable or hostile leaders who came to power by democratic 
means (Gretzky 1997, 40; Malashenko 2000). 
Strategic Culture. Russian foreign policy was characterized by other 
continuities as well. The same militarized strategic culture seen in the Soviet approach 
to Afghanistan was evident as well in Tajikistan, which the Russian military generally 
approached through the lens of counter-insurgency (Lynch 2000, 9, 98-100; Raevsky 
and Vorob’ev 1994, 5; Sagromoso 2003, 15). Russian peacekeeping doctrine in 
general emphasizes many strategies, tactics, and forms of military organization more 
appropriate to counter-insurgency, and Russian “peacekeeping” forces operate without 
effective rules of engagement or other systematic restrictions on the use of force 
(Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000, 98-102; Polikanov 2003; Raevsky and Vorob’ev 1994; 
Sagromoso 2003). This militarized strategic culture was evident during Tajikistan’s 
civil war in Russia’s sporadic artillery and aerial bombardment of opposition forces.  
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National Interests. Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Tajikistan – and, 
indeed, throughout the former Soviet Union – is highly “overdetermined” (Evangelista 
1996, Roeder 1997). Russia had a large number of national interests at stake in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia: stemming the flood of narcotics (and other contraband) 
from Central Asia into Russia, preventing the spread of radical Islam and inter-ethnic 
conflict further northwards, checking the encroachment of outside powers’ influence 
in the region, and maintaining Russia’s great power status in the lands it once ruled. 
Analysts disagree about the relative priority of these various factors, but they all 
obviously played some role in spurring Russia’s involvement in the conflict. 
Tajikistan was a key transit route for a torrent of drugs (opium and heroin) flowing out 
of Afghanistan, with state seizures of thousands of kilos of opium and heroin and a 
total volume of traffic probably ten times that amount, worth billions of dollars 
annually (Akiner 2001, 74-5; Olcott 2001, 42-3). Although Russian units in Tajikistan 
to some extent became “captured” by the drug trade, profiting from it themselves 
(Gretzky 1997, 25; Rubin 1998), one of the reasons for their deployment was 
nonetheless to reduce the flow of narcotics entering Russia. Fear of radical Islam and 
the spread of ethnic and sectarian violence also played an important role, particularly 
given Russian fears of state disintegration on the Yugoslav model in the early 1990s 
(Abarinov 1996a and 1996b; Gafarly 2000; Kasenov 1998; Rashid 2002). A 
geopolitical worldview and notions of a new “Great Game” in Central Asia also fueled 
interventionist tendencies among elements of the Russian foreign policy 
establishment, who desired to deny the region to potentially hostile foreign powers 
such as the United States, Turkey, Iran, and China (Bushkov et al 2002; Cummings 
2001; Kasenov 1998; Lo 2003, 83; Polikanov 2003, 190-191). Finally, Russian desire 
to maintain its great power status and its international reputation played some role as  
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well (Legvold 1999, Mlechin 1995, Dadmehr 2003), although Central Asia was hardly 
the ideal stage for recapturing lost international prestige (Kahler 1997). 
All of these interests were more than sufficient to guarantee some level of 
Russian commitment to Tajikistan, but none of them constituted such a clear strategic 
imperative as to justify the expenditure of substantial resources, either in terms of 
scarce money or Russian lives. Russia desired to stabilize its southern neighbor, but it 
was imperative that the effort to do so be accomplished with limited resources 
(Cummings 2001; Jonson 1998; Sagromoso 2003, 23; Serrano 2003). When Russia 
committed to the Rakhmonov regime it was originally convinced that its military 
forces could be used to secure Russian interests at a manageable cost (Polikanov 2003, 
188). When events in Tajikistan and Afghanistan demonstrated the risks of less than 
full commitment to the Rakhmonov regime, Russia was forced to reconsider its 
original policy of support for its proxy (Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000). 
The Structure of Intervention 
From 1993 to 1996 Russia adopted the “proxy” approach to intervention, 
attempting to ensure that its preferred faction won in Tajikistan’s civil war. When this 
policy proved unsustainable at a moderate level of resource commitments, Russia 
shifted to the “mediation” model, helping to orchestrate the peace deal that brought the 
Islamists of the UTO into office. Both of these models of intervention were apparent 
in the ways Russia structured both the military and civilian aspects of its intervention. 
Military Forces. Russia’s military presence took three forms: the 201
st 
Motorized Rifle Division, the Border Forces, and a variety of Russian military officers 
who held official positions in the government of Tajikistan. Up to 25,000 soldiers 
were authorized to the 201
st MRD, although its true strength was between 6,000 and  
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10,000 (Orr 1998, 155; Lynch 2000). Despite its budget shortfalls, low morale, and 
problems with corruption, the 201
st MRD was the overwhelmingly dominant military 
force in the country, with a monopoly on heavy artillery, heavy armored vehicles, and 
aerial support.
60 The Border Guards were comprised almost entirely of Tajik recruits 
with predominantly Russian officers. Although officially the governments of both 
Russia and Tajikistan were supposed to contribute equally to their budget, the Border 
Guards were financed almost entirely by Russia. They numbered approximately 
10,000-14,000 (Lynch 2000, 154; Orr 1998, 156). Finally, Russians held a variety of 
key “power ministry” positions and advisory roles in the government of Rakhmonov, 
including minister of defense from 1992 to 1995 (Atkin 2002, 109-110). In contrast, 
the government of Tajikistan (under Rakhmonov) had approximately 3000 soldiers by 
1996, mostly armed and trained by the Russians, while opposition forces had a total of 
approximately 10,000-12,000 fighters scattered among a variety of small, regionally 
based, and poorly trained paramilitaries (Lynch 2000, 154). Despite all of their 
problems, therefore, Russian forces were clearly capable of playing a decisive role in 
the conflict. 
Two of the 201
st MRD’s regiments and its headquarters element were deployed 
near the capital of Dushanbe, while the other two regiments were deployed near the 
Afghan border (Orr 1998, 155). The Border Guards were deployed primarily along the 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. The spatial deployment of these forces was significant. 
They were not deployed as a typical peacekeeping mission, either interposed between 
the warring factions or distributed throughout the country in order to build confidence 
and security among all parties. They instead were concentrated around the capital, thus 
deterring any attacks on their ally Rakhmonov, and along the southern border of 
Tajikistan, thus interdicting the opposition forces’ main supply lines from Afghanistan 
                                                 
60 Despite its problems, in 1998 the 201
st was rated Russia’s top military division (Akiner 2001, 44, 46; 
Polikanov 2003, 195).  
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(Neumann and Solodovnik 1995; Serrano 2003, 174-6; Trenin and Malashenko 2004, 
11, 113). 
Due to Russia’s resource limitations, Russian forces relatively seldom played 
an activist role during the civil war in Tajikistan. Most of the time they served simply 
as a deterrent and as “echelon support” to the Border Guards, the ranks of which were 
filled with Tajikistani recruits. When they did take direct part in combat, however, 
they typically did so using warfighting tactics on behalf of the government of 
Rakhmonov (Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000; Sagromoso 2003, 27). Since the end of the 
war, Russian troops have had relatively little influence on politics in Tajikistan.  
Civilian Aid and Diplomacy. It is impossible to assess with any precision the 
amount of aid Russia gave to Tajikistan. With periods of hyperinflation and rampant 
corruption, all figures cited are largely notional. Various reports have estimated that 
Tajikistan borrowed over $600 million from Russia during the course of the war 
(Nazarov 1996), while Duma deputies claimed that Russia was providing assistance 
worth roughly 25 billion rubles per year during the war (Gafarly 1996). Given the 
enormity of Russia’s own economic troubles, Russia certainly did not infuse anywhere 
near the money into Tajikistan that Western powers donated to Bosnia, for example. In 
a country as impoverished as Tajikistan, however, when no other donors are providing 
substantial assistance, infusions of $100 or more million per year represent a 
significant source of political leverage. At various points in the conflict this aid was 
reported to have played critical roles – for instance, weeks before the 1994 presidential 
elections in Tajikistan, when a reported Russian transfer of 15 billion rubles allowed 
Rakhmonov to pay months of wage arrears (Atkin 1997, 303). 
Russian diplomacy throughout much of the conflict was equally lopsided. As 
discussed above, Russia typically attempted to fuse the roles of mediator and partisan,  
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sponsoring peace talks and then pressing the opposition to accede to Rakhmonov’s 
terms – the integration of the opposition into purely advisory bodies with no 
representation in government itself and no guarantees of a level playing field in future 
elections. Opposition leaders frequently decried Russian pressure and threats and 
demanded substantive powersharing arrangements (Musin 1996, Pel’ts 1995, Rotar’ 
1996). After the shift in Russian policy in 1996, the opposition publicly noted the 
more even-handed role that Russian diplomats played in the negotiations and publicly 
praised top Russian officials for extracting meaningful concessions from Rakhmonov 
(Rotar’ 1996, Sytaia 1997). 
Since the end of the war, Russia has possessed fewer sources of leverage over 
the Rakhmonov regime and thus has had less of an influence over specific political 
outcomes in Tajikistan (Smith 1999). Most of Russia’s efforts have focused on 
ensuring the continued presence of Russian forces in the country. Russia retains a 
number of important tools with which to influence Tajikistan, however. The continued 
Russian military presence was an important counterbalance to threats from 
Afghanistan before September 11 and remains important vis-à-vis Uzbekistan 
(Dadmehr 2003, 257). Moreover, alongside opium and heroin trafficking, remittances 
from Tajikistani workers in Russia are one of the most important source of revenues 
for Tajikistan, and Russia remains one of the very few potential investors in the 
impoverished country (Panfilova 2002; Rashid 2002, 107). Had Russia chosen, 
therefore, it could have exerted some amount of influence on Rakhmonov to live up to 
the powersharing and democratic commitments he undertook in the Moscow 
Agreement that ended the civil war. There are no indications that Moscow did so.  
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Policy Options 
Although resource constraints induced a shift in Russian policy from a proxy 
model of intervention to a mediation strategy, neither of these choices was 
foreordained by the circumstances of the region or conflict. Other countries in 
Russia’s strategic position could have made different choices – and indeed, others 
have adopted a more politically inclusive approach. 
Powersharing was a fully viable alternative from the beginning of the conflict. 
Indeed, in the earliest months of the crisis, before Tajikistan captured the attention of 
at least some policymakers in Moscow, the commander of Russia’s 201
st MRD, 
General Zabolotnyi, brokered a powersharing arrangement among the primary 
antagonists. This agreement endured several months before disintegrating amid mutual 
suspicions and escalating violence. Rather than taking steps to buttress the 
powersharing government and increase transparency among the factions, Russia at a 
minimum acceded to and very possibly actively participated in the Kulyabis’ seizure 
of power under Rakhmonov in late 1992 – a move that was initially resisted by the 
Atlanticists in Moscow.  
Over the ensuing years Russia could have pressured Rakhmonov to make 
concessions to the opposition. In the end the United Tajik Opposition accepted a peace 
deal very similar to demands that it had voiced in the early years of the war (Mlechin 
1995; Rotar’ 1996; Smith 1999). Had Rakhmonov made such an offer in 1993, the war 
might have ended years earlier. Analysts broadly agree, however, that Russian military 
and financial support to Rakhmonov removed any incentive for him to compromise 
(Atavullo 2000; Atkin 1997, 303; Atkin 2002, 109-110; Jonson 1998, 9-10; Lynch 
2000, 164-6). Similarly, while a number of other factors and actors contributed to the 
peace accords in the end, Russian pressure on Rakhmonov was, if not the critical 
condition, certainly one of the key prerequisites for the peace deal (Dadmehr 2003,  
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257; Rotar’ 1996; Smith 1999, 248; Sytaia 1997). Thus a powersharing formula was a 
viable policy option throughout the years of the civil war. Moscow simply preferred to 
ensure the outright victory of its proxy. 
In the aftermath of the civil war Rakhmonov has reneged on many of the 
powersharing and democratic commitments he undertook in the peace negotiations. 
Russia has not held him to any of these promises. Certainly Tajikistan offers relatively 
infertile soil for democracy, but it is not unreasonable to believe that a political system 
could institutionalize access to political power for all major political groupings in 
Tajikistan and provide the public at least some minimal ability to sanction abuses of 
power. Nearby Mongolia, for instance, scores a “2” on the Freedom House democracy 
index – a score equal to Mexico’s and Romania’s. While Russian academics and think 
tank experts generally dismiss any talk of democracy in relation to Central Asia, many 
Central Asia specialists in the United States vigorously defend democracy as the 
appropriate prescription for the region’s downward spiral (Olcott 2005; Schoeberlein 
2002). International organizations have sought to instill democratic processes: The UN 
and OSCE have sought to uphold the integrity of the electoral process in Tajikistan, 
while the IMF and World Bank placed pressure on Rakhmonov to withdraw a 
legislative proposal that would have banned Islamist parties from participating in 
elections. In all of these cases Russia was either silent or actively supported the 
legitimacy of elections tilted overwhelmingly in Rakhmonov’s favor. Furthermore, the 
United States and numerous international NGOs have sought to nurture civil society in 
Tajikistan as a means of both checking and bolstering state power (Babus 2004; Slim 
and Hodizoda 2002).
61 Other actors, in short, have sought to encourage both 
                                                 
61 There has been some U.S. ambivalence concerning the promotion of democracy in Tajikistan. A 
number of reports suggest that the United States subordinated democracy to concerns over Islamic 
radicalism (Mesbahi 1997; Rashid 2002). At the same time, USAID has funded programs to promote 
civil society, and the U.S. government has emphasized democracy-promotion in its public 
pronouncements. Inconsistencies in the U.S. approach are not particularly surprising. Tajikistan has 
always been peripheral to American national interests, and thus the United States has never committed  
121 
horizontal and vertical political inclusion – that is, political competition among all 
major organized political groupings and participation by unarmed elements of civil 
society. Russia, on the other hand, initially opposed inclusion of the opposition in 
political competition and since the end of the war has done nothing to uphold either 
competition or participation. 
None of this discussion indicates that Russia should have pursued a higher-
order democracy-promotion strategy in Tajikistan. Given Russia’s resource constraints 
and the difficulty of the environment – with Tajikistan’s Soviet-era economy having 
collapsed and the opium economy booming – such an approach would have been 
highly challenging. Yet a powersharing formula combined with some efforts to 
constrain the worst abuses of warlords and to foster unarmed elements of civil society 
was a perfectly plausible alternative to that adopted by Russia. Indeed, this blueprint 
formed the basis of international organizations’, transnational NGOs’, and the United 
States’ approach to both Tajikistan and neighboring Afghanistan after September 11
th. 
As a result of the U.S.-led intervention, Afghanistan has demonstrated greater political 
liberalization (as measured by Freedom House) in four years than Tajikistan has in the 
nine years since a peace deal was brokered. Had Russia – likely in conjunction with 
international organizations and other international actors – adopted such an approach, 
it may have helped to alleviate some of the problems that have plagued postwar 
Tajikistan. 
Outcomes 
Russia’s turn to a mediation strategy in 1996-1997 had the advantage of 
shoring up the Tajikistani state and maintaining Russian influence while 
                                                                                                                                              
significant resources to pursuing its policies in the country. Without substantial sources of leverage, 
Washington was unlikely to pursue in earnest an ambitious democracy agenda resisted by existing 
power-holders, although indications are that it has done so to the extent its resource commitments 
permit (Babus 2004).  
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simultaneously limiting Russian resource commitments. This change of strategy 
enabled Russia to play a critical role in bringing Tajikistan’s civil war to an end – a 
triumph for Russian diplomacy, even if its client Rakhmonov is hardly the Abraham 
Lincoln of Central Asia that the Russian military’s newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda, 
claimed (Ramazanov 2001). Given Russia’s resource constraints and the lack of 
commitment from other international actors, a mediation strategy designed to bring the 
primary warring factions into a powersharing arrangement was probably the strategy 
best-suited for bringing stability to Tajikistan. Such an approach, however, still has 
significant drawbacks, and Russia’s lack of follow-through with its client has further 
exacerbated these failings. 
The postwar political order in Tajikistan has been characterized by three flaws: 
the gutting of the formal powersharing provisions of the peace agreement, the 
concentration of power among warlords, and the prevalence of violence and 
assassinations among Tajikistan’s various factions. Postwar Tajikistan has tolerated 
substantially more political pluralism than any of the other former Soviet Central 
Asian republics save Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, this tolerance is born of necessity – 
the inability of either side to triumph militarily in the civil war – rather than 
conviction. Rakhmonov has used his domination of state organs to craft political 
institutions and electoral laws that have rapidly eviscerated the formal powersharing 
provisions of the Moscow Agreement. As discussed above, the president won re-
election in 1999 with 97 percent of the vote. Rakhmonov has engineered the removal 
of many opposition figures from the governmental positions they won as a result of 
the peace accords, often replacing them with the Kulyabis who held the positions 
before the peace deal. A number of prominent opposition politicians have been 
assassinated. Meanwhile, Rakhmonov has sought to co-opt various faction leaders by 
offering them lucrative positions within the Kulyabi-dominated patronage network.  
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While this informal powersharing is pluralism of a sort, it is pluralism offered 
primarily on Rakhmonov’s terms (Schoeberlein 2002; Smith 1999 and 2002; Zoir and 
Newton 2001). 
In part as a consequence, much political power has remained concentrated in 
“shadow institutions” outside of the state. The various warlords of the civil war period 
almost universally retained the loyalty and capabilities of their paramilitaries. They are 
the de facto political authorities of large swathes of territory in Tajikistan, and they 
effectively control much of the economy. Without greater institutionalization of 
powersharing within the government, and without the empowerment of unarmed 
elements of civil society, these power-brokers have no incentive to sacrifice their 
prerogatives to the state. Thus Rakhmonov has concentrated much of Tajikistan’s 
formal political power in his own hands only by eviscerating the scope of the state’s 
effective authority (Dadmehr 2003; Slim and Hodizoda 2002).  
Such a political system rewards the use of violence as a routine instrument of 
politics. Assassinations and gunfights have been common in Tajikistan since the end 
of the war, and even larger-scale insurrections have taken place from time to time. The 
level of violence is obviously much lower than it was during the civil war, but its 
continued prevalence at low intensities has troubling implications for the future of the 
country (Dadmehr 2003).  
Russia’s incomplete efforts to broker a powersharing agreement, in other 
words, have purchased peace and relative stability in the short-term for Tajikistan – a 
worthy accomplishment. But the failure of Russia and other outside powers to 
reinforce the institutionalization of powersharing and to develop broader 
constituencies committed to peace risks the stagnation or even reversal of Tajikistan’s 
precarious political order.  
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Contending Explanations 
While the framework presented here provides an explanation for the strategic 
choices made by Russia and the consequences that they had for the political authority 
structures of Tajikistan, others have advanced alternative explanations, including 
Russia’s strategic position, its internal weaknesses, and the role of international actors 
and global discourses. 
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the account provided in this chapter 
is that Russia was not the critical actor involved in brokering the peace deal for 
Tajikistan. In a number of narratives of the war, either internal factors (in particular, 
war exhaustion and a number of battlefield reverses suffered by forces loyal to 
Rakhmonov) (Hay 2001; Smith 1999) or the United Nations and other international 
actors (Goryayev 2001) played decisive roles in bringing about the powersharing 
compromise that ended the conflict. Certainly both of these elements contributed to 
the shape of the postwar political authority structures of Tajikistan. There are clear 
reasons for believing that Russia’s role, however, was ultimately decisive. While 
forces loyal to Rakhmonov did suffer several defeats in the months prior to the 
Moscow Agreement, numerous reports suggest that Russian troops’ new-found 
commitment to neutrality (following Russia’s shift of strategy in 1996) were 
responsible for a number of these military setbacks (Panfilov 1996d). And while the 
UN played an invaluable role in promoting dialogue between the parties and drafting 
the specific arrangements of the peace accords, without taking into account Russia’s 
role, it is impossible to explain why Rakhmonov became willing to compromise in 
1996 and 1997 but had not been willing in the four years previous.  
A second potential line of argumentation claims that the Russian approach to 
Tajikistan differed from the United States’ and NATO’s approach to Bosnia or 
Kosovo because the two actors’ strategic motivations were different. In the case of the  
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former Yugoslavia, the primary threats to NATO were posed by state failure – waves 
of immigration and the potential of the slaughters to undermine the alliance’s 
credibility at home and abroad. Consequently, NATO sought only to stabilize the 
former Yugoslav republics and help to build new states. Russia, on the other hand, 
sought to prevent incursions into Central Asia by outside rivals to Russian hegemony, 
and consequently Moscow aimed to ensure an ally held office in Tajikistan. Thus, 
according to this argument, Russia’s strategic situation, not regime type, explains why 
it sought to create a loyal autocracy in Tajikistan. 
It is indeed true that many Russians think in geopolitical terms and understood 
the stakes of Central Asia in general or Tajikistan in particular in terms of great power 
rivalry (Bushkov et al. 2002; Dubnov 1996). The chaotic decision-making of the 
Yeltsin government and the opaque decision-making of the Putin government make it 
impossible to provide a truly definitive judgment on the relative significance of the 
various threats Russian decision-makers perceived to be emanating from Tajikistan. 
All publicly available information nonetheless points to greater Russian concern for 
the consequences of state failure in Tajikistan than for an alignment of Tajikistan with 
a foreign power. Certainly top Russian officials frequently stressed radical Islam, 
narcotics trafficking, and generalized instability as the greatest threats posed by 
Tajikistan and Central Asia more broadly, and the 1993, 1997, and 2000 National 
Security Concepts all de-emphasized state-based threats relative to non-state threats 
(Abarinov 1996b; Gafarly 1996; Ivanov 2004; Lo 2003, 83). Moreover, unlike the 
Caucasus, Tajikistan evoked only very limited interest among any external powers, 
with the partial exception of Iran. Although Iran provided some support for 
Tajikistan’s Islamist opposition, such support was limited, and in any case, due to a 
variety of ethnic, religious, and economic factors, Iran’s involvement posed little 
threat to the rest of Central Asia (Mesbahi 1997). Finally, Russian behavior  
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throughout the crisis indicates it prioritized these threats over those posed by external 
powers. As discussed above, in the initial months of the conflict Russian officers 
sought to broker a powersharing agreement among the Tajikistani factions, and 
Foreign Minister Remake did so again in 1996-97. Moreover, after the September 11
th 
attacks, President Putin was quick to accept the American military presence in the 
region in order to alleviate the threats posed by Afghanistan. All of these actions are 
more consistent with a prioritization of state failure threats over those of geopolitics. 
Thus Moscow’s strategic situation was not substantially different from that of NATO 
relative to Yugoslavia or the United States in Afghanistan. Russia nonetheless chose to 
adopt a different strategy, and this choice has had significant implications for 
Tajikistan’s political development. 
A third argument might explain the difference in outcomes between Russia’s 
intervention and Western interventions in terms of aid commitments: Russia’s 
economic collapse precluded it from spending the sums of money committed by rich, 
Western states in successful instances of peace building. Certainly Russia’s parlous 
economic situation restricted the amount of aid it could commit to Tajikistan, and 
more economic assistance for Tajikistan may well have helped to secure more 
inclusive political authority structures. Yet there are at least three reasons for believing 
the lack of aid did not determine political outcomes in Tajikistan. First, as discussed in 
pervious chapters, the “carrot” of aid can often have perverse consequences when 
offered in the absence of any “stick” with which to keep under control the predations 
of paramilitarized factions. Thus additional aid without an external military presence 
designed to ensure a more inclusive political system may well have simply reinforced 
the position of Rakhmonov, who would have had more patronage resources to 
disburse. Second, although little external assistance would have been forthcoming in 
any case, given Tajikistan’s utter irrelevance to most states prior to September 11,  
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international reluctance to become involved in Tajikistan was in part motivated by 
concern for the role that Russian “peacekeeping” troops were playing in the internal 
conflict (Neumann and Solodovnik 1995).
62 Had Russia committed to a more even-
handed policing of the civil war and welcomed a more substantial political role for the 
United Nations, additional aid may have been available. Thus the lack of aid for 
Tajikistan was in part a consequence rather than a cause of the country’s continued 
authoritarianism. Third, Russia did possess considerable leverage over Rakhmonov 
through those economic assets which were at its disposal: The economy of Tajikistan 
was largely dependent on the remittances of Tajikistani workers in Russia; Russia was 
the single most realistic potential economic partner for Tajikistan; and that aid which 
Russia did commit was employed to maximum political effect – such as the 
disbursement of billions of rubles directly to Rakhmonov’s government immediately 
before the 1994 elections. While Russia could not afford to donate billions of dollars 
annually for the reconstruction of Tajikistan, Russia did have the tools to help foster a 
more inclusive political solution for Tajikistan. Moscow chose not to use these tools 
for that purpose. 
Finally, Russia’s championing of a powersharing arrangement and elections in 
the 1997 peace accords might be attributable to the influence of a global norm of 
peacebuilding pervasive in the post-Cold War era. According to Roland Paris (2003, 
442-3), for instance, “peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed 
to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture” – 
specifically by promoting democratic, sovereign states. This argument may not 
                                                 
62 The relationship between Russia, the West, and various international organizations in Tajikistan was 
a complex one. On the one hand, many Western powers – particularly the US – were content to let 
Russia play a stablizing role along Afghanistan’s northern border, seeing in this an opportunity to limit 
the expansion of instability and Islamic radicalism without direct Western involvement. On the other 
hand, many of these same countries had substantial concerns about the manner in which Russia used its 
influence in Tajikistan. Consequently, Russia was able to get some recognition of its special role in 
Tajikistan through the UN and OSCE, but it was not able to obtain the financial support for its 
“peacekeeping” activities that it desperately sought. Moreover, Russia was often reluctant to grant the 
UN or OSCE too large a role in Tajikistan. (See also Lynch 2000, 163; Sagramoso 2003, 19, 29).  
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originally have been meant to apply to cases such as Russian “peacekeeping” along its 
southern rim. The consistency of the Russian-brokered peace accords with these 
global norms is nonetheless striking. Does Russia’s conformity with these global 
norms mean that these norms drove Russian decision-making? To the contrary, 
Russian behavior suggests that we should treat such correlational arguments about the 
relationship of norms and behavior with some caution. Russia followed a strategic 
logic in which such global norms were an afterthought for most of the actors who 
dominated Russian policy towards Tajikistan. So long as policy-makers in Moscow 
believed Rakhmonov could win the civil war with modest Russian support, they 
whole-heartedly backed him.
63 Only when the costs of outright victory came to appear 
prohibitive and the risks of failure increasingly serious did Russia champion a 
meaningful powersharing formula in peace negotiations. Russian behavior, in short, 
followed a path determined by its own regime type, strategic culture, and resource 
constraints, not by global norms, which were followed when convenient and ignored 
otherwise.  
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
Two important implications follow from this analysis. First, logics of 
consequence and logics of appropriateness can yield similar or even identical 
outcomes, making it imperative to consider equifinality in social science explanations. 
Many observers have noted a global norm of democracy in the post-Cold War era 
(Fox 2000; Franck 2000), and Paris has even claimed that agencies structuring 
peacekeeping missions have uncritically adopted this norm (Paris 2003). Russia’s 
actions in 1996-97 and the peace agreement it brokered appear to lend support to the 
notion that this global norm has shaped conflict resolution efforts since the end of the 
                                                 
63 Such an approach also characterized Russian behavior in Chechnya and in the southern Caucasus, 
where Russian military activities bolstered their preferred proxies (Shenfield 1995).  
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Cold War. A closer look at Russian behavior – particularly its actions from 1993-96 in 
Tajikistan and its activities in the Caucasus – suggests that it was driven by a strategic 
logic emphasizing resource constraints and discounting democracy. Obviously 
Russian “peacekeeping” in the former Soviet Union is not a typical example of 
peacebuilding operations. Yet the fact that it adopted a similar form with very 
different motivations should lead us to question the extent to which normative 
convergence is possible in part because it is compatible with more strategic logics.  
Russia’s behavior in Tajikistan also carries implications for policy, not simply 
for the former Soviet Union but also for other instances in which non-democratic 
states have intervened to restore order in neighboring states, such as Syria’s 
intervention in Lebanon or Nigeria’s in Liberia. The fact that Russia played a critical 
role in bringing peace to Tajikistan suggests that non-democratic regional powers can 
be a positive force for promoting stability in unstable regions of the world. This 
positive potential comes with a caveat, however. Russia’s policy was most inclusive 
when it felt its resource constraints most keenly, and its policy was least inclusive 
precisely when it believed it could devote the resources necessary to achieve its first-
order preferences. Thus, when non-democratic “regional sheriffs” such as Russia are 
most able to promote an inclusive peace, they may well be least willing.  
Such a conclusion does not indicate that cooperation between democracies and 
non-democracies in flashpoints such as Tajikistan is impossible, however. As 
discussed in the chapters above, when facing high resource constraints, all states’ 
preferences concerning interventions are remarkably similar, converging on the 
“mediation” model of intervention. In cases such as Chechnya, where an unstable 
region directly threatens core national interests of a non-democracy, non-democracies 
are likely to adopt very different strategies from those of democracies. But where 
national interests are less directly engaged and resource constraints concomitantly  
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higher, non-democracies may be persuaded to cooperate with democracies to 
implement the mediation model. In cases such as Tajikistan, Western states may be 
able to offer financial assistance to a non-democratic intervener in return for a 
verifiable commitment to broad political inclusion in a powersharing formula. Such 
international cooperation will be difficult, given the very different ways that 
democracies and non-democracies tend to approach such interventions, but it should 
nonetheless be possible. Where successful, it offers the potential for Western states to 
enlist regional actors in securing acceptable outcomes without becoming militarily 





Although the general outlines of the war and NATO intervention in Bosnia are 
well known, the case remains an important source of lessons for scholars interested in 
the relationship between state-building and military force. Given the richness of 
previous accounts, this chapter does not seek to “tell the story” of international 
involvement in Bosnia, and it certainly does not do justice to the subtleties of the case. 
The chapter aims instead to answer the two questions motivating the broader study: 
What approaches did the various intervening powers adopt in the course of the 
military interventions in Bosnia, and what were the consequences of those 
approaches?  
The conjunction of regime type, strategic culture, and national interest again 
provides a useful, parsimonious framework for understanding the policies of the major 
intervening powers. From the beginning of the crisis, before violence erupted, the 
democracies of western Europe and the United States were all committed to 
democracy in the Balkans both as an ideal end-state and as the preferred means of 
conflict regulation – although many were skeptical that democracy could brake the 
building momentum toward war. Significant differences, however, quickly arose 
between the Western powers concerning the relative significance they accorded the 
Balkans and the perceived relationship between force and diplomacy. The United 
States consistently believed that force was the ultima ratio that would likely decide the 
outcome of the various Yugoslav republics’ and autonomous regions’ relationships 
with Belgrade. While diplomacy would inevitably play an important role, Washington 
decision-makers tended to view diplomacy initially as a hope-beyond-hope that 
violence could be avoided and later as either a palliative to the dreadful consequences 
of violence or a means of marshalling support for military suasion. European  
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statesmen and women, on the other hand, commonly placed greater confidence in 
persuasion and diplomatic leverage. The United States thus tended to favor maximalist 
solutions to the war in Bosnia – ones that emphasized justice over peace (to borrow a 
trope in common use throughout the crisis), but that would require substantial military 
force to implement. While certainly sensitive to the cause of justice, European powers 
typically were willing to make greater concessions to the militarily stronger parties – 
the Serbs of Bosnia and Serbia proper – in order to avoid military escalation.  
The catastrophic disconnect in American foreign policy, as many observers 
have noted, is that its preference for a relatively more inclusive political order for 
Bosnia (and later for Kosovo) was unmatched by its interests in the region. It was not 
until the survival of the Atlantic alliance itself was threatened that the United States 
directly engaged in Bosnia. Despite the spasmodic quality of American intervention in 
the former Yugoslavia, it was eventual American commitment to the region that made 
possible a relatively inclusive peace settlement for Bosnia. In the absence of American 
intervention, had a peace agreement been brokered, it almost certainly would have 
come at the expense of the militarily weakest party, the Bosnian Muslims. While in 
many respects flawed both in their initial formulation and in their implementation, the 
Dayton accords and subsequent implementation operations have created space for an 
inclusive and participatory postwar order gradually to take hold.  
In terms of the theory undergirding this analysis, only the United States and 
eventually the United Kingdom combined a commitment to democracy promotion, a 
militarized strategic culture, and eventually sufficient commitment to act on their 
preferences.
64 The differences between the United States and European actors are 
illustrated in Table 9. 
                                                 
64 Following the British Labour Party’s electoral victory in 1997 and Tony Blair’s assumption of the 
position of Prime Minister, the UK also adopted a transformational approach to both Bosnia and later 
Kosovo. The reasons for and implications of this variation in British policy will be discussed in greater 
detail below.  
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Table 9: Major Powers’ Intervention Policies toward Bosnia 
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Bosnia cannot currently be called a democracy; it is a significantly flawed 
quasi-democracy in which “shadow institutions” formed by criminal networks, 
paramilitary organizations, and extremist political parties remain the most powerful 
indigenous political actors. But considerable progress has been made towards a 
sustainable, inclusive political order. Participation in political processes has induced 
many nationalists to moderate their political demands in order to satisfy voter 
discontent. The prospect of renewed wide-scale violence in Bosnia has diminished 
substantially, as testified by the fact that NATO withdrew its combat forces in 2004, 
replaced by a small European Union force (EUFOR). While many factors are 
responsible for the gradual progress of Bosnia towards more democratic politics, the 
strong military presence anchored by the United States was a key prerequisite. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds using the same framework as the 
previous one. A short narrative of the international interventions in Bosnia introduces 
the most relevant facts of the case. A focused, controlled comparison of the major 
powers’ approaches to Bosnia follows, with primary emphasis on the United States, 
Germany, and Russia, but with attention devoted to the roles of Britain, France, and  
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Italy as well. The next section then reviews contending explanations, and a final one 
examines the implications of this analysis for military interventions more generally. 
An Overview of International Intervention in Bosnia  
The broad outlines of the war in Bosnia are well known to most students of 
international relations. Rather than reconstructing the conflict in detail – scholarship 
that has been ably conducted by other authors (especially Burg and Shoup 1999) and 
that would in any case be impossible in the space available – this section provides a 
brief overview of both the two major attempts to impose a peace settlement on Bosnia 
and two important implementation episodes in post-war Bosnia. These episodes were 
chosen because each represents a critical juncture in the evolution of the war and 
subsequent peace in Bosnia, and each reveals one of the causal pathways linking the 
independent variables with the hypothesized outcomes. A comparison of the two 
peace proposals – the Vance-Owen plan and the Dayton accords – reveals the 
relationship between the intervening power and the nature of the political institutions 
that are likely to be created through intervention. The analysis of Dayton 
implementation through an examination of the attempted coup against President 
Biljana Plavsić and the Herzegovacka Banka raid demonstrates the importance of 
committed, militarized, democratic interveners for the deterrence of would-be spoilers 
and the enforcement of democratic provisions of peace accords. 
Peace Plans that Failed and the One that Worked 
By the late 1980s the economic and political forces that had encouraged 
Yugoslav unity had begun to dissipate. Various political elites in Yugoslavia’s 
constituent republics seized on the opportunities available to press their own agendas 
and promote their own political fortunes. Due to the particular ethnofederal structure  
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of the Yugoslav state, competitive politics quickly led to demands for sovereignty 
among the federation’s constituent republics (Bunce 1999). As the federation 
dissolved into five successor states over the period from 1990-1992, however, power 
relations among Yugoslavia’s nationalities shifted dramatically. The dangers inherent 
in such a rapid transition propelled both Croatia and Bosnia into full-scale wars – 
between the Serb minority and Croat majority in Croatia and between Serbs, Croats, 
and Muslims (or Bosniacs) in Bosnia. While the conflict in Croatia quickly settled into 
a stalemate, with UN forces interposed between the hostile parties in a de facto 
partition of the country, the war in Bosnia rapidly escalated into the worst violence 
Europe had seen since the Second World War. Eventually the war would claim 
200,000 lives and would displace over half of the pre-war population of approximately 
4.5 million – a horrific conflict by any standards. 
In the final days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the major 
external powers were remarkably united in their vision for how the crisis could ideally 
be defused, although they were bitterly divided by the realities of the situation. All 
sought to reconcile the secessionist preferences of Slovenia and Croatia on the one 
hand and the centralizing preferences of Serbia on the other by balancing support for a 
unified Yugoslavia with demands for the democratization of Yugoslavia as a whole 
and the devolution of considerable autonomy to the constituent republics.
65 When 
events on the ground called into question the viability of this balancing act, however, 
the countries of the West reacted differently. Germany pressed for the recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia in hopes that the internationalization of the conflict would 
provide the international legal instruments with which to deter further escalation of 
                                                 
65 For the accounts of former government officials concerning their countries’ policies at the time, see 
for instance those of Libal (1997) on Germany and Gompert (1996) and Zimmermann (1996) on the 
United States.  
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violence (Caplan 2002).
66 The United States was reluctant to recognize Croatia, 
believing that recognition would imply a responsibility to protect not only the 
sovereign state thus created, but Bosnia as well. While symbolic uses of force might 
have been adequate to deter Serbia from continued military and paramilitary activities, 
Washington was concerned that such uses of force would cause Serbia to escalate 
rather than de-escalate (an option that was, in fact, to be pursued by Serbia in the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999). Ambassador Zimmerman recounted a discussion he had with 
Brent Scowcroft, then National Security Advisor to President Bush, about the 
possibility of using force during the early days of the war in Bosnia: “The prevailing 
view in the Bush administration was that, for the sake of credibility, we would have to 
do what was necessary to prevail, even to the point of using ground troops. Since no 
senior official was prepared to wage a ground war, the line had to be drawn short of 
the use of force in general” (Zimmermann 1996, 215). From the beginning the United 
States believed that decisive military force would be necessary to resolve the crisis 
should central authority in Belgrade collapse, while Germany was relatively more 
optimistic about the possibilities for conflict resolution provided by international law.  
After Bosnia descended into war, the diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis did 
not taper off. Indeed, the next three and a half years were a flurry of diplomatic 
activity, with a variety of negotiators and peace plans entering and then exiting the 
international stage. Before the Dayton peace accords that finally brought an end to the 
war, three major peace initiatives stand out: the Lisbon or Cutileiro accords of spring 
1992, the Vance-Owen proposal of 1993, and the Owen-Stoltenberg or Contact Group 
                                                 
66 There was considerable ambiguity in Germany’s justification of its decision about how exactly 
recognition would quell the violence (Axt 1993, 354). The overriding hope was that recognition alone 
would deter Serbia from further acts of violence in Croatia. Failing that, Germany was willing to 
consider proposals for consensual peace operations – although the prerequisite consent of all parties 
was clearly absent. When high-intensity military operations proved necessary and the Bundeswehr was 
not dispatched to participate alongside other European contingents, the result was a trauma for German 
diplomacy and a retreat from a prominent German role in the Yugoslav crisis.  
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plan of 1994. Of these the Vance-Owen plan was by far the most developed and is 
believed to have come the closest to bringing an end to the conflict before the direct 
intercession of the United States and the brokering of the Dayton agreement (more 
formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace) (Burg and Shoup 
1999; Gow 1997; Silber and Little 1995, 287). The following pages will therefore 
compare the Vance-Owen plan with the Dayton accords. The fundamental dilemma 
facing all peace negotiators was that the costs and risks involved in imposing a peace 
on Bosnia were incommensurate with the national interests at stake for the states who 
would have to intervene. Interestingly, however, the major states involved resolved 
this dilemma in different ways. The argument advanced here is that the involvement of 
the United States as a militarized democracy was a necessary condition for brokering 
an inclusive peace deal to end the war in Bosnia and for enforcing a political order that 
has gradually moved towards greater democracy. Such an interpretation is at odds with 
a number of major works of scholarship (especially Gow 1997) and with the 
interpretations of many senior officials involved in the crisis, including the 
international negotiator David Owen and the foreign (later prime) minister of France, 
Alain Juppé (Holbrooke 1998, 318; Owen 1995). The argument will proceed in three 
steps, beginning with a comparison of the two plans’ provisions, followed by an 
analysis of their enforceability, and concluding with an examination of why the 
Vance-Owen plan failed while the Dayton accords succeeded in bringing an end to the 
violence. 
Provisions of the Two Plans. Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance were 
international negotiators appointed to represent respectively the European Union and 
the United Nations in efforts to broker a peace deal for Bosnia. Although Vance was a 
former American Secretary of State, the duo worked most closely with the European  
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powers, Britain and France, who had troops deployed in UNPROFOR, the wartime 
UN peace mission in Bosnia, and who would be primarily responsible for enforcing 
the provisions of a peace accord. Their efforts began in earnest in the fall of 1992, 
following the collapse of the Lisbon agreement in the spring of that year, and yielded a 
publicly presentable draft plan by January 1993. The plan called for the radical 
decentralization of governmental power to ten provinces, each of which (with the 
exception of the capital province of Sarajevo) would be dominated by a particular 
ethnic group, with seats in the Interim Provisional Governments of the provinces 
roughly determined by the ethnic distribution according to the pre-war 1991 census. 
Nearly all governmental functions – crucially including policing – would be 
performed at the province level, with the central government retaining some limited 
economic powers and the right to represent the country in foreign affairs (at Serb 
insistence, defense functions were eliminated from the original drafts). Moreover, each 
of the three major ethnic groups would wield a veto over all substantive issues at the 
level of the central government. The proposal also called for the separation of all 
military forces, cantonment of heavy weapons (to be supervised by the UN force 
present in Bosnia, UNPROFOR), and the demilitarization of Sarajevo. The plan also 
called for a civilian official to oversee implementation of the agreement in the 
transitional period (Gow 1997, 239-241; Malcolm 1994, 247-248).  
The Dayton accords (officially the General Framework Agreement on Peace, 
with accompanying annexes) were negotiated by an American negotiating team led by 
American Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and – in sharp contrast to 
the Vance-Owen plan – had the backing, both political and military, of the United 
States. In many ways its provisions were similar to those of Vance-Owen, particularly 
in the radical decentralization of political power. The critical differences concerned 
the territorial division of the country, multi-ethnic representation in local governments,  
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and the agent of external military enforcement. The Dayton accords, unlike Vance-
Owen, divided the country into two “entities” along a 51-49 percent territorial split, 
with the Muslim-Croat Federation receiving the marginally larger share of territory 
and the Republika Srpska the smaller. While the Dayton accords permitted multi-
ethnic representation in the legislatures of both entities – and indeed, hoped to 
promote such representation by guaranteeing displaced voters the right to vote in their 
pre-war district of residence – the peace agreement did not designate seat set-asides 
for all three ethnic minorities in each unit of government, as did Vance-Owen. Finally, 
the Dayton agreement was to be enforced by NATO, whereas the Vance-Owen plan 
was to be enforced by UNPROFOR (with the addition of American troops, in contrast 
to the wartime UNPROFOR).  
Critics of the Dayton accords argue that they represented a significant set-back 
from the Vance-Owen plan for the creation of a multiethnic, inclusive post-war order 
(especially Gow 1997). The decentralized governmental units of the Vance-Owen plan 
explicitly preserved the principle of multi-ethnic inclusion by explicitly setting aside 
seats for all three ethnic groups in each unit, and they denied each ethnic group control 
of contiguous territories through which they could attempt to create ethnically pure 
“states within a state.” Under the provisions of the Dayton accords, on the other hand, 
the Serbs were allocated contiguous territory with a separate legal identity (the 
Republika Srpska), and ethnic Serbs were clearly allocated a dominant political 
position within their entity, while the Muslims and Croats shared a dominant position 
in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Minority political 
representation in each of the entities would depend on citizens voting in the districts 
corresponding to their pre-war places of residence (although under both Vance-Owen 
and Dayton, effective political participation would depend on enforceable guarantees 
of safety for minority politicians operating in regions controlled by the forces of other  
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ethnic groups). Thus, on paper – and contrary to the predictions of the analytical 
framework offered here – the plan proposed by the European powers provided for 
institutions that were more politically inclusive than the peace deal pushed by the 
more militarized United States. The apparent anomaly can be explained by the 
enforceability of the two agreements. 
Enforceability of the Two Plans. Two closely inter-related issues lie at the core 
of comparisons between the two plans: first, the ability of the international community 
to secure the agreement of all of the warring parties, and second, the ability of the 
international community to compel compliance with the provisions of the plans once 
the parties had – in theory, at least – agreed to a peace deal.  
Both the Croats and Muslims agreed to support the Vance-Owen plan. The 
Muslims, however, did so in the calculated expectation that the Serbs would refuse the 
deal, thus engendering more international sympathy for the Muslims. The Muslim-
dominated Sarajevo government was highly skeptical of the willingness of the Serbs 
to honor the commitments undertaken in the framework of Vance-Owen and the 
willingness of the international community to enforce their compliance. These 
concerns were, in fact, well-founded. 
According to the journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little, Serbian president 
Slobodan Milosevic demanded a number of “clarifications” of the peace proposal from 
David Owen. The first of these concerned the Posavina Corridor – the narrow and 
militarily vulnerable strip of land that connected the eastern and western halves of 
Serbian territory. The negotiators assured him that neither Croat nor Muslim forces 
would be allowed into this territory but that it would instead be controlled by UN 
forces – and, in a side-deal, they even specified that Russian forces would be assigned 
to this sensitive region (Silber and Little 1995, 278). Thus, unless Russian forces were  
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willing to conduct highly aggressive operations to root out the Serb paramilitaries 
operating in the corridor, these lands would remain within the de facto control of Serb 
ultranationalists. Given the partial behavior of Russian troops in the “near abroad,” 
such a prospect was always highly unlikely. A second and related “clarification” 
demanded by Milosevic concerned all other  
territory which had been conquered by the Serbs, cleansed of their Muslim and 
Croat populations, but which would have to be surrendered to Croat or Bosnian 
Government (Muslim) sovereignty under the Plan: this amounted to more than 
a third of the territory the Serbs controlled. According to Milosevic, Owen 
gave an assurance that Croat and Bosnian Government forces would not be 
allowed to police those territories; ‘only UN forces which will guarantee 
personal safety, the safety of property, and the security of the citizens can be 
deployed in those areas,’ he said. Milosevic was thus convinced that the 
Vance-Owen Plan provided him with a way of achieving his central war aim – 
the creation of a viable Serbian state on Bosnian territory. It even appeared to 
hold out the prospect that that state would, in practice if not on paper, consist 
of a single unbroken territorial entity – even though, in theory, the Vance-
Owen map gave the Serbs three distinct chunks of territory linked only by UN-
protected through-routes. Milosevic’s calculation was that the Serbs could sign 
the Plan, and then obstruct its implementation, much as they had done in 
Croatia the year before (Silber and Little 1995, 278-279).  
The ultimate goal of Milosevic and other Serb elites was the eventual creation of an 
independent Bosnian Serb state:  
The only way in which the Vance-Owen plan could gain even token 
acceptance among the Serbs was on the clear assumption that it would be a 
temporary resting-place on the way to the full secession of the Serb-conquered 
territories. On that basis Radovan Karadzic was encouraged by Slobodan 
Milosevic to sign the plan at a special meeting convened in Athens on 2 May 
1993. The basis of the Serbian approach was explained by Dragoslav Rancic, 
the confidant and spokesman of the nationalist ideologue Dobrica Cosic (who 
was now President of the Serbian-Montenegrin rump Yugoslavia). ‘It is just 
the first stage,’ he said. ‘It is not going to last long. Not even Lord Owen 
believes in it.’ He added that the Muslims would eventually be left with ‘a 
Balkan Lesotho,’ and that the Serbs would get everything they wanted 
(Malcolm 1994, 250).  
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Certainly the behavior of UNPROFOR up until this point had given the Serbs no 
reason to believe that the contingents involved would aggressively enforce the 
provisions of Vance-Owen. As will be seen below, only the most militarized 
contingents in IFOR and SFOR were later willing to undertake relatively riskier 
enforcement actions in post-Dayton Bosnia, and even these actions were more limited 
than those implied by Vance-Owen. Thus, the primary strength of the Vance-Owen 
plan – its denial of contiguous territories to ultranationalists intent on creating “states 
within a state” – was a strength in theory only, contradicted by the realities of the 
informal agreements made by the EU’s chief negotiator, David Owen, and the 
limitations of what external interveners were willing to do to enforce the provisions of 
the plan.  
Even with these evident limitations on the potential enforcement of Vance-
Owen, the international community was unable to induce the Bosnian Serbs to sign the 
agreement. Although Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic signed the plan under 
pressure from Milosevic, he made Bosnian Serb acceptance of Vance-Owen 
contingent on ratification by the Bosnian Serb “parliament.” The body held a debate 
on ratification on May 8, 1993. During this session, Yugoslav President Cosic argued 
in favor of ratifying Vance-Owen and subverting its implementation, proclaiming, 
“The entire project of provinces and Bosnia-Herzegovina is historically temporary…. 
A federation will exist, which is not yet equitable but it will be. In the places where a 
Serbian house and Serbian land exist and where the Serbian language is spoken, there 
will be a Serbian state” (Silber and Little 1995, 285-6). The Bosnian Serb deputies, 
however, refused to endorse the plan, instead putting it to a referendum which they 
were sure would fail. While Vance-Owen was almost certainly unenforceable, many 
Bosnian Serb leaders were confident “they could get what they wanted without even 
bothering to pass through the diversion of the Vance-Owen plan. Opposition was  
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especially strong among those Serb politicians who had become in effect the personal 
rulers of larger territorial fiefdoms, and did not want their powers to be clipped by any 
administrative interference” (Malcolm 1994, 250). The plan was ultimately rejected by 
the Bosnian Serbs following the failure of the referendum on May 16. 
The international community could have sought to compel Bosnian Serb 
acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan in one of three ways: an intensification of the 
economic pressure on Serbia designed to cut off Belgrade’s continuing military and 
financial support for the Bosnian Serbs; a sustained, high-intensity air campaign 
(potentially including targets in Serbia as well as Bosnia); or “rolling 
implementation,” in which the international community inserted ground troops into 
regions controlled by the parties who had signed the agreement (the Croats and 
Muslims) and slowly expanded the area under its control by moving forces into Serb-
held regions. The economic sanctions option will be considered in-depth further 
below. The air strike option was definitively rejected by the European powers – 
principally Britain and France – who had troops on the ground with UNPROFOR and 
feared that they would be targeted in retaliation by the Serbs. The only option left was 
“rolling implementation” with ground forces.  
Such an alternative was proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
and was defended by the British scholar James Gow (1997). There are two possible 
scenarios according to which “rolling implementation” might have unfolded. In the 
first scenario, international ground troops would first deploy to regions held by the 
Croats and Muslims before seeking to break the back of Serb resistance by splitting 
Serb-controlled territory in half by seizing the Posavina corridor. Such a scenario, 
while favored by some observers (Gow 1997, 198-9, 248-52), was never politically 
realistic. None of the UNPROFOR-contributing states had shown a willingness at any 
point to undertake such dangerous enforcement actions, and their potential willingness  
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to do so was flatly contradicted by public statements made by their top leaders (Gow 
1997, 305). Nor did these states (with the exception of Britain, Europe’s most 
militarized state) prove willing to undertake high-risk enforcement actions in Bosnia 
even after the Dayton accords were imposed. Nor are there any other examples in the 
post-Cold War era of states risking large-scale casualties in open-ended ground 
combat where no vital national interests are perceived to be at risk, as Chapter 2 
demonstrated. In other words, such a scenario was never truly plausible. The other 
possible scenario according to which “rolling implementation” might have proceeded 
is one in which international peacekeeping troops deployed to the Croat- and Muslim-
controlled regions of Bosnia and continued to press for Serb consent to deploy to the 
other 70 percent of the country’s territory held by the Serbs. As will become clear in 
the paragraphs below, Serb consent to the deployment on their territory of a credible 
military force with an enforcement mandate was eventually achieved only through 
considerable military pressure.  
Thus, in the absence of an aggressive international military campaign, Vance-
Owen could only have meant the partition of Bosnia, with the Serbs retaining 70 
percent of the country’s territory and the Muslims relegated to a “Balkan Lesotho,” in 
Yugoslav President Cosic’s own words. It is hard to imagine a relatively inclusive, 
participatory political order emerging in either a “Muslim Lesotho” or in a Bosnian 
Serb statelet controlled by paramilitaries and war profiteers, founded on the principle 
of ethnic exclusion and governed without an armed international presence to enforce 
the democratic provisions of a peace accord. The Vance-Owen plan, in short, was 
superior to the Dayton accords only had the international community committed to a 
dangerous and costly enforcement campaign which none of the European powers were 
willing to seriously contemplate. European diplomacy, in short, had reached a dead 
end: the Europeans could, perhaps, have brought peace to Bosnia, but only at the  
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expense of disenfranchising the Muslims and hamstringing a civilian peace 
implementation effort. 
The Dayton accords, in contrast, contained more formal concessions to the 
Bosnian ultranationalists, concessions that limited democratic self-expression by 
ensuring ethnic domination of different territorial units. They did, however, have the 
great advantage of being implementable while still preserving various instruments 
designed to inject democratic accountability and inter-ethnic cooperation. The 
militaries of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska were to be strictly 
separated, and NATO forces (three reinforced heavy divisions, amounting to 60,000 
troops) were to be deployed throughout the country. The real achievement of Dayton – 
and the vital difference between it and Vance-Owen – was to craft a relatively 
equitable agreement in which the enforcement measures required for implementation 
corresponded to the level of commitment of the militarized democracies necessary to 
compel the local parties’ compliance. 
Why Dayton Ended the War. There are numerous explanations for why the 
Bosnian Serbs did not thwart the Dayton accords as they had Vance-Owen. The three 
primary explanations concern the international economic embargo against Serbia, the 
sweeping Croatian military offensive of summer 1995, and the NATO airstrikes of 
August-September 1995.  
The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia-
Montenegro for the republics’ role in the war in Bosnia in May of 1992. In the wake 
of the sanctions’ imposition, the Serbian economy collapsed, with devastating 
consequences for the population of Serbia and Montenegro, although it is unclear the 
extent to which sanctions were responsible for this outcome and the extent to which 
other factors – including the collapse of trading relations with other Yugoslav  
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republics, the inflationary financing of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, and the 
kleptocratic nature of the Milosevic regime – contributed. Although there is 
considerable debate about the effect of the sanctions on Milosevic’s eventual decision 
to compel the Bosnian Serbs’ acquiescence to Dayton, it seems clear that they played a 
critical role. In the absence of sanctions, it is unclear what other factor could have 
induced Milosevic to reverse himself and abandon the Greater Serbia project that he 
had pursued for years (Stedman 1998; see also Stremlau 1996) – particularly given 
that such a decision was a costly one insofar as it weakened his nationalist credentials 
and strengthened the position of many of his domestic political opponents (Thomas 
1999). More controversial is the argument made by a number of observers and 
officials that economic sanctions alone, without the reinforcing effects of the massive 
military reversals suffered by the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 – could have brought about a 
peace agreement.  
There is significant reason to doubt that sanctions alone produced the Bosnian 
Serbs’ acquiescence to Dayton. Long after sanctions had been imposed on Serbia, 
Belgrade continued to arm and supply Bosnian Serb paramilitaries. Even after Pale’s 
rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, when Milosevic loudly announced that he would 
impose a sweeping embargo against the Bosnian Serbs, cross-border traffic was 
resumed within days (Silber and Little 1995, 335). Belgrade does appear to have 
imposed significant restrictions on cross-border traffic in the wake of the Bosnian 
Serbs’ rejection of the Contact Group plan in 1994 in order to get international 
sanctions on Serbia lifted. Milosevic even accepted the placement of international 
monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border to report on his compliance with international 
demands that he stop aiding the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic’s acceptance of these border 
monitors is often uncritically accepted by observers as an indication that economic 
sanctions had compelled him to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. In reality, however, the  
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monitoring mission was much less than it appeared. There were a total of 135 
observers, dispatched to monitor a 375 mile-long, mountainous border, and they were 
only allowed to observe the actions of the Serbian border police rather than being able 
to conduct searches themselves (Lewis 1994; Reuters 1994). European negotiators 
were unable to broker a more intrusive mandate. Silber and Little report that the 
blockade of the Bosnian Serbs was “real only in the sense that [Milosevic] was 
sending a message to the politicians and, as importantly, to the West. There is strong 
evidence that the border remained porous. The Bosnian Serbs still received essential 
military supplies from the Yugoslav Army as well as their salaries from Belgrade. The 
central point was that Milosevic wanted to see a political and not a military defeat” of 
the Bosnian Serbs (Silber and Little 1995, 343). The sanctions were thus partially 
effective. They led Milosevic to place increased pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. But 
even after three years of sanctions, Milosevic was unwilling to withdraw critical 
military support from his proxies in Bosnia, a point acknowledged by Owen himself 
(1995, 352). And without significant military defeats, Pale would not have accepted 
the major concessions made at Dayton and the stationing of a militarily credible 
foreign force throughout its territory (Stedman 1998, 178). 
The Bosnian Serbs’ military defeats were the result of the spectacular military 
advances of the combined forces of the Croatian regular army and Bosnian Croat and 
Bosnian government units, aided by a sustained NATO air campaign aimed at the 
Bosnian Serbs. It is impossible to determine the relative significance of the air and 
ground campaigns. Although primary responsibility for the altered military balance 
may well belong to the Croatian and Federation ground forces, NATO airstrikes 
played a highly significant role in disrupting Bosnian Serb communications and 
logistics, as well as in deterring overt assistance from Serbia and demonstrating to the 
Bosnian Serbs that the West – including the United States – had finally committed to  
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altering fundamentally the military balance in Bosnia (Daalder 2000, 120-124; 
Johnson 2006, 53-6; Pape 2004). 
In the end a shift in battlefield fortunes was necessary to broker a relatively 
inclusive peace for Bosnia. Although the UNPROFOR Rapid Reaction Force – 
dominated by Britain and France – played a role in bringing about this altered strategic 
landscape, it is a stretch to claim that the RRF was the critical change on the path to 
Dayton, as some British and French officials have (for instance Neville-Jones 1996-
97). The RRF’s primary contribution was to protect UNPROFOR peacekeepers while 
a more aggressive policy was implemented; it did relatively little to implement that 
policy itself. And even after the RRF was deployed and the United States had begun 
using the ongoing NATO airstrikes as leverage to impose a peace settlement, many 
European governments pressed for the early termination of the air operations 
(Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 7). Thus the main determinants of the Bosnian Serbs’ 
military reversals were the result of policies that the United States had long supported 
and the Europeans had opposed: making Croatian and Bosnian military forces more 
combat-effective and conducting airstrikes in support of a more equitable military 
balance.
67  
The Dayton accords were purchased at a terrible price. American equivocation 
and lack of resolve between 1992 and early 1995 contributed to prolonging the war 
unnecessarily, thus indirectly costing thousands of lives. Perhaps a more foresighted 
and resolute American presidency could have brought about a peace in Bosnia years 
before – either by washing its hands of the Bosnian war entirely and allowing the 
Europeans to impose the Vance-Owen plan on the unwilling Bosniaks, or by 
                                                 
67 Echoing a theme found throughout this study, the American approach was not nearly so coherent as 
to be a “strategy.” American policy in summer 1995 was highly reactive. Elements of the foreign policy 
establishment, led by Richard Holbrooke and Tony Lake, seized on events in Bosnia to press for an 
aggressive military response, in contrast to the Europeans. The success of these policy entrepreneurs in 
using the air strikes as leverage over the Serbs in the run-up to Dayton was, however, a highly 
contingent outcome (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 7).  
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committing to doing what was necessary to secure a peace settlement on terms 
acceptable to the United States. In the end, however, it was the commitment of the 
United States as a highly militarized democracy that made a relatively inclusive 
settlement possible. 
Implementation 
Once the Dayton accords were agreed, the fundamental problem became one 
of implementing its provisions in the face of strong resistance by the same “shadow 
institutions” – networks of paramilitaries, organized criminal enterprises, and 
ultranationalist political parties – that had come to dominate the country during the 
course of the war. These networks quickly assumed the guise of peace-time 
legitimacy, transforming from paramilitary bands into police and “special police” 
units, from war profiteers into government officials. They used patronage networks, 
bribery, and the implicit threat of violence to maintain voter loyalty, deter political 
rivals from challenging their dominant positions, and perpetuate their hold on both 
political and economic power (Andreas 2004, Corpora 2004, Festić and Rausche 2004, 
Manning and Antic 2003, Perito 2004, Woodward 1999).  
International actors recognized the danger these shadow institutions posed to 
the creation of a self-sustaining inclusive and participatory political order, yet the 
same ambivalence that had characterized the international response to the war also 
defined the international response to the peace (Clark 2001; Dziedzic and Hawley 
2005, 21; Festić and Rausche 2004; Meyer zum Felde 2002; Woodward 1998). It was 
clear to the policy-makers directly involved that democracy was more than just 
elections, but direct actions to “create a safe and secure environment” for the conduct 
of elections by marginalizing the leaders of the shadow institutions was a risky 
proposition. The dangers inherent in highly intrusive, law-enforcement operations  
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were a principle reason for strident European opposition during the Dayton 
negotiations to the creation of an armed international police force with executive 
authority (i.e., the authority to make arrests), despite American urging for such an 
institution to avoid an “enforcement gap” (Holbrooke 1998, 251-2; Neville-Jones 
1996, 52; Perito 2004, 113-116). Yet the United States as well demonstrated a 
reluctance at first to confront these paramilitarized shadow institutions, paralyzed by 
bitter infighting between the Departments of State and Defense and between the 
Democratic president and a Republican-controlled Congress. 
For just over a year after the introduction of NATO troops in the IFOR 
(Implementation Force) mission, little direct action was attempted. Following 
presidential elections in the United States and the election of Tony Blair to the post of 
prime minister in Britain, however, the United States and Great Britain – the two most 
militarized democracies in the IFOR (later SFOR) coalition – led efforts to weaken 
these shadow institutions, in part through the aggressive use of their military 
contingents (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 20; Woodward 1998). While the military 
contribution to peace implementation in Bosnia is only one part of a much larger story, 
NATO nonetheless provided the skeleton on which civilian implementation efforts 
depended.  
The following pages detail two incidents chosen because they represent critical 
turning points in Bosnia’s post-war political development where military force played 
a key role. In these episodes NATO troops – led by the British and American 
contingents – prevented an armed attempt by Serb ultranationalists to overthrow 
relatively more moderate forces and thwarted an effort by Herzegovinian extremists to 
forcibly alter the fundamental structures of the Dayton accords. Critics commonly 
argue that such efforts were too little too late. While such criticisms may be true, it is 
also the case that the military deterrence and enforcement actions that were carried out  
151 
made a critical difference to the post-war political order, and such actions were 
overwhelmingly advocated and conducted by the United States and Britain, often 
against the opposition of other troop-contributing countries. 
The Coup Attempt against Plavsić. In the year after Dayton was signed, a split 
emerged among Bosnian Serb political forces between somewhat more moderate 
politicians based in the Republika Srpska town of Banja Luka and those in the 
wartime “capital” of Pale. Many of the Banja Luka politicians were themselves 
ultranationalists implicated in wartime atrocities; indeed, Biljana Plavsić, the leader 
with whom the international community came to work very closely, had been one of 
Radovan Karadzić’s closest wartime allies and was later herself indicted for war 
crimes. Plavsić and many of the other Banja Luka politicians were, however, willing 
to abide by the Dayton accords, work with the international community, and limit the 
criminalization of the Republika Srpska economy. They were opposed by the Pale 
hardliners, who controlled much of the police and “special police” apparatus filled 
with members of the wartime paramilitaries. Tensions between these two groups came 
to a head in July through September 1997. Deputies in the RS loyal to Pale called for 
Plavsić’s dismissal; Plavsić responded by dissolving the parliament and calling for 
new elections. Pale supporters in the parliament later voted to strip her of control of 
the RS military, turning its command over to an ad hoc body dominated by Pale 
loyalists. 
The dispute quickly escalated into threats of violence. In August 350 British 
and Czech troops, supported by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and U.S. Apache 
attack helicopters, seized a 12-ton arms cache in Banja Luka with enough weapons to 
arm a 2000-person army. The operation was widely believed to have thwarted a coup 
attempt against Plavsić. It was also considered an extremely dangerous operation, and  
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Canadian and Dutch units reportedly refused to participate (Erlanger 1997; Maclean’s 
1997; Associated Press 1997). A second suspected coup attempt was prevented on the 
night of September 8-9, when American and British SFOR units intercepted over 100 
busses carrying several thousand “demonstrators” – most of them out-of-uniform 
police loyal to Pale – bound for a demonstration in Banja Luka. The OSCE had given 
orders permitting the planned demonstration to take place, despite the fact that 
firearms and hand grenades had been found in demonstrators’ vehicles in the days 
leading up to the crisis. A senior American official working in the Office of the High 
Representative, Jacques Klein, counter-manded the order and worked with British 
General Angus Ramsay throughout the night of September 8-9 to intercept the 
busloads of hired “demonstrators” converging on Banja Luka (Steele 1997; Walker 
1997; Woodard 1997).  
British and American policy-makers proved the strongest advocates of the 
more confrontational approach, despite the fact that the operations were perceived as 
highly dangerous, with the potential to escalate into large-scale confrontations with 
Pale militias (Erlanger 1997; Steele 1997), and British and American military forces 
were at the forefront of the operations to marginalize the Serb paramilitaries. Jacques 
Klein, a former American general serving as the High Representative’s administrator 
for the pivotal town of Brcko, played a critical role on the ground in the September 
crisis, threatening Serb forces loyal to Pale with SFOR enforcement actions if they did 
not back down (anonymous author interview with a senior American government 
official, March 2, 2006; Steele 1997; Woodard 1997). Meanwhile, the United States 
also took the lead in advocating a conceptual shift at NATO headquarters. Jock Covey, 
the Senior Deputy High Representative of Bosnia at the time, recalls that  
as Serb hard-liners were attempting to muscle Biljana Plavsic, president of the 
Republic of Srpska from 1996 to 1998, out of power … Washington proposed 
to NATO headquarters in Brussels that it adopt a more rigorous standard [of  
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implementation]: support the peace process and oppose those who seek to 
obstruct it. Within hours, this simple rule of thumb was translated into the 
SFOR commander’s intent and passed down to subordinate units. This new 
concept immediately legitimated the role of SFOR in preventing Krajisnik’s 
coup against Plavsic. Thereafter, it was clear to all concerned – would-be 
spoilers as well as risk-averse commanders – that the international military 
would no longer be neutral about the peace process. The importance of this 
seemingly small conceptual adjustment cannot be overestimated (Covey 2005, 
78). 
Agreement in Brussels was facilitated by the fact that the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), American General Wesley Clark, had recently taken office with a 
mandate to press for a more activist implementation agenda in Bosnia and particularly 
to neutralize the “Ministerial Special Police” (militarized police units loyal to Pale) 
(Holbrooke 1998, 349; Clark 2001, 84-5). In contrast to these actions by American 
and British actors, as mentioned above, Canadian and Dutch units were reported to 
have refused to take part in the August raids on the Serb weapons cache in Banja 
Luka.
68 Moreover, as will be discussed below, the actions of the British and American 
contingents stand in sharp contrast to those of French and Italian regular army units in 
the Herzegovacka Banka crisis in 2001. 
The attempted coup against Plavsic and subsequent NATO actions were 
believed by the actors involved to represent a major crossroads in international policy, 
with Richard Holbrooke comparing SFOR’s actions to the NATO decision to launch 
sustained airstrikes in 1995 (Erlanger 1997). Subsequent analyses suggest that the 
1997 crisis did represent a significant juncture in the post-Dayton political 
development of Bosnia. Carrie Manning, for instance, argues that electoral 
competition among Bosnian Serb parties was a critical factor in inducing the single 
largest Bosnian Serb party, the SDS, to moderate its political platform (Manning 
                                                 
68 This refusal is particularly noteworthy because Dutch and Canadian units were often relatively more 
aggressive in their pursuit of their mandate in other circumstances, and these nations were among the 
few willing to deploy to the dangerous southern regions of Afghanistan, as the next chapter will discuss.  
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2004). Yet such competition would have been impossible had the Pale hardliners 
successfully used force to topple their opponents. Military force obviously cannot 
impose democratic outcomes. It is, however, critical to create the political space 
necessary for democratic competition.
69 
The Herzegovacka Banka Crisis. A second crisis erupted four years later when 
Bosnian Croat hardliners in the HDZ party sought to use force as part of an effort to 
create their own “state within a state.” Croat ultranationalists had long resisted any 
efforts to weaken their de facto autonomy within the Herzegovinian heartland of the 
Federation. In October 2000, however, in accordance with a judgment of the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court, OSCE officials re-wrote Bosnian Federation election laws in 
ways that negatively affected Croat ultranationalists’ hold on the upper chamber of the 
legislature. In elections in the following month, the HDZ (as well as hardline Serb and 
Bosnian Muslim nationalist parties) lost both share of the popular vote and seats in the 
parliament, despite the party’s enormous advantages in patronage spoils deriving from 
its monopolization of all economic assets during the war (Economist 2001; Festić and 
Rausche 2004; Peterson 2001). In a bid to retain their stranglehold on power – and to 
prevent their being investigated for “war crimes, corruption, illegal trafficking and 
other nasty things” (Economist 2001) – Ante Jelavić, the Bosnian Croat member of 
Bosnia’s presidency, and the rest of the HDZ leadership sought to prevent more 
moderate Croat parties from entering a coalition government with more moderate 
                                                 
69 It is highly instructive to compare NATO’s response to the attempted coup against Plavsić with 
UNTAC’s response to the “creeping state coup” conducted by the GOC in Cambodia. The results of the 
first post-war elections in Cambodia were largely negated by the GOC’s threatening violence if it was 
not made a co-equal partner in a new coalition government, despite having lost the elections. UNTAC 
was in no position to forcibly deny the GOC’s demands and, rather than face renewed violence or a 
confrontation with the GOC, it agreed to the GOC’s demands. Subsequent to this decision, the GOC 
retained control of the administrative and coercive apparatus of the Cambodian state and undermined 
any substantive efforts at powersharing. Within years of UNTAC’s departure, the GOC seized de jure, 
as well as de facto, control of the government. Critics charge that the UN essentially legitimated a state 
coup; supporters argue that UNTAC oversaw a difficult transition to peace, if not democracy.  
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Bosnian Muslim parties. After a three-month stand-off, Wolfgang Petritsch, then High 
Representative of Bosnia, ordered the installation of the new coalition government and 
the removal of Jelavić and other key HDZ hardliners from their governmental posts. 
Jelavić and his allies quickly struck back, creating a new “constitutive assembly” – the 
Croatian Sabor – as a precursor to creating a third, autonomous “entity” within Bosnia. 
They also called on all ethnic Croats in the police and military to cease cooperation 
with Federation authorities. Reportedly some 8000 Croat soldiers deserted the 
Federation army (Economist 2001). 
Interlocking networks of paramilitaries and patronage systems fueled by 
criminal activities were critical in determining the outcome of this confrontation 
between the international community and the HDZ. Croat hardliners reportedly 
offered payments of $250 to $25,000 to each member of the military who deserted 
their posts (Peterson 2001). Threats of violence were used by the HDZ both to secure 
the funding necessary to create the new state-within-a-state and to enforce the loyalties 
of soldiers who otherwise would have remained loyal to the Federation (International 
Crisis Group 2001, 4). One media report told of a number of incidents of intimidation, 
such as that of a  
senior Croat military commander [who] told members of the 18,000-strong 
SFOR that he would remain neutral and not walk out. He disappeared for 
several days, then emerged on television … looking roughed up and sweating. 
He avoided eye contact with the camera as he professed allegiance to the HDZ. 
In another incident, two prominent Croat officials and businessmen – who until 
recently were HDZ supporters, and employ hundreds of Croats in their meat 
business – issued a statement last Tuesday rejecting HDZ methods. Early the 
next morning, a bomb blast ripped through one of their cars (Peterson 2001). 
The Federation’s defense minister, a moderate Croat named Mijo Anić, warned of a 
possible armed revolt by HDZ hardliners (Gutman 2001). 
The international community responded through both political and military 
means. As a preliminary step, the American commander of SFOR, Lieutenant General  
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Michael Dodson, ordered SFOR forces to round up all heavy weaponry from Croat 
military units. The British deputy commander of SFOR, Major General Robert 
Connatt, announced that SFOR would prevent the withdrawal of Croat military units 
from the Federation’s integrated military structures (Perito 2004). Different SFOR 
contingents responded to these orders in different ways, however. American forces  
worked five days and nights straight to round up all heavy weapons in the 
U.S.-run northeastern sector…. In the French-controlled zone near Mostar, 
Spanish troops posted a lackadaisical guard carrying no weapons at one 
consolidated arms depot in the town of Caplina. Croats appeared to be 
completely in charge – despite the absence of Federation patches from their 
uniforms. “We make sure that the weapons are completely and professionally 
guarded,” the French sector's commander, Major General Robert Meille, told 
reporters last week. Meille seemed unconcerned about the renegades. “They 
are rebels,” he said. “But this is the problem of the government. It is not my 
problem” (Gutman 2001). 
A second and much more ambitious step, however, targeted the sources of the 
HDZ’s patronage network with which it was attempting to build a new state. The 
center of the nexus of paramilitaries, criminalized economies, and patronage-driven 
nationalist political parties was the Herzegovacka Banka, a bank controlled by HDZ 
hardliners. Amra Festić and Adrian Rausche, two former OHR officials, describe the 
significance of the bank for the HDZ’s efforts to construct a state-within-a-state under 
the guise of a third “entity” within Bosnia: 
The third entity offered them a haven from the uncertainties of lost power and 
position. To guarantee this continued control, a political economy designed to 
underpin the HDZ’s leading role for Bosnian Croats – independent of the 
international oversight of public institutions and based in the private sector – 
had been gradually built up. This political economy was focused on a leading 
bank, Herzegovacka Banka, and its network of related companies in key 
sectors of the economy: insurance, oil, investment funds, telecommunications. 
This group of firms was collectively known as ‘Herzegovina Holding.’ 
Although nominally designed to support a Croat economy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the HDZ maintained its control by carefully selecting the 
management of these firms…. The complex interlocking of financial and 
economic interests through Herzegovina Holding suggested that the [HDZ  
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hardliners] had achieved a level of sophistication that made their political 
power difficult to criminally investigate along traditional lines (Festić and 
Rausche 2004, 30-32).  
The High Representative ordered that the bank come under temporary 
international administration in order to facilitate a criminal investigation of its 
activities. OHR officials worked with SFOR in an operation to seize bank records and 
begin an audit conducted by international investigators. While the High Representative 
ordered the operation, Adrian Rausche, the Deputy Head of OHR’s Anti-Fraud 
Department, recalls that it was three American officials – Robert Barry (then chief of 
the OSCE mission in Bosnia), Tom Miller (U.S. ambassador to Bosnia), and 
especially Ralph Johnson (Senior Deputy High Representative for Bosnia) – who 
strongly advocated the policy against the initial reluctance of many other international 
officials involved (author interview with Rausche, April 21, 2006). 
Operation Athena was launched on April 6, 2001. The concept involved 
sending international auditors and Bosnian policemen into several branches of the 
bank, protected first by Italian Carabinieri (paramilitary units specializing in crowd 
control and organized crime) in the so-called “Blue Box,” with SFOR regular army 
contingents providing support (the “Green Box”) should the operation go awry (Perito 
2004, 173-5). In the event, HDZ hardliners rapidly organized large-scale riots to 
prevent the seizure of incriminating records. These riots combined large mobs of men, 
women, and children hurling insults and rocks with smaller groups of armed 
paramilitary HDZ loyalists. Despite the brave efforts of Carabinieri and other “Blue 
Box” defenders, these armed groups quickly overcame the “Blue Box” at numerous 
branches of the bank, seizing auditors, translators, and Bosnian police. Twenty-nine of 
the personnel involved in the operation were injured, many of them severely, and the 
identities of masked Bosnian personnel were compromised, thus subjecting them to 
fear of violent reprisals. Moreover, the personnel involved were forced to return the  
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seized documentation necessary to indict high-ranking members of the “third-entity” 
movement.  
Despite the danger both to personnel and mission, the national contingents 
comprising the “Green Box” reacted in very different ways to the crisis:  
In Orasje, Vitez and Tomislavgrad, American, Danish and Canadian units 
provided full security for the auditors of the bank's branch offices. Although 
these operations were met by groups of angry protestors, a review of 
documents in the banks was successfully completed without major incident. In 
these areas SFOR provided a significant show of force, as well as an outer 
perimeter of security, known as a 'green box', around the banks. However, at 
the main office in Mostar, as well as at a number of branches in Herzegovina 
(including offices in Mostar, Grude, Medjugorje and Posusje), the auditors 
were confronted by well-organized mobs that beat international officials and 
Federation authorities. In the worst case, in Grude, hostages were taken and 
threatened with execution, unless and until materials taken from the bank were 
returned. This blackmail worked. All the towns in which the mobs were 
successful in frustrating the auditors' access to bank documentation are located 
in that part of Bosnia under the control of SFOR's French-led division. 
Participants in OHR's operation, both expatriates and Bosnians, expressed 
bitterness over SFOR's failure, despite its previous assurances, to extend 
adequate security cover to civilians from the start of the operation. However, 
having assessed the security risk as low, French SFOR in these areas did not 
provide the 'green box' of wider protection, sending only a few Italian 
Carabinieri to each building, including even the headquarters of the bank…. 
SFOR then also failed to send in forces to rescue the international and local 
civilians trapped in the banks, who reportedly called for help as the crisis 
unfolded over the course of several hours. On the other hand, security at the 
French base in Ortijes, miles away from the trouble, was beefed up markedly 
during these events (International Crisis Group 2001, 4-5).
70 
Having failed to secure control of the bank or its records during the April 6 operation, 
the international community returned twelve days later. In this second operation SFOR 
took no chances, deploying nearly 5,000 troops and 400 armored vehicles (Festić and 
Rausche 2004). This second operation was led by the British. According to Rausche, 
the decision to give the British the lead – despite the fact that the main targets of the 
                                                 
70. This account broadly accords with those of two international officials directly involved in the 
incident (author interview with Adrian Rausche, April 21, 2006, and anonymous author interview with 
a junior OHR official participating in the operation at one of the bank branches, May 2004).  
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operation were in the operational zone controlled by France – was a political one. 
Although the French general in charge of the sector wanted to take the lead, he was 
reportedly over-ruled by authorities in Paris (author interview with Adrian Rausche, 
April 21, 2006). 
Much like the attempted coup against Plavsić, many observers considered the 
Herzegovacka Banka incident to be a crucial turning point in Bosnia’s political 
development. James Lyons, the Balkans director of the well-respected International 
Crisis Group, was quoted at the time as saying, “If [the West] backs down – this is the 
scary part – then Dayton literally falls apart” (Peterson 2001). Much like the Plavsić 
coup incident, the ultranationalists’ capacity for violence only became visible when 
their hold on power was threatened by relatively more moderate political parties. Had 
the HDZ been successful in its “third entity” project, then not only would more 
moderate Croat political parties have been marginalized by the HDZ’s capacity for 
violence, but the governmental machinery of Bosnia would have been further 
paralyzed by yet another veto-wielding sub-state political unit. Instead, the 
international community’s Herzegovacka Banka raids yielded three key successes: 
First, the third-entity project collapsed. After one year, the HDZ was forced to 
indefinitely ‘postpone’ its plans…. Second … the Herzegovacka Holding 
system is being broken up and liquidated, including sales of companies and 
assets to non- or less political owners. This means that the clandestine 
political-economic framework that had maintained a third entity has been 
broken and the ability to create a shadow authority has been substantially 
impaired…. Third, the focus on prosecutions has prevented hardline HDZ 
figures from credibly arguing that the Croats have been unfairly targeted. The 
criminal investigation has managed to more or less deflect any accusations of 
bias, allowed the federation authorities to be integrated into the process, and 
perhaps even deepened the fissures between the ‘criminal’ and ‘non-criminal’ 
elements of the HDZ…. The arrest of Ante Jelavić and two other 
Herzegovacka Banka conspirators for corruption and fraud charges in early 
2004 attested to not only the success of the strategy but also the significantly 
improved capabilities of the Bosnia law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts 
to deal with such critical matters. Finally, Herzegovacka Banka’s assets have 
been depoliticized. The effective prosecution of the persons responsible should  
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help to reshape the political economy into one more conducive to democratic 
standards and market-economy principles (Festić and Rausche 2004, 31-32). 
The capacity to deter violent escalation of crises and to enforce the rule of law 
against the actions of “shadow institutions” wielding violence to secure their hold on 
power, in other words, proved essential to creating the space necessary for a relatively 
more participatory and inclusive political order. The mere presence of a sizable and 
capable military force was not enough, however, to prevent the Croat ultranationalists 
from seeking to create “facts on the ground” backed up by an ethnically “pure” Croat 
army. Many officials involved in the crisis were reluctant to challenge the HDZ 
directly, and many national contingents refused at various points to participate in 
operations designed to thwart the third-entity project. Throughout this crisis, American 
and British officials and military units were more aggressive in responding to the 
HDZ’s confrontational tactics.  
There are many possible reasons for an intervening state’s reluctance to engage 
in a particular crisis. At various other points and in other missions, the United States 
and United Kingdom have been less willing to challenge local “spoilers.” The 
Herzegovacka Banka incident, as well as the Plavsić coup incident before it, however, 
do fit into a broader pattern. During various high-intensity crises, the U.S. and Britain 
have been more willing to use military force to marginalize “spoilers” and create space 
for non-militarized elements of the political spectrum to participate in post-war orders. 
While the American and British instincts for relatively more militarized tactics and 
strategies have sometimes proven disastrous in other contexts, they proved critical in 
fostering the slow progress of post-war Bosnia towards something resembling a 
democratic order.  
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A Focused Examination of Interveners’ Policies in Bosnia 
Throughout the periods of peacemaking and peace implementation in Bosnia – 
and again later in Kosovo – the major powers for the most part exhibited remarkably 
stable orientations towards the conflict. Some variation occurred among the 
preferences of the interveners. Most notably, Britain became much more aggressive 
under the Blair government, Germany slowly became more willing to participate 
directly in “out-of-area” military operations, and the liberal, pro-Western period of 
Russian foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse proved short-
lived. For the most part, however, the behavior of the major powers conforms with the 
predictions of the theoretical framework advanced in this study. Britain and the United 
States, as militarized democracies, proved the most willing to use force to enforce a 
more democratic political order for Bosnia (and later Kosovo). Although Germany 
adapted to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era, Germany along with Italy 
remained among the NATO countries least willing to advocate or engage in high-
intensity military activities in the Balkans. France occupied a middle ground. Russia, 
on the other hand, tended to regard democracy promotion with considerable 
skepticism, often seeing it as nothing more than rhetorical cover for the expansion of 
NATO’s military sphere of influence. In conjunction with national interests, these 
orientations determined the broad outlines of the intervening powers’ policies and the 
likely outcomes of their interventionist actions. Although American interests were not 
sufficiently engaged for the United States to commit wholeheartedly to the 
implementation of the Dayton accords that it had brokered, ultimately it was the 
United States and Britain that provided the de-militarized space in Bosnia in which 
relatively more moderate political forces could begin to shift the balance towards a 
more democratic postwar political order.  
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Attitudes of the Major Powers 
Germany. Surprisingly, Germany played the initial pivotal role in the Yugoslav 
crisis by forcing an early decision on the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. 
Germany strongly advocated for the recognition of these two republics as independent 
states, seeing in their struggles with Belgrade a parallel with Germany’s own recent 
overthrow of autocratic communist rule and struggle for self-determination.
71 Its 
recognition policy was thus an expression of its own norms of democratic governance. 
Unlike many of the other Western democracies, however, Germany placed relatively 
greater faith in the efficacy of international law, believing that Serbia would not dare 
to militarily assault a sovereign state.
72 When that assumption proved mistaken, 
German foreign policy suffered a traumatic defeat, and Germany retreated behind the 
                                                 
71 Michael Libal, the director of the Southeast Europe Department of the German Foreign Office at the 
time of the recognition debates, explained Germany’s position succinctly, writing that “all that the talk 
about ‘self-determination’ amounted to in reality were two things: first, as in the case of German 
unification, to respect democratic decisions in the framework of existing political institutions, in this 
case the individual Yugoslav republics; second, to defend the right of these republics to survive the 
process of dissolution of the larger state by safeguarding their own integrity and protecting themselves 
against the threat of ethnically motivated violence coming from other republics, or supported by them” 
(Libal 1997, 110-111, italics added). See also Axt 1993; Crawford 1996; Gow 1997, 167-171; Libal 
1997; Müller 1994; Schmidt 2002; and Wagner 1992. Some have argued that German economic 
interests motivated the recognition decision. Arguing against this view, see Axt 1993. 
72 Richard Caplan (2002, 164-165) summarizes a position paper written by the German Foreign Office 
in 1993 to explain the logic of its recognition decision: “[B]ecause the Yugoslav conflict was not a civil 
war but a war of conquest by Serbia, the international community had only two choices: it could either 
respond with a military containment of Serbia or it could pursue ‘internationalization of the conflict by 
political means through formal recognition of the threatened republics in order to thwart any hopes 
Belgrade might have of faits accomplis achieved through the use of force being tolerated’…. 
Recognition, by this reasoning, would deter Belgrade from the further prosecution of its military 
campaign and even effect a withdrawal of its forces because the Yugoslav army’s control of Croatian 
territory would then be in violation of Croatia’s sovereign rights.” The precise mechanisms by which 
Serbia would be deterred remained ambiguous in Germany’s advocacy (Axt 1993, 354). Clearly 
Germany was itself unwilling to participate directly in any enforcement actions. Thus, either Germany 
was expecting to force its allies into high-intensity enforcement actions in which it was unwilling to 
participate itself – a rather cynical reading of German foreign policy – or it believed that international 
law would be substantially more efficacious than it turned out to be in this instance. The latter 
interpretation accords with Germany’s broader foreign policy tradition: “When the Cold War ended and 
Germany was united, the strategic vision for keeping peace in Europe, as prevailing in Bonn, was 
through a multilateral network of institutions…. It was a vision basically based on the rule of law rather 
than on any thought about the use of force. It was, in other words, a typical expression of the German 
aversion to thinking seriously about war” (Müller 1994, 125). See also Wagner 1992, 33-34; Woodward 
1995, 185-6.  
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lead of the other major powers of the EU and NATO. Constrained by its own non-
militarized strategic culture, Germany was unable to offer any military contribution 
beyond participation in AWACS reconnaissance overflights and Sharp Guard 
maritime sanctions enforcement (Gow 1997, 173). More than a year after the signing 
of the Dayton accords, Germany finally deployed ground forces as part of SFOR in 
Bosnia itself.  
Defenders of Germany’s policies argue that it was unrealistic for Germany to 
adopt a more aggressive military posture so soon after the end of the Cold War and 
Germany’s semi-sovereign status. They argue that Germany moved towards greater 
“normalization” throughout the 1990s and that it was a reliable partner by the time of 
the Kosovo crisis, when it launched combat air sorties during Operation Allied Force 
and assumed control of one of the five military zones (MNBs) of KFOR. Although 
German strategic culture undeniably evolved in the decade after the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, perhaps more startling than the changes are the continuities. Germany did 
“normalize,” but it became normal in much the same way that Italy or Belgium are 
“normal” countries.
73 Public opinion in Germany lagged behind that of Britain or 
France in support of military options throughout the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo 
(Auerswald 2004; Sobel 1996). While it participated in military actions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, it continued to do so under enormous political constraints, and it continued to 
favor diplomacy over force to a much greater extent than Britain or the United States.  
The United States. Up until the summer of 1991, American and German (and 
other European states’) foreign policies towards Yugoslavia were in agreement on the 
desirability of restructuring the federal republic as a much more decentralized, 
democratic confederation (Libal 1997, Chapter 2; Woodward 1995; Zimmermann 
                                                 
73 For a critical examination of the concept of “normalization,” see for instance Hampton 2000/2001.  
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1996, 41-65). Where they diverged were in their assessments of the efficacy of 
internationalizing the conflict between the secessionist republics and Serbia. While 
German commonly decision-makers believed that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 
as sovereign states would make the conflict amenable to the same instruments of 
interstate conflict resolution and international law that had proved successful in 
reducing Cold War tensions, top officials in the Bush administration tended to believe 
that recognition would create a crisis resolvable only through military force, and it did 
not see American interests as sufficiently engaged by Yugoslavia to warrant the 
decisive application of American military capabilities (Gompert 1996, 122-123; 
Zimmermann 1996, 215). When Germany nonetheless pressed for recognition, 
Washington was more than content to allow the Europeans to take the lead in 
attempting to cobble together a policy that would accomplish what American policy-
makers saw as a nearly impossible goal: a viable peace achieved without decisive 
force.  
The Europeans in fact proved unable to square this circle. The American 
foreign policy community, however, neither re-calibrated its conception of what an 
acceptable peace would entail, nor did it alter its judgment that the stakes in the former 
Yugoslavia could not justify the diversion of American military resources from what 
were perceived as their more pressing deterrent roles in Southwest and Northeast Asia. 
Instead Washington opposed European diplomacy, which it saw as imposing an unjust 
peace on the Bosniaks, while simultaneously failing to devise a workable plan to 
secure a more inclusive, equitable postwar political order.  
Consistent with its strategic culture, when faced with the utter collapse of its 
policy and the severe ramifications of inaction, the United States proved more willing 
to escalate to higher levels of force than any of its European allies but Britain under 
Blair. The militarization of American strategic culture was evident in both the foreign  
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policy and elite and in the public. As the narrative above described, American officials 
were consistently associated with the advocacy of the most confrontational policies in 
both the pre-Dayton period (e.g., arming the Bosniaks and widespread airstrikes 
against the Serbs – the so-called “lift and strike” policy) and the post-Dayton period 
(e.g., intervention to thwart the attempted coup against Plavsić and striking the 
Herzegovacka Banka to disrupt the “third entity” movement). Public opinion polls do 
not demonstrate a particularly high level of support for forceful action in pre-Dayton 
Bosnia, although the Clinton administration did not commit to selling such a policy to 
the American public until the fall of 1995. In Kosovo, however, where the Clinton 
administration did publicly commit, polls show that the American and British publics 
were much more acceptant of higher-intensity uses of force than were German or 
Italian publics.
74 This broader acceptance of high-intensity uses of force in the United 
States – both among policy elites and among the public – allowed for more aggressive 
actions to restructure Bosnian political authority structures. 
Russia. Moscow played a less pro-active role in the Balkans than the Western 
powers, but it nonetheless remained a significant player in multilateral efforts to bring 
peace to the former Yugoslavia. Preoccupied with its own transition and dependent on 
external financial credits, Russia’s contributions were primarily diplomatic, but at 
various points it sought to use troops deployed to the theater as diplomatic leverage.
75 
As discussed in the previous chapter, most Russians simply do not believe that 
                                                 
74 For polls related to Bosnia during the war, see Sobel 1996; for Kosovo, see Auerswald 2004. After 
the Clinton administration committed to Bosnia and American forces were deployed, public support for 
the operation was very high even though most Americans believed that U.S. military forces had 
sustained significant casualties in the operation (Kull and Ramsay 2001, 218-223). The polls during the 
Kosovo crisis show a surprisingly high level of French support for force, although the Chirac 
government proved much less willing than Clinton or Blair to support high-intensity military operations 
such as a ground assault.  
75 Most notably, Russia sought to defuse NATO’s threats of airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs in 
1994, and it sought to effect a de facto partition of Kosovo in 1999 by unilaterally claiming its own 
military district in the northern, predominantly Serb area of Kosovo (Pape 2004; Talbot 2002).  
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democracy is possible or preferable under conditions of high instability (see also Lo 
2003, 100-1, 108). In both Bosnia and Kosovo Russia generally advocated variants of 
a “soft partition” policy, where ethnic groups would be separated into distinct 
geographic and political units, comprising a single state in name only.
76 Relatively 
liberal observers in Russia generally viewed Western interventions in the former 
Yugoslavia as serving the same end; less sympathetic Russian observers saw in NATO 
policies efforts to assert military control over Eastern Europe, to humiliate Russia, and 
ultimately to intervene in Russia itself (Alexandrova-Arbatova 1997; Danilov 1999; 
Davydov 1999). Western claims to be pursuing multi-ethnic democracy were 
generally dismissed as either rhetorical cover for a policy of ethnic favoritism or 
military expansionism, or as errant idealism (Bordachev 1998; Danilov 1999). Russia, 
in short, may have preferred the proxy model, but given its own very limited interests 
in the former Yugoslavia and its resource constraints, it adopted a mediation model for 
its foreign policy. 
Britain, France, and Italy. As explained in the discussion of research design in 
the first chapter, this study concentrates on the policies of Germany, the United States, 
and Russia as exemplars of the three major types of interveners. Britain, France and 
Italy may be seen as lesser included cases, with the United Kingdom representing a 
militarized democracy, Italy a non-militarized democracy, and France occupying a 
middle ground. Each of these countries behaved largely according to the model 
presented here. All three in principle supported democratic principles of conflict 
                                                 
76 For a revealing look at Russian skepticism concerning Western policy in the Balkans, see former 
Russian Foreign and later Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov’s memoirs (1999, 339-355). Concerning 
Primakov’s advocacy of political autonomy as a solution for Kosovo, see Krasnaia Zvezda 1998, 
Petrovskaia 1998, Sysoev 1998. Of course, in practice the lines Russia chose to draw disproportionately 
benefited the Serbs. It is difficult to say whether this was a result of ethnic favoritism or of a realism 
reflecting Serbia’s military preponderance. The discussion of alternative hypotheses below will seek to 
parse between these explanations.  
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resolution for the Balkans, but they diverged in their assessments of the practicality of 
such an option given the military actions that would be entailed. 
Under the government of John Major, Britain adopted a restrained policy 
towards the conflict in Bosnia that closely resembled the approach taken by France. 
Both his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, and his successor, Tony Blair, however, 
advocated much more hawkish policies. Under Blair Britain undertook actions in the 
former Yugoslavia that would simply have been inconceivable in the German or even 
Italian context. The UK was the principle advocate of a ground campaign to impose a 
peace in Kosovo, and it took the operational lead in many of the highest-intensity 
SFOR enforcement actions in Bosnia. British public opinion was highly supportive of 
such an aggressive role.
77  
Italy, like Germany, suffered defeat in the Second World War and has adopted 
very restrained military roles ever since. Rome frequently shied away from higher-
intensity military operations, such as the airstrikes over Kosovo. In marked contrast to 
Germany, however, Italian paramilitary troops – the Carabinieri – have proven highly 
adept at lower-intensity peace operations (Perito 2004).  
France occupies an intermediate position between the less militarized states 
like Germany and Italy and the more militarized ones like the United States and 
Britain. Since its defeat in Algeria, France has been reluctant to participate in large-
scale expeditionary operations. While France has been active in providing military 
assistance to Francophone Africa, these operations almost always involve very small 
numbers of French troops supporting the government in power, with very little 
parliamentary or public oversight (Moisi 1984). Where France has taken the lead in 
large-scale, widely visible missions such as Operation Turquoise after the Rwandan 
                                                 
77 For public opinion poll data, see Auerswald 2004. For a discussion of the relationship between 
Britain’s imperial past and the British public’s reflexive support for military options in the Balkan 
context, see Towle 1994.  
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genocide or Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, it has generally preferred 
interpositional peacekeeping duties to more intrusive (and thus confrontational) 
mandates (International Crisis Group 2004b; Vaccaro 1996). At times France has 
advocated aggressive military actions in the former Yugoslavia – most notably under 
President Chirac in 1995 in Bosnia and again during the Kosovo crisis, where it was 
one of the primary European contributors to combat air sorties flown in Operation 
Allied Force in 1999. More often, however, it has sought accommodation with the 
parties to the conflict, seeking to exercise the minimal amount of force necessary to 
stabilize the situation at hand. France has interpreted its mandate in Bosnia similarly to 
many of its African peacekeeping missions, adopting a minimalist approach that seeks 
to separate the parties without fundamentally transforming power relationships.  
All of the major Western countries involved sought to promote a democratic 
resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The nature of the conflict, 
however, tended to marginalize parties with a vested interest in the de-militarization of 
the conflict. Consequently, states with less militarized strategic cultures were left 
without effective tools for implementing their first-order preferences and instead were 
forced to adopt a mediation model for resolving the war and subsequent tenuous 
peace. As will be seen in the following section, even the militarized democracies had 
to balance their orientation towards aggressive enforcement measures with the limited 
national interests at stake in the Balkans. 
Interests of the Major Powers 
The only American interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia were its desire 
to retain a strong transatlantic military alliance (with American leadership) and to 
build a “new world order” predicated on peaceful resolution of international disputes 
and democratic governance. Even these interests were limited by resource constraints;  
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for many years the United States was more interested in deferring a greater proportion 
of the defense burden to its European allies than to maintaining undisputed leadership 
of the NATO alliance or to building a rather nebulous – and potentially extraordinarily 
expensive – world order. Unlike Europe, the United States was a global power with 
defense commitments around the globe. At the time much of the American defense 
community was preoccupied with containing Iraq and preparing for the contingency 
that the former Soviet Union might itself descend into violent chaos (Baker 1995, 636; 
Gompert 1996; Halverson 1996).
78  
The Europeans also had no vital interests in the former Yugoslavia, although 
they were somewhat more directly affected by the conflict. Parallel to the American 
interest in retaining a vital NATO under American leadership, most Europeans were 
enthusiastic about the opportunities for Europe to act as a major, unified diplomatic 
player in the post-Cold War era – first as the European Community (EC) and later as 
the European Union (EU). The Europeans also had an interest in developing a world 
order based on Helsinki principles of peaceful dispute resolution and democratic 
governance. But beyond these diplomatic goals, the Europeans sought to minimize 
many of the direct “security externalities” of the conflict. The most important of these 
was the massive refugee crisis provoked by the violence. Europeans also feared the 
potential for the conflict to widen geographically, threatening the stability of many of 
Europe’s eastern neighbors (Calic 1996, 68-9).  
The great challenge on both sides of the Atlantic was to reconcile the major 
powers’ first-order preferences for how the war should be resolved with their fairly 
limited interests in the conflict. It was a balancing act that both sides juggled poorly, 
although the United States did far the worse, refusing to commit to either providing 
the necessary resources for the realization of its ambitious first-order preferences 
                                                 
78 On the reluctance of the U.S. military in particular to become involved in what it saw as a peripheral 
region, see Western 2002.  
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while simultaneously refusing to accept a peace that reflected the military, rather than 
moral, balance of forces. When the Clinton administration ultimately decided to 
intervene, it was not a decision that was made lightly. The president expected to take 
casualties in the operation, which was a politically perilous decision in the aftermath 
of the Mogadishu debacle in Somalia (Chollet 2005; Daalder 2000, 63-4, 106-7; 
Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 15). Even after the decision to intervene, American 
commitment was much less than total, reflecting the intermediate level of the 
American interests at stake in Bosnia. Only after the 1996 mid-term elections did the 
administration replace many key personnel in Bosnia, Brussels, and Washington with 
officials dedicated to more aggressive implementation of the Dayton accords 
(Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 20), leading to the sorts of enforcement actions seen in the 
attempted coup against Plavsić and the Herzegovacka Banka incident. 
Structure of the Intervention 
Prior to 1995, all of the powers involved had adopted a mediation model to 
structure peace negotiations and the eventual deployment of a peace enforcement 
coalition force. As discussed in the narrative above, while various countries and 
negotiators had pressed for democratic mechanisms in the various peace plans, in 
practice most of the enforceable provisions for democratic institutions were offered as 
concessions to secure the agreement of the warring parties. Only the combined ground 
and air campaign in 1995 provided the necessary military leverage to impose a peace 
agreement with realistically enforceable provisions that more resembled the 
transformation model. Even then, however, many of the countries participating in the 
IFOR and SFOR peace enforcement missions preferred to avoid confrontation with the 
paramilitaries that thwarted Dayton implementation, leading to the divergent policies 
and complex bargaining arrangements described in the narrative above.   
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Military Structure. The troop-contributing countries of IFOR – above all the 
United States – sought to ensure that the NATO-led force would have the military 
credibility that UNPROFOR had lacked. To this end they deployed 60,000 troops, 
including substantial armor and air support, within NATO command and control 
structures.
79 They were deployed throughout the territory of Bosnia,
80 and they were 
given extremely broad powers of enforcement through the so-called “silver bullet 
clause” of the Dayton accords, which permitted international forces “to do all the 
Commander judges necessary and proper” (“General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” quoted in Holbrooke 1998, 223).  
These forces were divided between three reinforced multinational divisions 
(MNDs), one each under the control of the United States, Britain, and France. 
Although all forces operated ostensibly under the same robust NATO rules of 
engagement, the distinct approaches of these three “lead nations” led many 
international personnel in Bosnia to refer to the MNDs as “the Three Kingdoms.” 
Besides the conflicts over the conduct of enforcement operations described in the 
narrative above, the three MNDs had differential rates of refugee returns and the 
apprehension of war criminals. Refugees were repatriated at the highest rate within the 
British MND (after the Blair government took power), reflecting Britain’s highly pro-
active approach to guaranteeing the security of ethnic minorities (Bassuener 2005, 
109),
81 while for years after the initial introduction of IFOR (later SFOR) troops, there 
was scarcely a single arrest of a war criminal within the French sector (Sudetic 2000). 
                                                 
79 Unified NATO command and control arrangements were in distinct contrast to the so-called “dual 
key” arrangements (in which both the UN and NATO had to agree to combat operations) that had 
frequently hamstrung NATO air operations during the war.  
80 Initially the U.S. military opposed such a provision, preferring simply to deploy to the Federation in 
order to deter a resumption of fighting without risking clashes with Bosnian Serb forces. American 
civilian officials insisted that IFOR be deployed throughout the territory of Bosnia in order to prevent 
the “soft partition” of the country and to enforce compliance with Dayton throughout the country’s 
borders (Holbrooke 1998, 220-221). 
81 The United States military did not distinguish itself by facilitating refugee repatriation.  
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Civilian Structure. The civilian structure of the Dayton accords and subsequent 
implementation efforts was largely decided by a continuing clash between so-called 
“minimalists” and “maximalists,” both within the United States government and 
between the United States and European powers. During the fall of 1995, proponents 
of a transformational model of intervention, led principally by U.S. Ambassador 
Richard Holbrooke, fought with those who adopted a mediation approach, which 
would have sought merely to police a durable ceasefire and separation of the warring 
parties. The mediation approach found many champions within the U.S. government, 
particularly among the military, who favored its less demanding implementation 
requirements. The institutions created by Dayton incorporate both models of 
intervention, reflecting the intermediate interests at stake in Bosnia and the reluctance 
of the European countries to pursue more ambitious political goals with a 
concomitantly higher risk of confrontation with the local parties. The division of 
Bosnia into two “entities,” the Republika Srpska and the Federation, with a clear 
separation of indigenous military forces along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), 
reflects the logic of the mediation model. But Dayton also incorporated a variety of 
instruments designed to undermine the rigid division of the country, including 
provisions for state-level political institutions, refugee returns, the apprehension of 
war criminals, and various human rights mechanisms (Cousens and Cater 2001; 
Holbrooke 1998; Woodward 1998 and 1999). 
One of the most controversial provisions mandated the holding of elections 
within one year of the accords’ signing. With an eye towards the U.S. Congress, the 
Clinton administration initially insisted that the IFOR mission last only a single year, 
despite the ambitious goals that Holbrooke and the other American negotiators had 
pursued at Dayton. When Washington consented to an extension of the IFOR mandate 
(now renamed SFOR), it agreed to only an 18-month extension. Not until more than  
173 
two years into the mission did the Clinton administration commit to keeping American 
troops deployed indefinitely – that is, replacing an “end date” with an “end state.” As a 
direct consequence of the initial one-year mandate, the United States advocated 
holding elections within one year of the peace accords’ signing. Officials responsible 
for Bosnia policy at the time recognized the contradiction between the lofty goals of 
Dayton and the extremely short time horizons. The explanations provided by these 
officials do not reflect a blind faith in either democracy or in elections, as some critics 
have maintained, but rather a delicate balancing act between ambitious political goals 
and a Congress skeptical of deploying large numbers of troops for extended periods of 
time where no vital national interests were at stake (Holbrooke 1998).  
Outcomes: Democratic Change, Achievement, and Durability in Bosnia 
Bosnia, of course, looks nothing like Switzerland or any other mature 
multiethnic democracy, but neither is it any longer dominated by paramilitarized 
actors operating outside of formal democratic institutions. In fact, it is a unique 
creation, combining the semi-trusteeship of the Office of the High Representative with 
both the shadow institutions inherited from the war and more legitimate domestic 
political actors willing to play by democratic rules of the game. Although there remain 
many troubling aspects of Bosnian politics, there has been substantial political 
progress since the signing of the Dayton accords. 
At least three sources of change lie behind this progress: the weakening of 
popular support for nationalist parties, the moderation of nationalist parties’ political 
platforms, and the rise of numerous less-nationalist parties. Popular support for 
nationalist parties has charted a steady decline, falling below the 50 percent level in 
the 2000 and 2002 elections (Caspersen 2004, 675-6; see also Pugh and Cobble 2001 
for an analysis that disputes the most negative interpretations of the nationalists’  
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electoral strength). Accompanying this decline has been the emergence of a number of 
viable parties less tied to the criminalized economy and paramilitaries of the wartime 
era; several of these parties united (admittedly under the tutelage of the international 
community) to form a coalition government for the Federation following the 2000 
elections. This increased electoral competition has forced many of the nationalist 
parties to respond (at least in part) to voter discontent, particularly on the issue of 
corruption, and has led to a general moderation of the more nationalist parties’ 
platforms (Manning 2004).  
According to Andreas Schedler’s (2002) quadripartite division of regime type 
based on Freedom House rankings, it has progressed from “closed autocracy” (a score 
of 6 on the Freedom House scale) to “illiberal democracy” (a score of 3).
82 One 
comprehensive study of peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia published in 2001 pointed out 
that “some observers with experience have stated that Bosnia compares favorably to 
other post-communist states, including Russia and Ukraine, where the level of mafia 
involvement in politics in both countries is much higher (Cousens and Cater 2001, 
122). Since that time Bosnia has made further progress. This progress does not mean 
that all is well with Bosnia. Widespread voter alienation and depoliticization, for 
instance, is a severe constraint on developing mechanisms of accountability for 
political elites who continue to stall economic and political reforms (Søberg 2006). Its 
current level of political achievement is nonetheless far beyond what many skeptics in 
1995 deemed possible. 
Policy Options and Counterfactuals 
Could the major powers have adopted different policies than they did and, if 
so, what would have been the likely outcomes of these alternative approaches? 
                                                 
82 As a point of comparison, Turkey also scored a 3; see Freedom House 2007.  
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Answering this question is important for theoretical as well as policy purposes: The 
accomplishments of intervention are best understood in terms of the counterfactual of 
what would have happened in the absence of intervention. As the narrative above 
makes clear, there were indeed alternatives to using military force and to promoting 
democracy in order to realize an inclusive, durable political order: first, advocating the 
continued unity of socialist Yugoslavia and turning a blind eye as Belgrade and the 
Yugoslav National Army forcibly repressed secessionist movements in the other 
republics; second, recognizing the “hard partition” of Bosnia between Croatia and 
Serbia; and third, supporting a “soft partition” of Bosnia, with each national group 
awarded territory according to its military victories. Each of these was problematic for 
different reasons. 
The first alternative was considered by the Bush administration in 1991 but 
ultimately abandoned as infeasible or unacceptable. With an eye towards the 
disintegrating Soviet Union, the administration of George H. W. Bush strongly 
supported the principle of territorial integrity, and it sought to promote a solution in 
which Yugoslavia remained united but less centralized. Events on the ground quickly 
outpaced American efforts to broker such a compromise, however. With Yugoslav 
defense forces divided between a centrally controlled military and territorial defense 
forces controlled by each republic, the institutions of unified Yugoslavia had 
distributed military capabilities in such a way as to make any weakening of central 
authority likely to be an extraordinarily bloody affair (Bunce 1999). The U.S. and 
Europe could have continued to support a unified Yugoslavia, but doing so would not 
likely have made the outcome any less bloody. Nor was either side of the Atlantic 
anxious to condone a large-scale campaign of violent repression by Belgrade, 
particularly when there were no guarantees that such a campaign would have 
succeeded in preventing the broader civil wars that all feared.  
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Once the fighting had spread from Croatia to Bosnia, a second alternative 
policy would have accepted the vast military superiority of Serbian and Croatian 
forces and recognized the partition of Bosnia between them. The presidents of Croatia 
and Serbia, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosević, met together early in the war 
and reportedly drew up lines for the division of Bosnia between them (Burg and 
Shoup 1999, 104). Those who argued that humanitarian intervention was too costly or 
too unlikely to succeed either implicitly or explicitly advocated such a policy, as did 
many of those in Russia who decried Western favoritism towards the Bosniaks. 
Military victory in civil wars, such observers argued, provides the basis for the 
construction of politically stable states, which in turn are the necessary prerequisite for 
enduring peace (Licklider 1995; Luttwak 1999). These states might subsequently be 
induced through aid conditionality and other means to obey international norms of 
governance, including those pertaining to the treatment of the populations defeated in 
war (Weinstein 2005). In the context of the former Yugoslavia, a hard partition of 
Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia might have ended the war more rapidly and thus 
saved lives. In the best-case scenario, the Bosniaks might have held the same position 
in the newly expanded states as, for instance, the Sandjak Muslims of Serbia – that is, 
they would have been denied political rights and economic opportunities but might 
have improved their lot over time. This, however, is the best case scenario. As 
previous research has made clear, military victories not only increase the likelihood of 
enduring peace, they also increase the likelihood of genocide (Licklider 1995). Given 
the behavior of paramilitaries operating in Bosnia during the early months of the war, 
there is little reason to believe the Muslims of Bosnia would have remained a viable 
sub-population in a Greater Serbia or a Greater Croatia analogous to the Sandjak 
Muslims; the Palestinians or the Tutsi living in Uganda after the violence of the 1950s 
and 1960s in Rwanda are perhaps more apt analogies.  
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The final and most likely alternative scenario was the “soft partition” of Bosnia 
into distinct ethno-national territorial units, with no effective provisions for integrative 
political mechanisms – in other words, de facto partition within a single de jure state. 
As discussed in the narrative above, soft partition was the most likely outcome of 
European efforts prior to 1995 to broker a peace deal.
83  
The narrative raised considerable doubts about whether such a deal was 
possible at all unless outside powers were to compel the parties to accept the 
arrangements, and such enforcement actions were highly unlikely without the 
participation of the United States. Nonetheless, because such peace plans met more of 
the demands of the militarily dominant parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, it is 
possible that they might have been successfully imposed without the benefit of the 
Croatian military offensive and NATO airstrikes of 1995. Such plans, however, would 
have gained the uncoerced consent of these militarily dominant parties by offering 
these parties a relatively more advantageous position – at the expense of the militarily 
weakest faction, the Bosniaks. So long as they were winning the war, the 
paramilitaries and war profiteers that dominated the government of the Bosnian Serb 
wartime government would not have voluntarily consented to any measures that 
sought to limit the territory they controlled, the “rents” they reaped through their 
control of a predatory proto-state, or their hold on political power. As the narrative 
demonstrated, only substantial military setbacks and the risk of outright military defeat 
compelled the Pale leadership to make substantive concessions.  
Thus, the soft partition option would have created three microstates, none of 
which would have been economically viable without integration into (or subsidies 
from) neighboring, much larger economies. Such an arrangement would have 
                                                 
83 Daalder (1997) argued for a hard partition of Bosnia two years after the signing of the Dayton 
accords. The issues associated with soft partition (discussed below) generally apply to Daalder’s 
version of hard partition as well.  
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accorded well with the aims of the wartime political parties of the Bosnian Serbs and 
Croats. They would have maintained their hold on power, without any effective 
mechanisms for the international community to enforce elections or compliance with 
the rule of law, they would have retained the vast economic fortunes the wartime 
leadership had acquired during the war, and they would have been the beneficiaries of 
continued subsidies from the nationalist parties in Serbia and Croatia proper. The 
Bosniaks, on the other hand, would have inhabited a tiny proportion of the territory of 
Bosnia as a whole, with massive refugee populations that had no realistic hope of 
return. Moreover, the Bosniak-controlled territory would have been cut off from many 
of the economic assets and trade routes of pre-war Bosnia.  
Proponents of soft partition argue that the Dayton accords accomplished little, 
if anything, more than earlier plans for soft partition, and they did so after the loss of 
many more thousands of lives in the war. There is substantial truth to these criticisms. 
The Dayton accords were an uneasy compromise between soft partition and a 
transformational blueprint for a relatively more democratic, integrated, and 
multiethnic Bosnia. In the initial year and a half of implementation, Dayton yielded 
almost exclusively a soft partition of the country.  
By the summer of 1997, however, both the United States and Britain had 
committed to more aggressive enforcement of the transformational elements of the 
Dayton accords. In 1997 these countries ensured that the Pale hardliners could not use 
their paramilitaries to marginalize other Serb political parties. Beginning in the same 
year, a steadily increasing number of war criminals were apprehended. By 1999 
freedom of movement across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) dividing the 
Federation and Republika Srpska had improved substantially, and meaningful refugee 
returns began to become possible. In 2001 NATO forces, with Britain playing the 
dominant role, foiled an attempt by the hardline HDZ to create by fiat a “third entity.”  
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In successive elections hardline nationalist parties gained fewer and fewer votes, and 
the content of their political platforms generally moderated. By 2005 the situation in 
Bosnia had stabilized to the point where SFOR was replaced by an EU-led force 
(EUFOR). Freedom House scores continued to chart a slow but steady trend towards 
greater democracy in the country, reaching the same level of democracy as Turkey by 
2006. By 2006 many in the conflict resolution and development communities had 
begun to become relatively optimistic about Bosnia.  
The country is by no means a consolidated democracy. It is a hybrid creation 
of the international community, fusing Western-imposed institutions to an underlying 
political dynamic born out of a vicious civil war. The resultant political system 
combines elements of autocracy and division with democracy and integration. While it 
is too early to judge the ultimate outcome, there are strong indications that this hybrid 
creation can not only be sustained but also improved over time as Bosnians adapt to 
the new opportunities available to them. 
Clearly there were viable policy alternatives to the transformation model of 
intervention – indeed, the European powers pursued the mediation model for years, 
and many within the Clinton administration pressed for such an approach. Equally 
clearly, there are differences between the political authority structures that Dayton 
created and the soft partition that an intervention without American participation 
would have produced. Military interventions can produce a relatively more inclusive 
and participatory political order, so long as the intervening countries are committed to 
undertaking the military enforcement actions necessary to create and sustain more 
democratic institutions. It is an open ethical question whether these political orders are 
a substantial enough improvement over those produced by the mediation model so as 
to justify the military force and loss of life necessary in challenging environments to 
achieve them.   
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Contending Explanations 
Numerous observers have contested the argument made here. Many advance 
alternative explanations for the sources of interveners’ preferences, including 
explanations based on partisanship, domestic institutions, ethnic ties, and leadership. 
Others question the causes of the outcomes in Bosnia, arguing that capabilities rather 
than strategic cultures account for variation in states’ willingness to use force, or that 
military force was not the primary determinant of outcomes. Finally, some have 
questioned whether the politics of post-war Bosnia can be considered even minimally 
democratic. Most of these alternative explanations are not direct competitors with the 
one advanced in this study; rather, they capture different elements of the complex 
processes at work. Thus the goal of this section is less to “disprove” alternative 
explanations as to assess the relative explanatory power of the various theories. 
Preferences 
Perhaps the most basic challenge to the argument adopted here is that 
democracies do not truly intend to promote democracy through their interventions. 
Instead, they are motivated to provide public goods (such as security) or other services 
that broadly benefit their own populations (such as inexpensive access to energy 
resources), while erecting only the “trappings” of democracy abroad to disguise their 
true goal, which is to prevent full democratization in the target state (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs 2006). Perhaps such a description of democracies’ preferences 
fits some other cases; it does not remotely describe the case of Bosnia. The 
democracies of Western Europe and the United States demonstrated a consistent 
commitment to democratic mechanisms of conflict regulation when such were deemed 
to be viable, such as before the war began and after the insertion of IFOR. Had 
democracy not been the goal of the post-Dayton intervention, the intervening powers  
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could have saved themselves billions of dollars in civilian aid expenses alone, not to 
speak of the cost of keeping tens of thousands of highly expensive troops deployed for 
years. Indeed, as detailed above, the Clinton administration took considerable political 
risks to support aspects of the so-called maximalists’ schemes for Bosnia, rather than 
the minimalist, balance-of-power approach favored by the U.S. military and the 
Congress. Perhaps most telling is the fact that the intervention occurred despite the 
fact that no vital national interests, such as direct security concerns or access to cheap 
energy resources, were at stake. 
More plausible as an alternative explanation is the contention that factors other 
than regime type and strategic culture best explain the interventionist impulses of the 
major powers. Stephen Saideman (2001), for instance, argues that ethnic ties motivate 
patterns of one-sided support or opposition to the parties in a civil conflict. His 
argument relatively accurately explains patterns of support among third-party actors 
that shared borders with the former Yugoslavia or were former imperial overlords in 
the region – countries such as Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. It does 
much less well in explaining the actions of the major powers such as the French (who 
acted against their co-religionists, the Croats), the British, or the Americans. Even the 
behavior of the Germans, who are commonly accused of bowing to Catholic pressures 
to support the Croats, is poorly explained by the ethnic ties argument. While Germany 
did support Croatian independence, it also was one of the primary proponents of 
intervention on behalf of the Muslims in Bosnia. In their special role in the 
administration of the divided city of Mostar, many Germans were highly critical of the 
Herzogivinian “mafias” and worked to weaken these Croats’ hold on power (Seidt 
2002). Such actions are more consistent with an overall commitment to democracy as 
an instrument of conflict resolution than to a narrowly one-sided intervention on 
behalf of co-religionists.  
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Brian Rathbun (2004) contends that partisanship more reliably predicts the 
occurrence of humanitarian intervention than any state-level variable, with left-wing 
parties more likely to initiate humanitarian interventions than right-wing parties.
84 
Certainly, as a general rule left-oriented parties are more disposed to state-directed 
efforts to improve the human condition than are right-oriented parties, and 
incorporating partisanship as a variable can help to explain when humanitarian 
interventions are more likely to occur. But there are considerable anomalies within this 
explanation, and even where it accurately predicts when interventions will occur, the 
theory cannot account for differences in the manner in which different governments 
with similar partisan leadership implement humanitarian interventions. While it is true 
that the Tory government of John Major sought to minimize its commitments in 
Bosnia, both his Tory predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, as well as his Labor successor, 
Tony Blair, were outspoken advocates of intervention. Although many American 
Republicans opposed humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, so did many Democrats. 
On the other hand, one of the primary proponents of intervention was Bob Dole, the 
1996 Republican challenger for the presidency.
85 Perhaps more fundamentally, 
partisanship does not explain the manner in which interventions are conducted. 
Whether the German Chancellor was a Social Democrat or a Christian Democrat, it is 
inconceivable that she or he could have advocated a ground invasion of Kosovo in the 
manner of Tony Blair. Germany has had troops deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan under governments of both the right and left, yet never have they taken an 
aggressive role in enforcement actions.  
                                                 
84 Rathbun’s theory explains intervention initiation and does not directly address the argument of this 
study, which concerns the manner in which interventions are conducted. By implication, however, 
Rathbun’s theory speaks to the likelihood that an intervening state will commit to more ambitious goals 
in cases of humanitarian intervention, and thus it is relevant to the discussion of Bosnia. 
85 Not only was Dole the sponsor of legislation designed to promote greater American activism on 
Bosnia during the war, he also ceased to challenge Clinton on Bosnia policy after Dayton, admitting 
that there was little difference between Clinton’s policy and the one he himself would have adopted 
(Holbrooke 1998, 345, 355-6).  
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A fourth alternative explanation concerns the leadership of the intervening 
state (Saunders 2007, Shafer and Walker 2006). Militarized, democratic interveners do 
not exhibit consistent patterns of behavior even in cases that are of significant interest 
to them. British behavior in Bosnia provides a prime example, where John Major 
responded to the war in Bosnia in a much different manner than Tony Blair. Again, 
such an explanation is not so much an alternative explanation to the one offered here 
as an additional variable that can help to explain within-intervener variation. While not 
all democratic leaders will be equally disposed to pursue ambitious policies of 
democracy promotion during interventions, democratic leaders are much more prone 
to export democracy than are the leaders of non-democracies, and militarized 
democracies are more likely to be willing to confront armed groups in the target state, 
thus making them relatively more disposed to ambitious efforts to reorganize the 
political structures of the target. These broad tendencies, however, do not ensure that a 
given leader will act according to his or her state’s type. 
Outcomes 
Three lines of argumentation contest that the actions of committed, militarized 
democracies led to a more democratic political order in Bosnia. The first claims that 
American military capabilities, not its strategic culture, were the deciding factor. A 
second argues that military force did no more than stabilize or secure outcomes that 
were achieved through other means. Specifically, some claim that economic sanctions 
on Serbia rather than the air and ground campaigns of 1995 made possible a peace 
settlement for Bosnia, while economic and political mechanisms were the primary 
drivers of change in the post-Dayton period. A third criticism disputes the notion that 
politics in Bosnia can be considered even a hybrid or lesser form of democratic  
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politics. All of these arguments are partially correct; disagreements concern the 
weighting or interaction of the variables at work. 
Many believe that the intercession of the United States was a necessary 
condition for imposing a relatively more inclusive peace on Bosnia, but they argue 
that military capabilities, not culture, were the key issue: The European powers alone 
did not have adequate numbers of troops to engage in peace enforcement (Gow 1997, 
306). While capabilities are certainly an important component of interventions and 
cannot be excluded from any serious analysis, strategic culture generally provides 
more leverage. At one level the distinction between strategic culture and military 
capabilities is a misleading one: Culture is a significant influence on the extent to 
which countries develop material capabilities. Although there is little difference 
between the level of military threat faced by the Europeans and Americans, Europeans 
have chosen to invest much less in their defense capabilities than the United States. 
Analyses arguing that the Europeans would seek to acquire actual military capabilities 
in line with their potential capabilities (Mearsheimer 1990) have proven wide of the 
mark. But even if we accept a rigid distinction between capabilities and culture, 
culture provides a better indicator of the goals that intervening states will in fact 
pursue. The Europeans have proven capable of sustaining the deployment of more 
than 30,000 well-equipped troops around the world for years on end, simultaneously 
operating in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
elsewhere. Such totals rival those of IFOR and SFOR. The issue is not overall 
numbers or equipment; the issue is whether militaries have the necessary training, 
organization, and domestic political support to potentially engage in high-intensity 
military operations abroad. Without such an orientation, peace enforcers are unlikely 
to deter well-armed spoilers, and a peace enforcement operation will prove  
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unsustainable.
86 Again, an examination of the broader empirical record suggests that 
this interpretation is correct. Of the European powers, only Britain has committed to 
higher-intensity peace enforcement operations. France is the only other power to have 
provided leadership of sizable of interventions in the post-Cold War era, and it has 
consistently pursued less-ambitious goals.
87  
A second line of criticism contends that military force was at best a 
contributing factor, while the economic sanctions against Serbia were the critical 
element for bringing the war to an end by inducing Milosevic to pressure the Bosnian 
Serbs into a deal. As discussed in the narrative above, the sanctions were indeed an 
important factor in securing peace for Bosnia. But the sanctions induced Milosevic 
only to limit the amount of support he provided to the Bosnian Serbs. He twice 
continued to provide financial and military aid to Pale, albeit at reduced levels, despite 
publicly having committed to end all support. The combined air and ground 
campaigns of 1995 changed the situation fundamentally. Without a substantial – and 
highly visible – infusion of military support from Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs risked 
outright military defeat. Milosevic was unwilling to endure continued international 
isolation and economic decline in order to head off a Bosnian Serb defeat, so he 
committed to brokering a negotiated end to the conflict. Economic sanctions are thus 
an important part of the story, but without military reversals, they proved unable in 
four years of implementation to secure an end to the conflict. 
Similarly, military enforcement actions and deterrence were not alone capable 
of fostering political progress in post-Dayton Bosnia, but they were a necessary 
                                                 
86 Of course, even with a militarized strategic culture, an intervener may be unwilling to commit to 
higher-intensity peace enforcement operations; the example of Somalia readily comes to mind. But 
direct confrontation with a militarized intervener is a risky proposition for a potential spoiler, 
particularly where the intervener has significant national interests at stake and where the intervener is 
offering the target-state party the opportunity to be included in the post-intervention political order.  
87 The distinction between capabilities and culture is an important one for a number of minor powers 
such as Canada and the Nordics. Many of these countries’ militaries have proven relatively aggressive 
in the implementation of their mandates. Their overall capabilities, however, have prevented them from 
playing other than a secondary leadership role in peace enforcement operations.  
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condition and an element of the combination of factors that proved sufficient to induce 
positive political change. Without NATO’s intercession in the attempted coup against 
Biljana Plavsic, Pale hardliners would have retained a monopoly on political power, 
anchored in their monopoly on paramilitary violence (or the threat thereof). Similarly, 
NATO support for the operation against the Herzegovacka Banka was a precondition 
for preventing the HDZ’s attempt to use armed force to secure its continued hold on 
power in the Croat regions of Bosnia. Observers are certainly correct to contend that 
interventions cannot produce democracy through armed force alone. They are also 
correct in arguing that democracy arises out of grassroots support for democratic 
processes and from the dynamics generated by political competition among elites who 
have committed to observing the “rules of the game.” But too often they ignore the 
preconditions that are necessary for such political dynamics to evolve. Outside 
military force is often necessary to open a de-militarized political space in which 
unarmed elements of civil society can find their voice and to enforce the agreement of 
political elites to obey at least minimalist “rules of the game” regulating political 
competition. Such an intrusive role for intervening forces risks confrontation with 
those local parties who benefit from the paramilitarization of politics. Relatively few 
interveners are willing to take on such a role. 
The final, most fundamental criticism of the argument advanced here 
challenges the notion that the politics of Bosnia can be described as being democratic 
in any meaningful way (Chandler 2000). This perspective contends that all meaningful 
political initiatives originate with the international community and are imposed on 
elected Bosnian officials, either de jure through the High Representative’s Bonn 
Powers, or de facto, through the threat of withholding the aid on which Bosnia 
depends. Again, there is considerable truth to these criticisms. They are, however, too 
blunt and sweeping to describe accurately the complexity of Bosnian politics. The  
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many indications of political progress in Bosnia were detailed in the section above on 
the outcomes of the Western intervention. Currently Bosnia remains a hybrid polity, 
with elements of an international protectorate uneasily co-mingled with nationalist 
political parties, a criminalized postwar political-economy, and a political culture with 
little historical experience of democracy. Within this environment of cross-cutting 
incentive structures, there is visible a gradual moderation of nationalist political 
parties’ platforms and behavior, relatively pragmatic preferences among voters, and 
the rise of enough new political actors to ensure some degree of electoral competition 
(Søberg 2006). This is not democracy, but it is a hybrid regime with substantial 
democratic aspects and the foundations for continued progress.  
Conclusion and Implications 
The project to build a durable peace in Bosnia through the promotion of a 
multiethnic democracy was not the project of everyone, or no one, or the United States 
alone, as various theorists of democracy promotion through military interventions 
have contended. The various democracies of Europe and North America all sought to 
promote democratic mechanisms for ethnic conflict regulation before, during, and 
after the war. The less militarized states, however, were unable to decisively alter the 
dynamics that favored the armed parties in Bosnia. Consequently, they turned to their 
second-order preference, the mediation model of intervention, in which the warring 
factions were offered a postwar political order that ratified the military balance of 
power and consolidated the position of the predominant armed groups. The United 
States maintained its first-order preference for the transformation model throughout 
the conflict, but for years it was unable to reconcile its ambitious preferences with its 
lack of a vital national interest in the region. The result was a vacillating foreign 
policy that infuriated its allies and stymied efforts to impose a peace that, while unfair  
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to the primary victims of the war, would have at least saved lives. In the end, however, 
the threat that this impasse posed to the transatlantic alliance itself became a 
significant enough impetus to action that the Clinton administration accepted the 
political risks inherent in undertaking a hazardous intervention in the absence of a vital 
interest. Even then the United States did not wholeheartedly commit to a 
transformational model of intervention. Instead, consistent with the intermediate 
stakes involved in the crisis, American policymakers balanced the transformational 
preferences of the “maximalist” camp with the mediation preferences of those who 
sought to husband American military resources for direct threats to American security. 
The resultant Dayton accords were an incoherent blend of the two models. Only in 
1997, more than a year into Dayton implementation and after the American midterm 
elections in 1996, did the United States, along with Tony Blair’s Britain, commit to 
many of the enforcement actions necessary to undermine the paramilitary-backed 
shadow institutions in Bosnia that posed a significant brake on political development. 
American vacillations have rightfully been criticized by many observers. In the 
end, however, American commitment to intervention was a necessary condition for the 
achievement of a peace that could yield a relatively inclusive, participatory political 
order. Unlike the peace plans negotiated by the Europeans before American 
intercession, the Dayton accords provided a realistic, enforceable blueprint for a 
postwar Bosnia in which democratic mechanisms of ethnic conflict regulation could 
be used to weaken the control of the paramilitarized factions that dominated Bosnian 
political life. After the Dayton accords were in place, it was the United States and 
Britain that provided the backbone of the higher-intensity enforcement actions 
necessary to break the monopolies on power held by the Pale hardliners in the 
Republika Srpska and the Herzogivinian extremists of the Federation. Progress 
towards a relatively more democratic postwar political order in Bosnia, in short, was  
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contingent upon the commitment of militarized democracies such as the United States 




On September 11, 2001 four airplanes crashed into the two towers of the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, killing more than 
3,000 people and provoking an American military response that would profoundly 
alter world affairs. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the North 
Atlantic alliance for the first time in its history invoked the self-defense provisions of 
Article V of its charter, committing its European members to come to the defense of 
the alliance’s leading member. Russian President Vladimir Putin was among the first 
to call the American president, offering him Russia’s sympathy and support. German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared “unlimited solidarity” with the United States – 
a phrase that would return to haunt him as America widened its “global war on terror.” 
The September 11 attacks posed a difficult strategic challenge. Formerly the 
ability to kill large numbers of people in a foreign country had been a capability 
possessed only by states. States, in turn, could be deterred from launching such attacks 
for fear of devastating reprisals. Non-state actors such as al Qaeda, on the other hand, 
are difficult to locate and therefore difficult to deter. The Bush administration 
responded to this challenge by making the states that harbored terrorists accountable 
alongside the terrorists themselves for any attack made against the United States. Such 
a policy, however, immediately posed another challenge: What to do with the states 
themselves? For a president who had come into office vehemently opposed to the 
“nation-building” enterprises of his predecessor, this challenge was a difficult one 
indeed. 
In part for this reason, Afghanistan represents a “hard” case for the theory 
presented here – in fact, it would be difficult to find ones much harder. The military 
intervention into Afghanistan was not launched for humanitarian purposes, as were the  
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large majority of those in Europe and Africa. It was initiated by a president who did 
not believe in nation-building, and the execution of the policy was entrusted to a 
bureaucracy – the U.S. Department of Defense – that has been similarly disdainful of 
using military forces to help shape the political authority structures of target states. 
Moreover, Afghanistan itself is as inhospitable to democratic development as any 
country on the planet, with extraordinarily low levels of development, high levels of 
illiteracy, an almost non-existent middle class, high ethnic heterogeneity, an 
unforgiving physical environment that inhibits nearly any form of economic 
development besides opium production and trafficking, and a legacy of civil war that 
has destroyed the entire physical and human infrastructure of the country. Beyond 
these factors inimical to democratic political development, Afghanistan also suffers 
from a variety of factors that inhibit even the achievement of peace and stability: in 
particular, a variety of hostile neighbors locked in rivalry with one another over the 
control of Afghanistan and easily transportable and highly lucrative primary 
commodity exports (i.e., opium and its derivatives). Given these circumstances, any 
evidence that intervening states did, in fact, seek to promote democracy and that they 
were at all successful should count as important testimony to the validity of the 
theoretical framework advanced in this study. 
The invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent events in fact provide a 
fascinating illustration of the causal pathways linking the regime type and strategic 
culture of intervening states with political outcomes in the targets of intervention. 
Unlike much of the Clinton administration, the Bush administration did not believe in 
nation-building. Its initial priorities in Afghanistan were to “decapitate” al Qaeda by 
capturing or killing its leadership, to punish (in a highly visible way) the Taliban 
regime that had harbored the terrorists, and to create an Afghan government of 
national reconciliation capable of fostering sufficient political stability in Afghanistan  
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for American forces to operate in pursuit of the first two goals. Yet within two years 
the Bush administration had come a substantial distance (if not nearly as far as its 
critics would have liked) towards attempting to create the democratic regime in 
Afghanistan that had been part of its declaratory strategy all along. There was nothing 
inherent in the strategic situation in Afghanistan that pre-determined such a strategy: 
From the beginning many critics of American policy (albeit almost exclusively critics 
outside of the United States) had insisted that the United States either could have 
worked with the Taliban to apprehend al Qaeda operatives or could have staged 
special operations against al Qaeda figures without toppling the Taliban itself (for 
instance Dorronsoro 2005, 320-1). If the policy adopted by the Bush administration 
seemed inevitable, it was because the political culture of the United States made such 
a course of action appear to be the only reasonable one. 
Germany, Russia, and other actors involved in the intervention do not present 
puzzles as interesting as those posed by the Bush administration, but they nonetheless 
conform to the predictions of the analytical framework advanced in the first chapter. 
Although Russia had supported the Tajik and Uzbek members of the Northern 
Alliance against the Pashtun-based Taliban, Moscow was more than willing to support 
the American-led efforts to broker a government of national reconciliation in hopes of 
defusing the Islamic threat to its Central Asian neighbors. Germany had worked 
alongside the United States in the 1990s to foster a government of national 
reconciliation to replace the Taliban, and many in Germany hoped to use the post-9/11 
invasion to promote a more liberal, more democratic regime in Afghanistan. Unable to 
provide military forces capable of challenging Afghan warlords, however, Germany 
remained a minor player in state-building efforts in Afghanistan, restricting its 
activities to restrained peacekeeping operations in the safest part of the country. Other 
states behaved much as predicted, with the British playing a major role in counter- 
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insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, while the less-militarized states such as 
Italy made contributions more similar to Germany’s.  These patterns of behavior are 
summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: Major Powers’ Intervention Policies toward Afghanistan 
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Afghanistan is nothing approaching a democracy. Indeed, the most that 
outsiders can realistically hope to achieve is a broad-based, representative and 
accountable government – that is, one that includes all major groups in Afghanistan 
and that has some relatively effective means for sanctioning predatory state elites. 
Although significant progress towards this goal had been achieved in the first four 
years of the intervention, currently many observers are pessimistic that these 
achievements can be sustained and improved upon. The two most intractable – and 
closely inter-related – challenges facing Afghanistan are its opium economy and the 
existence of Pakistan as a haven for insurgents. It is almost certainly true that in the 
most hostile implementation environments outside interveners cannot bring about 
sustainable change towards representative and inclusive governance. While Iraq was 
clearly (at least to this author) a case of hubris, where a successful transformational  
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intervention was doomed from the beginning, it is not yet clear that Afghanistan is 
also condemned to failure.  
The remainder of this chapter, like the case studies before it, will proceed in 
four steps, beginning with a narrative of the intervention, followed by a focused, 
controlled application of this study’s variables to the case of Afghanistan, and 
concluding with an examination of alternative explanations and the implications of 
this case for interventions more broadly. 
An Overview of the Intervention in Afghanistan 
Even more so than Bosnia, Afghanistan is an unfinished intervention, the end 
of which is difficult to foresee. Many, perhaps most, expert observers in the past few 
years have shifted from an attitude of guarded optimism about Afghanistan to one of 
deep concern deriving from the inter-related challenges of a burgeoning opium 
economy and an insurgency with considerable foreign backing. It is important, 
however, to maintain perspective. Even in the face of such challenges, Barnett Rubin, 
one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan, noted that, “[b]efore the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, and all that followed, Afghans and the handful of 
internationals working on Afghanistan could hardly have imagined being fortunate 
enough to confront today’s problems” (2006, 1). The following narrative briefly 
summarizes the American response to the terror attacks of September 11 and the 
United States’ efforts to construct a new Afghan regime through the Bonn process. 
The discussion then turns to the American efforts to displace the burden of 
implementing the Bonn process to the Europeans in 2002, before a significant 
(although still only partial) shift in Bush administration policy towards formerly 
disdained “nation-building” missions. The narrative concludes with a summary of 
Afghanistan’s status after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004-5 and  
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the potential for the progress of the first few years to be sustained in the face of a 
thriving opium economy and an increasingly effective insurgency. 
The Invasion of Afghanistan and the Bonn Process 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, the Bush 
administration rapidly identified al Qaeda as the organization responsible for the 
attacks. While it was clear that the United States would seek to degrade al Qaeda’s 
capabilities and destroy the organization if it could, the manner in which these 
objectives were to be accomplished was a matter potentially open for debate. Many 
outside observers, particularly on the European left, believed that this task was best 
pursued through diplomacy and a “law enforcement” mentality, using both persuasion 
and aid incentives to induce the Taliban to deliver top al Qaeda leaders to the United 
States for prosecution.
88 A “decapitation” strategy might have been pursued that 
would have used military and covert instruments to kill or capture al Qaeda without 
targeting the Taliban and pursuing regime change or state-building objectives. There 
was nothing inherent in the strategic situation, in other words, that pre-determined a 
state-building military intervention as the appropriate strategy. 
The Bush administration, as is well known, came to office on a political 
platform that included a harsh condemnation of the “nation-building” adventures of 
the Clinton administration. Its preference was to use military and covert means to 
eliminate the leadership of al Qaeda and to punish the Taliban regime in a way that 
would be visible to all the world as a deterrent against other regimes’ harboring known 
terrorists. American decision-makers sought to construct a new government for 
Afghanistan that would provide the minimal levels of stability necessary for the 
United States to accomplish its military objectives. To this end they desired to build a 
                                                 
88 Gilles Dorronsoro, for instance, argues that “the only effective stratagem for the elimination of the 
radical networks would be to make an alliance with the Taliban” (Dorronsoro 2005, 320).  
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broad-based government of national reconciliation, including representatives from all 
ethnic groups and all armed militias excepting the Taliban. Building liberal democracy 
in Afghanistan was in no way part of the agenda. The reasons for such limited goals 
were many, although two were foremost. First, the Bush administration feared that a 
large international presence in Afghanistan (a “large footprint,” in the terminology 
broadly used among internationals involved in Afghanistan) would engender hostility 
towards non-Muslim foreigners and provoke the same intractable insurgencies that 
had defeated the Soviets and the British long before. Second, top decision-makers in 
the administration were rapidly coming to the conclusion that Iraq should also be 
included in the “war on terror,” and the administration wanted to husband resources 
for the march on Baghdad.
89 Thus, rather than pursue the riskier and more resource-
intensive transformation model, the Bush administration initially adopted a mediation 
approach. 
American military operations against Afghanistan commenced on October 7, 
an offensive combining air strikes and covert operations designed to bring various 
Afghan militias into the war against the Taliban on the side of the United States. 
Initially the United States sought to mobilize a broad-based coalition of Afghan 
warlords against the Taliban, working not only with the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of 
the Northern Alliance (a force that had battled the Taliban for years) but also with 
ethnic Pashtun groups which were willing to break with the Taliban. American 
decision-makers feared that a narrow government dominated by the Northern Alliance 
would not be stable. Unfortunately, no “southern alliance” ever emerged to balance 
the Northern Alliance; Taliban forces quickly killed Abdul Haq, one of the few 
Pashtun leaders in the country who was willing to work with the United States. With 
their initial strategy thwarted, American decision-makers decided to commit to much 
                                                 
89 Weinbaum (2006) points out that the proposition that Iraq diverted resources from Afghanistan in the 
longer term is debateable, a point to which the analysis will return in the next section.  
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more intensive support of the Northern Alliance and greatly expanded airstrikes 
(Cottey 2003, 175). Soon thereafter Taliban forces were quickly routed, and Northern 
Alliance forces seized Kabul, despite calls by the American president and secretary of 
state to stop their advance short of the capital. Firmly in control on the ground, 
Northern Alliance commanders seized all of the significant ministries of the Afghan 
government (Starr 2006, 111).  
From November 27 to December 5, American and other world leaders 
convened a conference in Petersberg, outside the German city of Bonn, summoning 
together all of the major Afghan political and military leaders outside of the Taliban in 
what was intended to be a continuation of the international community’s efforts in the 
late 1990s to broker a government of national reconciliation.
90 With the Northern 
Alliance’s dominance on the ground, however, and with its militias continuing to 
assist the United States in hunting down the remnants of al Qaeda, its leaders – 
particularly the so-called Panjshiri faction of ethnic Tajiks – were in a strong position 
to claim most of the leadership positions in the new transitional government, including 
all of the so-called power ministries. Eventually they were persuaded to yield the 
presidency to the Pashtuns, but only on the condition that it go to Hamid Karzai, who 
had neither the widespread legitimacy of the former king of Afghanistan nor any 
significant militia supporting him. 
Had this division of governmental offices been the full extent of the Bonn 
conference’s achievements, it would have represented nothing more than a highly 
skewed powersharing arrangement little different than the numerous ones that had 
been brokered since the final days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This 
                                                 
90 Interestingly, Germany and the United States had cooperated closely before September 11 in an 
attempt to broker a successor regime to the Taliban. Both countries saw the Taliban as a weak and 
ultimately doomed regime and sought to use the traditional insitution of the Loya Jirga as a means of 
promoting an alternative, more broad-based government. (Author interview with a mid-ranking German 
official with direct knowledge of Germany’s relations with Afghanistan in the late 1990s; May 24, 
2006).  
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distribution of power, however, was to be only an interim arrangement. The Bonn 
conference set out a years-long evolutionary process in which an emergency Loya 
Jirga or “great council” would choose a transitional government and delegates to a 
constitutional Loya Jirga, which in turn would draft a constitution providing for a 
liberal democratic government. It is unclear from where the impetus came to tie a 
liberal democratic project to the original, more limited goal of a multi-ethnic 
government of national reconciliation. Mark Peceny claims that it originated with a 
number of the Afghan factions themselves, in part from a sincere belief (at least 
among some factions) in democracy and in part from the desire to win favor with the 
United States and other aid donors and troop-contributing countries by playing to their 
democratic biases (Peceny 2004, 15-21). Yet another explanation is possible: By 
enfranchising the population as a whole, the Bonn process implied a more equitable 
re-distribution of governmental offices, weakening the domination of the Panjshiri 
warlords and bringing more Pashtuns into power. Such an approach may have had 
relatively little to do with democracy promotion itself but was instead an effort to co-
opt the Pashtun population and draw them away from the Taliban. In either case the 
transitional process laid out in the Bonn Agreement was democratic in form, but it was 
not at all clear that international decision-makers at the highest levels were committed 
to implementing democracy in practice. 
The first two years of the Bonn Agreement’s implementation fell well short of 
many observers’ expectations while also avoiding the catastrophes that many had 
feared. The international presence did not provoke a widespread public backlash, 
although Pashtuns were often resentful both of their near-exclusion from the 
government in Kabul and the manner in which the United States prosecuted its 
counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban. A humanitarian crisis was avoided 
even as refugees in large numbers were repatriated to the country, but economic  
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development remained elusive outside of the opium economy and the few cities where 
international aid was doled out in substantial amounts. The process of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) under the Afghan “New Beginnings” 
program moved forward at a snail’s pace, ensuring warlords and militias remained the 
dominant actors in the country (International Crisis Group 2003a, 2004). Afghanistan 
soon began to harvest record crops of opium poppy, threatening to turn the country 
into a narcostate (UNODC 2003). 
Throughout these highly uncertain beginnings, the Bonn process went forward 
according to schedule, although warlords retained their dominant position in the 
process. UN and other international personnel coordinated the selection by 390 district 
assemblies of over 1000 delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga, held in June 2002. 
Assessments of this process vary, with some observers claiming that it involved a 
“significant amount of public participation” (Cottey 2003, 185), while others weighed 
in much more skeptically: “Few people deluded themselves into thinking that the Loya 
Jirga was a meaningful popular consultation – the aim was to encourage those who 
wield power in Afghanistan to exercise it through politics rather than through the 
barrel of a gun” (Chesterman 2002, 40). Assessments of the Emergency Loya Jirga 
itself are similarly divided. It did successfully choose a Transitional Administration 
(headed once again by Hamid Karzai) to govern Afghanistan until presidential 
elections could be held. On the other hand, the determination of office-holders was 
subject to considerable violent intimidation and many of those selected were 
themselves warlords (Cottey 2003, 185). Finally, a Constitutional Commission began 
the work of drafting a new constitution for Afghanistan, but it did so amid criticisms 
that its public consultations failed to provide meaningful public input into the 
document that was to become the foundation of a new political order (International 
Crisis Group 2003b). The Constitutional Loya Jirga nonetheless “went better than  
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many had dared to hope it would,” producing a constitution that was, despite flaws, a 
relatively progressive document (Rubin 2004, 10).
91 
For the first two years following the introduction of foreign troops into 
Afghanistan, outright disaster was averted, but the country’s political trajectory was 
deeply worrying to many. By 2003 American and other world leaders faced a 
decision: to allow the continued political disintegration of the country or to invest in a 
sustained effort to promote a new political order. Contrary to his stated preferences as 
a presidential candidate, Bush opted to commit more than double the number of troops 
and money committed to Afghanistan, despite already being over-burdened in Iraq. 
The Decision to Commit to State-Building 
Given the ethnic diversity and topography of Afghanistan, its ideal 
environment for the production and distribution of opium poppy and its derivates, and 
the competitive geostrategic agendas of its neighbors, the creation of an effective 
central authority now requires considerable assistance from outside actors. The 
weakness of the Kabul government in the first two years after September 11 was 
attributable to the minimal commitment of the United States and other outside powers 
to the state-building project. Similarly, the significant achievements of the Karzai 
government beginning in late 2003 owed much to the reengagement of the United 
States and other powers. Whether this reengagement can be sustained and will be 
sufficient to overcome Afghanistan’s many centripetal forces remains to be seen. 
Washington’s initial ambivalence towards state-building in Afghanistan had a 
number of negative consequences. The United States did not want to divert large 
                                                 
91 Rubin went on to explain that the “UN had more time and experience in making the meeting secure, 
and the president and his supporters were better organized. Hence warlords and jihadi leaders had lost 
some of the capacity to intimidate that they had exercised at the ELJ. The result was a constitution that 
reflected to a considerable extent the agenda shared by Karzai and those of cabinet members who 
considered themselves ‘reformers’” (2004, 10).  
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numbers of troops to Afghanistan or take high numbers of casualties there while 
simultaneously preparing for then launching an intervention into Iraq. Consequently, it 
sought to minimize the number of deployed troops not directly prosecuting the war on 
terror and to avoid antagonizing Afghan warlords. For this reason the Bush 
administration opposed the expansion of the peacekeeping component of the 
international military presence, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
beyond the Kabul region.
92 American forces also neither pressed the implementation 
of the DDR campaign on Afghan militias, nor did they engage in counternarcotics 
efforts in the initial stages of the Afghan intervention. Indeed, rather than seeking to 
marginalize the warlords, the United States often strengthened them, providing them 
with both cash and military aid in exchange for their assistance in hunting down 
members of al Qaeda and conducting counter-insurgency campaigns against Taliban 
and other forces (Buchsteiner 2004; Goodhand 2004, 53; Johnson and Leslie 2005, 16; 
Rubin 2004b).  
The American opposition to a broader state-building mission attracted 
considerable international criticism, but in fact there was very little appetite anywhere 
for undertaking such a dangerous and potentially open-ended mission (Oakley and 
Hammes 2004, 4; Rubin 2004b). The NATO Secretary-General reportedly had to 
“bludgeon” NATO member states to make even minor contributions to the ISAF 
mission (Cordesman 2004, 141). Even after the United States abandoned its reluctance 
to expand ISAF in 2003, finding troop-contributing states to volunteer additional units 
was nearly impossible. In the year following the change in American policy, NATO 
increased its commitment by a mere 1,250 troops, from 5,000 to 6,250 (Goodson 
                                                 
92 Initially the Bush administration opposed ISAF’s expansion even if European and other troop-
contributing countries provided all of the necessary forces: “Recalling the agonizing dilemmas of the 
UN and NATO in Bosnia, the USA feared the peacekeepers would be taken as hostages by enemy 
forces to hamper the US campaign, or require a US rescue operation that would divert resources from 
the war” (Suhrke et al 2004, 83).  
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2005a, 90). At issue was much more than simple numbers and capabilities. Expanding 
the ISAF mission beyond Kabul would involve other NATO members in precisely the 
dangerous and morally ambiguous operations that many troop-contributing countries 
feared: “In the capital, the Northern Alliance forces had reluctantly agreed to 
cantonment [of their forces] outside the city limits in return for political dominance in 
the national interim authority. There was no similar political reward in the provinces. 
Cantonment here would court serious military confrontation with the local 
commanders. Alternatively, ISAF would simply legitimize the power and presence of 
warlord forces by operating alongside them” (Suhrke et al. 2004, 83-4). Few countries 
either within or outside of NATO relished either of those choices. 
The shift in American policy began in 2003, originating both from front-line 
troops and from top policy circles. As early as the summer of 2002 U.S. troops in the 
field came to the conclusion that reconstruction and governance programs were 
necessary to consolidate military gains, although top levels of the Pentagon were not 
committed to such a course until mid-2003 (Rubin 2006, 6). Around the same time 
that such opinions were seeping upwards through the military ranks, political levels in 
Washington were also turning to a reinvigoration of American policy in Afghanistan. 
Beginning by the fall of 2003, and certainly by 2004, it was clear that the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq was not turning out as Bush administration officials had hoped. To 
maintain public support for the deployment of nearly 200,000 troops and the 
expenditure of tens and then hundreds of billions of dollars, the administration 
required a “success story,” an example of how armed intervention could indeed 
promote democracy in the greater Middle East. Since Iraq appeared unlikely to yield 
dividends along these lines in the near future, Bush administration officials turned to 
Afghanistan, where many trends were worrying but the political process had advanced 
relatively well at the national level (Hersh 2004). Thus, despite not believing in  
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“nation-building” at an ideological level, the Bush administration came to support it, 
due to both pressures from within the military bureaucracy and from the necessity of 
winning over American public opinion. 
Originally the United States sought to garner the resources necessary to 
implement its expanded vision for Afghanistan by drawing on its European allies. It 
quickly became clear, however, that the Europeans would not substitute for American 
commitment but would at best be induced to contribute troops and increased aid 
alongside an increased American presence. The United States ultimately doubled its 
military forces in Afghanistan, from 10,000 to more than 22,000, and it quadrupled its 
annual economic aid expenditures from the previous year, to two billion dollars 
(Goodson 2006, 151; Hersh 2004). At least as important as overall numbers was the 
change in approach. The United States moved from a seek-and-destroy military 
orientation to one more oriented towards providing security and development 
assistance through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The U.S. had previously 
deployed four of these PRTs, but following Lieutenant General David Barno’s 
assumption of command in Afghanistan in late 2003, the U.S. increased the number of 
these units to 16. President Bush also signaled his personal commitment to the country 
by making his special advisor for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to 
the country. 
In the wake of the renewed American commitment to Afghanistan, other 
NATO countries also expanded their contributions to the country. Non-American 
forces eventually increased in number from the initial 5,000 in ISAF to nearly 20,000, 
reaching a total of 31,000 (including U.S. troops), and they increased their 
geographical coverage from the Kabul region alone to cover the entire country. 
Germany took over the leadership of the northern sector, Italy the western, and Canada 
the southern (NATO 2006). Donor countries also increased their commitments, with  
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more than $8 billion pledged at the Berlin Conference held in April 2004 (Goodson 
2006, 164). 
At least four major changes ensued as a result of the American shift in 
approach. First, with an eye to strengthening the Kabul government, the United States 
began to limit (although not eliminate) the aid it gave to Afghan militias in pursuit of 
the war on terror (Cordesman 2004, 145). Second, American forces began to provide 
support to units engaged in counter-narcotics operations, including both eradication 
and interdiction efforts.
93 Third, the United States increasingly supported Afghan 
President Karzai’s efforts to marginalize powerful warlords who undermined Kabul’s 
authority (Goodson 2005b). In September 2004, for instance, Karzai replaced Ismail 
Khan, the warlord who formerly served as governor of Herat, by deploying several 
thousand Afghan National Army (ANA) troops, backed up by American Special 
Operations forces and air power. More generally, the American military presence 
made possible the slow, incremental efforts of Kabul to extend its authority and rein in 
the worst abuses of the warlords:  
The presence of B-52s in the skies was a visible reminder of their superior 
firepower. Some Afghans took to calling the air patrols ‘the new Vice and 
Virtue’ (a reference to the all-powerful Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and 
the Promotion of Virtue)…. The metaphor brought out the important point that 
the presence of international forces, and the resources they provided to the 
local military organizations, not only enabled rival groupings to revitalize their 
organization [in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban]. They functioned as a 
lid on intra-Afghan conflict as well (Suhrke et al 2004, 83-4). 
At the same time, renewed international attention reinvigorated both the formation of 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the disarmament of official militias through the 
Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), which had languished in the years since 
                                                 
93 American support generally took the form of direct financial and military assistance to Afghan 
government counter-narcotics units, funding for private military contractors who undertook such 
operations, logistical support for both of these types of units, and in extremis direct military support for 
these units.  
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the Taliban’s overthrow. The ANBP collected large amounts of heavy weaponry from 
militias, while the ANA made major strides in recruiting a more ethnically balanced 
cadre of soldiers, retaining them once they were recruited, and training them to 
become effective fighting units (Ghufran 2006, 89-90; International Crisis Group 
2005). 
In the context of Afghanistan’s daunting implementation environment, many 
observers interpreted these improvements as substantial accomplishments. They were 
all nonetheless very partial accomplishments. The improvements in the ANA were not 
matched by similar gains in the Afghan police and judiciary system. Reducing official 
militias and cantoning their heavy weapons did nothing to weaken the proliferating 
unofficial militias, armed not with tanks but with weaponry more than sufficient to 
intimidate the population and run illicit economies in opium and other contraband. The 
Karzai government scored a number of very visible victories against major warlords 
such as Ismail Khan in Herat, but lesser warlords remained the dominant actors 
outside of Kabul. And even Karzai’s government itself, although increasingly filled 
with competent technocrats at the top levels, was riddled with corruption and 
incompetence at lower levels. As Afghanistan moved towards the presidential and 
parliamentary elections prescribed in the Bonn Agreement, its politics showed signs of 
improvement but remained very far indeed from the liberal democratic model.  
After the Elections 
Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan on October 9, 2004; 
parliamentary elections followed on September 18, 2005. Hamid Karzai won the 
presidential elections with 55.4 percent of the vote, becoming Afghanistan’s first-ever 
democratically elected president. Some irregularities marred the presidential polling, 
and voting split largely along ethnic lines. Besides the Pashtun areas, however, Karzai  
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also polled well in the multiethnic west and multiethnic urban areas (International 
Crisis Group 2004, ii), which is likely the best that could be expected in the first post-
conflict elections. Parliamentary elections the subsequent year were more problematic. 
Voter turnout fell from the 70 percent mark established by the presidential elections to 
a mere 53 percent of registered voters, likely because of confusion caused by a 
complex voting system, resentment of the ubiquitous presence of warlords among the 
parliamentary candidates, and popular dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 
Karzai government (Ghufran 2006). More significant than the low voter turnout was 
the electoral system used: a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) formula that 
inhibited the formation of parties and greatly increased the difficulties of building 
parliamentary majorities with anything other than patronage politics (International 
Crisis Group 2006; Maass 2006; Reynolds 2006; Wilder 2005).  
The Karzai administration thus faces challenges both within the formal 
structures of the government and without. Internally, Karzai now confronts a 
parliament which he helped to make less governable by adopting the SNTV voting 
system. While the overall quality of executive officials has improved, with nearly all 
of the top ranks being filled with capable technocrats, Karzai must still confront high 
levels of incompetence and corruption at the middle and lower levels of his 
administration. Indeed, his strategy of co-opting warlords by removing them from 
their regional base and appointing them to positions in Kabul has been effective at one 
level but has also ensured that the central administration remains difficult to harness to 
a progressive political agenda. Finally, the court system remains in abysmal condition, 
filled with judges who are not qualified to run a modern judiciary, who are beholden 
to the religious establishment in Afghanistan, and who are subject both to bribery and 
intimidation (Rubin 2004a). Of course, all of these challenges are common throughout  
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post-conflict governments, and, while daunting, they are a vast improvement over the 
situation in 2001. 
The more significant threats lie outside of government, in the continued power 
of lesser warlords, the gathering strength of the Pashtun- (and Pakistan-) based 
insurgency, and in the opium economy – all three of which are closely inter-related. 
Even with substantial international aid, the Kabul government cannot co-opt all of the 
middle-ranking and lesser warlords, most of whom profit vastly more from opium and 
other illicit economies than they could possibly earn from governmental positions. Nor 
would a universal strategy of co-optation be a sustainable strategy for state-building; 
more likely, it would simply purchase an interregnum before international aid began to 
decline. On the other hand, particularly as the insurgency intensifies, neither the Kabul 
government nor NATO can afford a broad coercive campaign to enforce the 
demilitarization of minor warlords and their militias.  
The opium economy poses a similar challenge. As Larry Goodson (2005, 92-3) 
describes, none of the three major approaches to counter-narcotics are attractive: They 
are “poppy eradication, which threatens the fragile livelihood of poor Afghans; crop 
substitution, problematic because of the high unit price received for opium; and 
destruction of processing laboratories and interdiction of smugglers, both easily 
thwarted through protection schemes by senior government officials.” Experts in 
counter-narcotics operations in other parts of the world have recommended embedding 
a counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan within a broader agenda emphasizing 
governance (Mansfield and Pain 2005). Such an approach potentially offers to 
increase returns from the non-poppy sectors of the economy and to release an 
interdiction campaign from the stranglehold of corrupt office-holders. Unfortunately, a 
“good governance” campaign is extremely difficult to implement while 
simultaneously trying to build a state from scratch in an ethnically heterogeneous  
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society and prosecuting a counter-insurgency against well-funded, well-armed, and 
motivated groups with safe havens in a neighboring country and transnational 
financial and logistics networks. 
This insurgency represents the third, inter-locking element of the extra-
governmental challenge to the state-building project in Afghanistan. It receives 
funding from both the opium economy and transnational Islamic radical networks. It 
recruits predominantly from politically marginalized and religiously conservative 
Pashtuns in Afghanistan and in the largely autonomous border regions of northwestern 
Pakistan. And it is able to organize and regroup in Pakistan, safe from U.S. military 
forces and recently from those of the government of Pakistan as well (Karzai 2007). 
Counter-insurgency doctrine typically prescribes a strategy in which the support 
networks of an insurgency are targeted while the government provides public goods to 
the general population in an effort to secure their loyalty (O’Neill 1990, Chapter 8). 
Both elements of such an approach, however, are thwarted by the current realities of 
Afghanistan. With transnational financial and logistical networks and safe havens in 
Pakistan, it is extremely difficult for either the United States or the Kabul government 
to target the insurgency’s infrastructure. And with the opium economy providing 
incentives for Afghans at all levels to subvert the authority of the Kabul government, it 
is difficult for Afghanistan to develop a powerful, autonomous central authority 
capable of providing public goods. Thus, the absence of central state authority, the 
opium economy, and the insurgency all reinforce one another and confront state-
builders with a daunting challenge. 
Assessments of contemporary Afghanistan typically emphasize that there has 
indeed been some movement towards greater political competition and participation – 
“democratic stirrings” – in Afghanistan, but that this movement is likely to be rapidly 
reversed unless the United States and its allies commit to providing greater security,  
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economic opportunities, and public services to ordinary Afghans (Newberg 2007; 
Rotberg 2007). As casualties mount among the NATO member states deploying 
troops to the southern regions where the insurgency is active, and as opinion in the 
United States turns against the war in Iraq and thus possibly, by extension, against 
state-building in Afghanistan, it is unclear whether the intervening states will have the 
necessary “staying power” to accept the costs of a long-term, intrusive intervention. 
On the other hand, the intervention in Afghanistan has considerably more legitimacy 
among Europeans than Iraq ever did, and two different NATO secretaries general have 
declared Afghanistan the single most important test of the alliance. While the stakes in 
Iraq are vastly higher than those in Afghanistan, the future of Afghanistan may well 
tell us more about the future of interventions in the age of counter-terrorism. 
A Focused Examination of Interveners’ Policies in Afghanistan 
The United States clearly played the dominant role among foreign actors in 
restructuring Afghan politics subsequent to the attacks of September 11. Given that the 
attacks were made against American targets on American soil,
94 it is unsurprising that 
other outside actors did not exercise the same level of influence that they did in the 
Balkans. The discussion that follows will therefore focus on the United States. It will 
also, however, compare American actions to those of Germany and Great Britain. 
Although the Europeans did not have the same level of national interests at stake in 
Afghanistan as the United States, most shared very similar interests with one another: 
the desire to be seen as a loyal ally of the United States and the goal of denying 
transnational terrorists a safe haven.
95 Variation between Britain and less militarized 
                                                 
94 Many foreign nationals of course also lost their lives in the attacks on the World Trade Center. 
95 These interests were neither uncontested nor universally held among all European states. Such 
differences will be discussed in greater detail below.  
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states such as Germany or Italy thus sheds light on the nature of multilateral action in 
such contexts.  
The discussion will begin with an analysis of the attitudes and interests of the 
United States and the other major members of the international coalitions operating in 
Afghanistan, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It will proceed by examining the 
military and civilian structures of the missions and the outcomes (to this point) of the 
intervention. In the following section the discussion will turn to policy alternatives to 
the ones the United States pursued and a counter-factual examination of the probable 
outcomes of such policies. The analysis will then consider alternative explanations for 
the outcomes achieved before turning finally to the conclusions that can be drawn 
from Afghanistan and their implications for the future of intervention. 
Interests of the United States and other Coalition Members 
The September 11 attacks clearly rocked the United States as a whole – 
decision-makers, members of the media, and the general public. Journalistic accounts 
of the Bush administration’s reaction make clear that the administration responded 
both “from the gut” but also from concern that the attacks were but the first of a 
campaign of mass-casualty terrorist attacks targeting the American homeland 
(Woodward 2002). Moreover, the American public registered astronomically high 
levels of support both for the president and for the use of military force, even if high 
levels of casualties were involved – a “rally round the flag” effect familiar from other 
contexts. Action was not only possible; in many ways it was demanded.
96 Relatively 
                                                 
96 Levels of popular American support for the war in Afghanistan were astronomically high in the first 
year of the campaign. In several dozen public opinion polls collected by the Polling the Nations 
database, general support for the war in Afghanistan never fell below 80 percent during the high-
intensity phase of the war (through spring 2002; no data were available for later periods). Levels of 
support remained high even when questions posited that large numbers of American ground troops 
would be involved, that they would remain deployed for extended periods, and/or that high levels of  
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soon after the collapse of the Taliban, however, American resources began to be 
redirected towards the looming conflict in Iraq (Chesterman 2002, 39; Oakley and 
Hammes 2004, 1). American commitment, therefore, was significant but much less 
than total. 
Interestingly, although Germany was not directly targeted, German elites 
generally accepted that Afghanistan represented a significant security interest, both 
because of Germany’s alliance with the United States and the potential for 
transnational terrorist networks to target Germany itself.
97 In the immediate aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared 
Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” with the United States. German Defense Minister 
Peter Struck announced that Germany’s defense interests began at the Hindu Kush. 
Walther Stützle, a former State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense at the time of the 
September 11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, remarked that even 
more surprising than Struck’s comment was the minimal dissent it elicited from 
among German policy circles (author interview with Stützle, May 8, 2006). Even in 
personal discussions and in remarks made not for attribution in numerous interviews 
with the author in May 2006, German policy elites emphasized the importance of the 
intervention to Germany. One senior civilian official commented on his surprise at the 
breadth of support he found among German parliamentarians for the Afghanistan 
mission (anonymous author interview, May 11, 2006). Moreover, most members of 
                                                                                                                                              
casualties among American soldiers would result. In a November 15, 2001 Los Angeles Times poll, for 
instance, 73 percent of respondents registered support for the war in Afghanistan – with 55 percent 
registering “strong support” – even if “a substantial number of casualties among American troops” 
resulted. The only formulations that received less than majority support were those which specified that 
the U.S. would endure at least 10,000 fatalities (although opinion was nearly evenly split when 1,000 
fatalities were specified) and that “a large scale invasion … would station thousands of troops in 
Afghanistan indefinitely” (Time/CNN poll, October 13, 2001). Beyond immediate public support for 
military action, members of the administration also feared that there would be terrible recriminations if 
another mass-casualty terrorist attack occurred in the wake of the September 11 attacks, one that 
military action could potentially have thwarted. See for instance Woodward 2002, 60. 
97 Both interests are widely discussed in the press. They were also given in anonymous author 
interviews conducted with senior and mid-level German officials in May 2006.  
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the German foreign policy and defense elite did not accept the argument that German 
interests would be better served by avoiding contact with Afghanistan altogether. 
Indeed, Hans-Ulrich Klose, a Social Democrat who served as chairman and deputy 
chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee during the period of the 
Afghanistan intervention, dismissed as “absurd” the notion that Germany would be 
spared from Islamic extremist attacks simply because it dissociated itself from 
American military actions (author interview with Klose, May 15, 2006). In short, 
although many Germans have reservations about the manner in which the United 
States is prosecuting the intervention, at least among the policy elite there is broad 
agreement that participation in the intervention is in the interest of Germany. 
The same two interests of Germany that were at stake in Afghanistan – the 
elimination of safe havens for transnational terrorism and the desire to demonstrate 
solidarity with the United States – also bore on other NATO members, although with 
somewhat different implications for each. Top officials of the transatlantic alliance, 
including Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and SACEUR James Jones, all 
repeatedly emphasized in public statements that Afghanistan was a “defining moment” 
for the alliance and that its future would likely be determined by its performance there 
(Graham 2004a and 2004b; Schmitt 2004). France, for whom the strength of the 
NATO alliance was less important, felt relatively little need to contribute to operations 
in Afghanistan. Lesser NATO members were often not expected to shoulder the same 
level of burden in Afghanistan as did larger powers like Germany. Britain, on the 
other hand, much like Germany found its interests significantly engaged by the distant 
country.  
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Attitudes of the United States and Other Coalition Members 
Militarization. The Bush administration’s reaction to the September 11 attacks 
was militarized from the beginning, as Bob Woodward’s account makes clear. On the 
day of the attacks, President Bush reportedly told Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld that soon “the ball will be in your court and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff] Dick Myers’ court” (Woodward 2002, 19). The American public was similarly 
supportive of military action. Polls showed that 88 percent of Americans favored the 
American military campaign in Afghanistan, and a majority believed that the military 
operations would be likely to achieve the goals set forth by their country’s leaders 
(CBS News/New York Times Poll, January 6, 2002; CBS News/New York Times 
Poll, February 28, 2002; and Market and Opinion Research International, November 
1-2, 2001; all accessed via the Polling the Nations database). 
In contrast not only to the Bush administration but also to governments such as 
Tony Blair’s in Britain, Germany’s leadership found it extremely difficult to commit 
to participating in operations in Afghanistan. Two-thirds of Germans opposed German 
combat forces’ participation in anti-terror operations (Becher 2004, 402). In 
November 2001 German Chancellor Schröder was forced to tie a parliamentary vote 
over the deployment of 3,900 German troops to Afghanistan to a vote of confidence in 
his government. Even after having placed his government and his personal prestige on 
the line, he received a narrow majority of votes from within his own coalition. This 
ambivalence among German policy-makers and the public would shape the nature of 
Germany’s military contribution in Afghanistan. 
Democracy. At the level of public opinion and public rhetoric, the United 
States, Germany, and other coalition members were broadly committed to democracy 
promotion abroad. According to polling figures from the German Marshall Fund’s  
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“Transatlantic Trends” survey, in 2005 majorities in all of the countries polled (with 
the exception of Turkey) believed that it should be the role of either the United States 
(in the case of American respondents) or the European Union (European respondents) 
to promote democracy abroad. Germans were among the most supportive (at 80 
percent) and Americans among the least supportive (52 percent).
98 Moreover, support 
for democracy echoes throughout the rhetoric not only of the United States but also of 
many European countries. Records of German parliamentary debates, for instance, 
reveal repeated references to the Germany’s contribution to democracy promotion in 
Afghanistan.
99  
Assessing genuine support among key decision-makers for democracy 
promotion in Afghanistan, however, is more difficult. Decision-makers in both the 
United States and Germany are divided on the question of whether some form of 
democracy, adapted to the characteristics of Afghanistan, is a realistic long-term end 
state for Afghanistan. Given the extraordinary challenges facing Afghanistan’s 
transition, it is not hard to believe, as one senior German official put it, that at the end 
of the day, “Afghanistan will remain Afghanistan” (anonymous interview with author, 
May 11, 2006). Yet others are committed to the democratization project. One senior 
German official intimately involved in the country’s Afghanistan policy said that it 
would be “cynical” to believe that democracy was not one of the long-term goals 
being pursued by the international community, even though the more immediate goal 
was simply to form “a self-sustaining political order in accordance with the basic 
                                                 
98 American support for democracy promotion fell to 45 percent in 2006, while German support 
remained essentially unchanged at 78 percent. Given the close association in the Bush administration’s 
rhetoric between the Iraq war and democracy promotion, it is likely that this drop in American support 
is associated with the plummeting popularity of the Iraq war. All data is from the German Marshall 
Fund 2005, 2006. 
99 In arguing for an extension of the Bundestag mandate for the German ISAF deployment, for instance, 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer declared that “it is precisely now [before the Afghan 
presidential elections of 2004] that terrorism will seek to hinder democratic legitimation. The fact that 
over 10 million Afghans have registered [for the elections] is an impressive vote for the democratic 
renewal of this land” (author’s translation, Plenarprotokoll 15/129, 30 September 2004, 11753).  
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aspirations of the Afghan people while at the same time (and we hope there is no 
contradiction here) in accordance with basic, globally accepted human rights 
standards” (anonymous interview with author, May 11, 2006).  
As discussed in the narrative above, during the Taliban era both Germany and 
the United States worked towards the creation of a government of national 
reconciliation that would include Northern Alliance members, elements of what a 
German official involved in the process termed (very loosely) the “democratic 
opposition,” and more moderate elements of the Taliban. Although such efforts were 
thwarted before the September 11 attacks, they became the basis for the Bonn process 
after the fall of the Taliban. Thus, in one sense, both American and German 
approaches to Afghanistan (as well as the other Western European countries involved, 
Britain and Italy) demonstrate considerable continuity in their support for a broad-
based powersharing government. The largest change occurred in the willingness of the 
Bush administration to dedicate the resources necessary to move beyond a mediation 
strategy towards the transformation model of intervention. This movement, induced by 
both feedback from uniformed military deployed to Afghanistan and by the need to 
produce a “success story” of democracy promotion in the context of the “war on 
terror,” was always very partial. The Bush administration never committed the 
resources that many critics insisted were necessary to consolidate the regime in Kabul. 
It did, however, greatly expand the resources available for this mission, helping to 
ensure a relatively successful presidential election in 2004 and the more problematic 
accomplishment of parliamentary elections in 2005. 
Structure of the Intervention 
Military Structure. Within a month of the September 11 attacks American 
military operations against Afghanistan commenced. By the end of December more  
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than 12,000 bombs had been dropped on Afghanistan (Dorronsoro 2005, 325). These 
air strikes, combined with the offensives of the Northern Alliance, ultimately led to the 
defeat of the Taliban, with an Interim Authority officially taking power on December 
22.  
As the Taliban collapsed, foreign troops in large numbers began to deploy to 
Afghanistan in two missions, a counter-insurgency campaign under the broader 
Operation Enduring Freedom (often designated either OEF or OEF-A to indicate 
forces operating specifically in Afghanistan) and a peacekeeping operation mandated 
by the United Nations, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF was 
concentrated in the southern and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan where the 
Taliban and other insurgent forces were concentrated, and its mission was specifically 
focused on combating insurgents and transnational terrorists. In contrast, ISAF 
initially deployed only to Kabul and its immediate environs before slowly expanding 
into the more stable regions of the north. Prior to 2006 its mission had been more 
similar to a traditional peacekeeping operation: training forces of the new Afghan 
National Army (ANA), assisting with the voluntary disarmament and demobilization 
of militias, and similar tasks. In 2006 ISAF expanded into the more dangerous South 
and Southeast and took on peace enforcement and counter-insurgency roles. Just as 
ISAF expanded both in geographical scope and in mission, it also expanded 
throughout this period in numbers. In 2002 and 2003 ISAF stood at approximately 
5,000 soldiers, while OEF-A operated at slightly more than 10,000. By 2004 ISAF had 
expanded to more than 8,000 and OEF-A to approximately 18,000, and by 2006, after 
a majority of American forces operating in Afghanistan had been folded into ISAF, its 
overall numbers increased to more than 31,000 (Ghufran 2006, 88; ISAF 2006). At the 
same time OEF-A numbers dropped from just under 20,000 in 2005 to 8,000 in 2006. 
Both operations were multinational, although Americans overwhelmingly dominated  
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the ranks and leadership of OEF, while the Germans for much of the first several years 
were the single largest contributor to ISAF and provided a number of its commanding 
generals.  
The international military presence in Afghanistan came under considerable 
criticism in its early years for being under-resourced: too few troops in too few areas 
providing too little security. It has changed substantially over the past five years, 
although critics contend that these changes are too little too late. The United States 
originally opposed an expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul, fearing that these troops 
would interfere with its highest priority of hunting down al Qaeda and senior Taliban 
figures and that they would be vulnerable to assaults in much the same way that 
European troops in UNPROFOR had been kidnapped to prevent NATO airstrikes 
during the war in Bosnia. During 2002 and 2003 the United States dropped its 
opposition to ISAF’s expansion and began pressing Europeans to provide more troops 
for a geographically expanded ISAF mission. At this point it became clear that no 
other potential troop-contributing countries were eager to provide an expanded 
security presence in Afghanistan either. As detailed in the narrative above, both senior 
American officials and the NATO secretary general complained of allies’ reluctance to 
make even minor commitments to ISAF. By 2004 the United States committed to 
expanding its own presence in Afghanistan beyond a narrow counter-terror and 
counter-insurgency mandate. American military forces initiated the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, where small groups of soldiers (in the American 
case, usually 50-100) deployed to combine development and security assistance. The 
United States initially provided the majority of these teams, deployed in many of the 
most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. By 2006 ISAF numbers had expanded to the  
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level that many observers had been recommending from the beginning of the 
intervention.
100 
The United States clearly adopted a highly militarized approach towards 
Afghanistan. As many have pointed out, the U.S. was spending more than ten times as 
much on military operations in Afghanistan as on development assistance (for instance 
Vaishnav 2004, 245). Its PRTs tended to emphasize counter-insurgency functions 
rather than the peacekeeping functions adopted by the Germans, for instance, and 
American PRTs were co-located with OEF combat units (Hett 2005; Perito 2005; 
Schmunk 2005). American forces in some cases assisted the Karzai government in 
removing troublesome warlords from their local fiefdoms, such as the case of Ismail 
Khan in Herat. Although the American military presence made political stabilization 
possible by generally deterring direct armed challenges to the Karzai government, the 
United States also came under frequent criticism for overly militarizing its approach – 
that is, for emphasizing military instruments while contributing grossly inadequate 
amounts to civilian reconstruction and for adopting heavy-handed military tactics, 
including aggressive house searches and devastating bombing campaigns that 
alienated much of the Pashtun population. 
In contrast Germany accepted a much more limited role. With the exception of 
the special forces dedicated to OEF (fewer than 100 in all), the Bundeswehr deployed 
to the safest regions in Afghanistan: Kabul, its immediate environs, and the north of 
                                                 
100 William Durch (2003) provides one of the most detailed initial assessments of force requirements for 
Afghanistan, outlining three possible force packages – the light, medium, and heavy options. He 
himself favored the light option of approximately 18,000 ISAF soldiers, although he also recognized the 
medium option of approximately 34,000 troops to be a viable option. He was more critical of the heavy 
option, based on the model of such operations as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, which advocates of a 
more robust, intrusive intervention in Afghanistan commonly used as their baseline. The heavy option 
would have required between 100,000 – 600,000 troops deployed over an extended period – an option 
that was logistically daunting and risked sparking broad Afghan opposition by looking like an 
occupation force.   
219 
the country.
101 German officials repeated as a mantra that Germany emphasizes the 
“A” of the International Security Assistance Force.
102 In practice this means an 
avoidance of any direct enforcement role, whether in disarmament or counter-
narcotics. German Foreign Minister Fischer explicitly announced that German forces 
would take no part in counter-narcotics missions, even the destruction of drug 
laboratories (Kurbjuweit 2005b).
103 Although a variety of other countries established 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the aegis of the American-led OEF, Germany 
insisted that its PRTs come under ISAF command. Moreover, as other nations took on 
PRTs in much more dangerous parts of Afghanistan, not only did the Bundeswehr 
remain resolutely in the safest regions of Afghanistan, but there was not even any 
discussion in Germany of the possibility of deploying to other regions. Such 
discussions, in the words of one senior German official, might have “over-charged the 
system” (anonymous author interview, May 11, 2006). Even within its area of 
operations, there were reportedly numerous zones where German forces simply did 
not patrol; ISAF dispatched British units to patrol these problematic areas (anonymous 
author interview with a mid-ranking ISAF military officer, September 27, 2005). The 
                                                 
101 For data on the stability of these regions relative to the rest of Afghanistan, see CSIS Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Project 2005. It is important to note that the rest of this discussion refers to the German 
units other than the small contingent of special forces (KSK). The KSK was active in counter-terrorist 
operations in the southern and southeastern parts of Afghanistan, but little is known about their role in 
these operations. Most accounts suggest that they primarily participated in intelligence and 
reconnaissance missions. Much as with German participation in combat missions in Kosovo, however, 
German decision-makers attempted to keep Germany’s combat role in Afghanistan as “invisible” as 
possible. With so few troops involved, for the most part Germany succeeded in keeping these forces 
invisible. 
102 A German journalist observed of the Bundeswehr, “Not only are they the world's ‘best equipped’ 
army, they are also the friendliest. ‘Waving is protection,’ explained Commander Vogler-Wandler. 
Wherever the soldiers go, they pass the message that they do not want to harm anybody. We leave you 
alone, you leave us alone is the silent pact they seem to make” (Kurbjuweit 2005a). 
103 The militarization of counter-narcotics policy is of course a highly controversial subject, although 
such well-respected organizations as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) have called for international military participation in a narcotics 
interdiction campaign in Afghanistan. This study takes no stand on the relationship between counter-
narcotics policy and the promotion of a representative and inclusive government in Afghanistan. It is 
important nonetheless to note that Germany’s refusal to become involved in counter-narcotics 
operations is consistent with a broader pattern of non-militarized behavior.  
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Bundeswehr has lost only six soldiers to hostilities in Afghanistan, in contrast to the 
more than 300 combat fatalities among American forces. Four of those six German 
soldiers were killed in a single suicide attack on a bus carrying German troops – an 
event that was “hell” for German officials trying to maintain German support for a 
continued military presence in Afghanistan (anonymous author interview with a senior 
German official, April 15, 2005).
104 
No one disputes that the Bundeswehr is a highly trained, well-disciplined, 
motivated, and capable military force – one of the best in Europe. At various points 
since the end of the Cold War Germany has been the second largest contributor to 
multilateral military missions behind the United States and the single largest 
contributor to operations such as KFOR and ISAF. Clearly Germany is playing an 
important role in military missions all around the world, a contribution that few would 
have anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the 
nature of the Bundeswehr’s participation remains highly distinct from that of many 
other contingents from more militarized countries. Recounting an exchange between 
German Defense Minister Peter Struck and the press, one German journalist perfectly 
captured Germany’s ambivalence about its participation in such missions: 
During a flight to Afghanistan, Struck invited journalists on board to join him 
in his cabin. After a few harmless questions, a female journalist spoke up. ‘The 
Bundeswehr has been active overseas for a good ten years,’ she said. ‘In this 
time, only two people have been shot by German soldiers. Does that not 
suggest that they are lacking the fighting spirit?’ The question was followed by 
gaping silence, and red-faced embarrassment as the crowd looked down at the 
floor…. The German Defense minister twice began to speak, before stopping 
himself. Then he managed to form a sentence. ‘No, I don't think that German 
soldiers are softies.’ Struck’s press spokesman was quick to end the 
conversation (Kurbjuweit 2005a). 
                                                 
104 The same official noted that it would be “completely impossible” for Germany to endure the levels 
of casualties that either the Americans or British are taking in Afghanistan.  
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German forces in Afghanistan clearly avoided the overly militarized approach that the 
United States sometimes adopted. In doing so, however, they also provided only a 
very limited contribution to the creation of a secure environment in Afghanistan. 
Other national contingents in Afghanistan fell between the extremes of the 
United States and Germany. Much like the Americans, the British were willing to 
deploy in substantial numbers to the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan and to 
confront anti-regime militias in the South and Southeast of the country. They tended, 
however, to adopt a rather less militarized approach emphasizing small units and close 
contact with the local population. The Italians, on the other hand, were more 
reminiscent of the Germans, deploying to the relatively safer western regions of 
Afghanistan and adopting a less aggressive approach to patrolling.  
Assessing the relationship between the military structure of the intervention 
and political outcomes in Afghanistan is difficult. Many have criticized the American 
military role in Afghanistan for doing both too little and too much – too little to 
provide security for ordinary Afghans and to marginalize the warlords undermining 
Kabul’s authority, while at the same time too much to prosecute its war on terror, 
alienating many Pashtuns through intrusive house searches and the civilian casualties 
resulting from American air strikes.
105 On the one hand the American role has been 
the unambiguous necessary condition for progress towards a more representative and 
inclusive political order. The American invasion of Afghanistan opened opportunities 
for a more broad-based regime that nearly all experts believe was all but impossible 
before the September 11 attacks. Once in Afghanistan American forces and those from 
other more militarized states (particularly Britain) have prevented the Taliban from 
recapturing the country, they have at various points helped to remove troublesome 
                                                 
105 Even some American military officers expressed serious concern about the aggressiveness of 
American military actions in southern and southeastern Afghanistan (anonymous author interview with 
a mid-ranking ISAF official, September 27, 2005).  
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warlords from their local fiefdoms, and they have protected Karzai as he has purged 
many of the biggest warlords from their senior positions in the ministries. While 
American forces in particular have been criticized for an overly aggressive prosecution 
of the counter-insurgency, it is also true that they are the essential precondition 
without which the very existence of ISAF would not be possible, as German officials 
readily admit (anonymous interview with a senior German official, May 11, 2006).  
The true debate is not about whether the presence of militarized interveners 
was a necessary condition for change towards a more inclusive political order; clearly, 
it was. Rather, the debate is one about the sufficiency of the American strategy for 
Afghanistan. Could an earlier commitment of 30,000 or more troops have substantially 
changed the current complexion of Afghan politics? Would even more have been 
necessary – a number in the hundreds of thousands that more closely would have 
approximated the troop to population ratios in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor? 
Should OEF and ISAF troops have been more aggressive in disarming and 
demobilizing illegal militias? Should they have committed more strongly to a 
narcotics interdiction campaign? Or would any of these more aggressive approaches 
have sparked much broader resistance to the presence of international troops – 
something akin to the American decision in Iraq to dissolve the Sunni-dominated 
military of the Saddam Hussein-era? Clearly the strategy initially adopted by the Bush 
administration was inadequate, as American decision-makers themselves implicitly 
admitted in their change of course in 2003-4. What is not clear is whether a 
substantially heavier footprint would have significantly improved the situation in 
Afghanistan.  
Civilian Structure. The American and international approaches to the civil 
implementation aspects of the intervention parallel the military effort. The general  
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thrust of the policy accords with the predictions of the theory outlined in this study, 
but the policy was pursued much less resolutely than might have been expected. 
From the beginning American and international diplomacy sought to broker a 
broad-based government that excluded only the Taliban while incorporating all other 
political and ethnic groups. Over time the United States relented on the issue of 
participation by former Taliban members, and the Karzai government reached out to 
all but a narrow circle of top Taliban leadership (International Crisis Group 2004, 25-
6). At the same time, the international community attempted to slowly weaken the 
warlords who undermined the authority of the central government, visibly supporting 
Karzai’s efforts to remove a number of high-profile regional governors and to put in 
place a cabinet of experienced professionals rather than militia commanders (Sedra 
and Middlebrook 2005, 7-8; although these authors, like many critics, observe that 
these efforts were only a partial success, leaving in place many regional commanders, 
particularly and mid- and low-levels of governance). 
Rather than using explicit aid conditionalities to press for more inclusive and 
participatory governance, the international community worked with Afghan officials 
to produce collaborative blueprints for Afghanistan’s development, one aspect of 
which was “good governance.” The most recent of these initiatives emerged out of the 
London Conference in early 2006. Named the Afghanistan Compact, this document 
laid out principles to govern cooperation between donors and the Afghan government 
and benchmarks and timelines to which both donors and the Afghan government 
committed themselves. The document is replete with references to democracy, good 
governance, transparency, rule of law, and respect for pluralism and human rights.  
Some critics charged that the United States acted as kingmaker, installing its 
preferred candidate, Hamid Karzai, as president rather than encouraging a truly 
representative process of selection. Certainly the United States made clear its  
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preference for Karzai, but charges of his being installed by fiat are overstated. With 
Pashtuns forming a majority of the country, any broadly acceptable candidate would 
necessarily have been Pashtun. While the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, was 
popular among many Afghans, he was entirely unacceptable to the Northern Alliance, 
who threatened to “roll out their tanks” for Kabul if he were appointed interim 
president of the country (Strmecki 2003, 40). Karzai emerged as an ideal compromise 
candidate, with substantial support among Pashtuns while simultaneously being 
acceptable to the Northern Alliance. The fact that he secured a majority of popular 
votes in the presidential elections of 2004, with support not only from Pashtuns but 
also from some multiethnic urban areas, suggests that Karzai indeed represented 
something as close to a consensus candidate as Afghanistan was likely to produce. 
A closely related criticism concerns American acceptance of a strong 
presidential system and a voting system (the Single Non-Transferable Vote method, 
SNTV) that inhibits the formation of strong political parties (Maass 2006; Reynolds 
2006).
106 Opinions differ among experts about the desirability of creating a strong 
presidency in the Afghan context, but there is certainly no consensus that a 
presidential system was an undemocratic choice for Afghanistan. Opinion is much 
more unified in condemning the choice for an SNTV electoral system, although the 
decision appears to be one that was made out of ignorance rather than design, and 
there is hope that the negative consequences of the choice can be reversed in the near 
future without long-term damage. 
More telling are charges that the United States and other members of the 
international community were overly accommodating to warlords, privileging basic 
stability and the “war on terror” over the construction of a strong and representative 
central state (Barakat 2004; Bhatia et al 2004; Jalali 2007). Central to such criticisms 
                                                 
106 Wilder (2005, 18), however, claims that political parties played a more important role in the 
parliamentary elections of 2005 than is generally understood.  
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is the contention that regional warlords were “paper tigers” whom the international 
community could intimidate into compliance without major bloodshed (Sedra and 
Middlebrook 2005, 8). It may well be that the United States and other troop-
contributing countries could have been more aggressive in attempting to marginalize 
warlords. On the other hand, it may well be that more aggressive efforts to disarm 
illegal militias would have caused the violent backlash of Afghan warlords, replicating 
the United States’ oft-criticized decision to disband the Sunni-dominated Iraqi military 
of the Saddam Hussein era. Either decision was a gamble. According to the theory 
advanced in this study, the United States might have been expected to commit more 
resources and take more risks in pursuit of a transformational agenda, and Afghanistan 
may have made much more progress towards building a viable, representative and 
inclusive government as a result. At the same time, the theory presented here 
highlights the high degree of uncertainty associated with the use of force, and, while 
the United States was not as aggressive as many of its critics would have liked, it 
certainly was much more so than less militarized states such as Germany and Italy 
operating within the same context. 
Outcomes 
Most observers agree that Afghanistan has experienced remarkable political 
changes in the past five years. Questions and doubts concern the ability of the Kabul 
government, with the assistance of the international community, to translate these 
initial gains into a more effective, more rule-bound and transparent, and more 
representative regime that can eventually overcome the enormous challenges posed by 
the opium economy, lesser warlords, and the resurgent insurgency. 
The changes of the past several years represent a remarkable if still-unfinished 
achievement:  
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Circumspect observers of the December 2001 Bonn Conference would have 
scarcely believed that within four years the country would have held a largely 
peaceful presidential election that would see one candidate prevail with a clear 
majority of the vote; a constitution promulgated, one of the most progressive in 
the Muslim world; and a complex legislative electoral process undertaken 
without major security incidents…. Through the implementation of the Bonn 
process and complex bargaining that reaches down to the district and village 
level, the Karzai government has been able to extend its authority to most areas 
of the country and to curtail the overbearing influence of warlords in national 
politics. The de facto veto that prominent warlords seemingly held over 
national policy from 2001-03 has largely been removed. This is not to say that 
the threat of warlordism has receded. Politics at the local level are still highly 
militarized and factionalized, and regional commanders remain the dominant 
presence in the political and economic life of villages and districts across the 
country. But the Bonn process, buttressed by international military and 
development assistance, has positioned the government to challenge these local 
power dynamics (Sedra and Middlebrook 2005, 3-4).  
Seen in light of Afghanistan’s history, these changes are even more remarkable. Even 
in Afghanistan’s “golden days,” in the period before the wars of the 1980s and 1990s, 
previous Afghan constitutions had been “more myths than operational codes” (Norchi 
2004). Never before had Afghanistan had such a meaningful election campaign as the 
ones held in 2004-5 (Wilder 2005).  
Yet, for all of Afghanistan’s accomplishments, it would be misleading to 
suggest that these changes have been more than the initial steps towards a sustainable 
participatory and representative government. Afghanistan remains one of the weakest 
states in the world (Rubin 2006, 26). Most of its population remains bitterly 
disappointed in the Kabul government’s inability to deliver public goods, including 
adequate security, health care, and education (Wilder 2005, 35). Despite its weakness, 
it is being called upon to fight both a burgeoning opium economy and an insurgency 
strengthened by safe havens in Pakistan and transnational sources of support. 
Certainly Afghanistan’s situation remains precarious. Massive international 
intervention with the military capabilities of the United States was a necessary  
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condition for significant political change towards a representative and inclusive 
government; it remains to be seen whether the intervention will also be sufficient. 
Policy Options and Counterfactuals 
Even once the United States committed to intervening in Afghanistan and 
attempting to install a new regime in Kabul, it possessed alternative policy options to 
the ones chosen. In the very broad terms of this study, the United States need not have 
pursued either democracy, nor, according to many of its critics, need it have 
militarized its campaign in Afghanistan to the extent that it did. A third and more 
nuanced alternative is the one most commonly advocated by critics of American 
policy: adopting a less militarized approach to the Taliban in the initial years of the 
intervention while adopting a much more aggressive stance vis-à-vis warlords and the 
provision of public security. Each of these options is problematic in its own way, but 
the very fact that these alternatives could have been chosen – and, indeed, the first was 
chosen for the first two years of the United States’ intervention – reveals that there 
was nothing inherent about the strategic situation in Afghanistan that determined the 
strategy adopted by the United States. Other actors facing an identical situation might 
have chosen other strategies, which suggests that the perceptions and politics of 
intervening states are critical for understanding outcomes. 
The first set of counter-factual policies that the United States could have 
chosen concerns the promotion of democracy: Washington could have chosen not to 
pursue a democratic agenda in Afghanistan by not intervening against the regime at 
all, by supporting a single faction (the “proxy” model of intervention), or by 
supporting only a weak powersharing structure (the “mediation” model). In fact, for 
the first two years of its intervention, the United States did choose the last option – and 
earned considerable international criticism for not pursuing more ambitious goals. The  
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American intervention could also have followed the same path as the Russian 
intervention in Tajikistan from 1993-1997 (the mediation model), providing economic 
and military support to one faction at the expense of others. In doing so, however, the 
United States would have risked creating a pliable but fragile regime with a narrow 
support base – a less-ambitious but highly problematic alternative. Or the United 
States could have acted against al Qaeda alone, either in cooperation with the Taliban 
or through focused covert operations that left intact the Taliban government. Given the 
dependence of the Mullah Mohammed Omar’s regime on the financial and military 
assistance of al Qaeda and the weak leverage available to the international community 
through non-military instruments (Barfield 2004, 289; Goodhand 2004; Newberg 
2007), however, neither variant of the non-intervention strategy stood a high 
probability of success, and both would have left in place an environment in which 
transnational terrorism had flourished. Democracy promotion, in other words, is a 
daunting challenge in the Afghan context, but the alternatives were at least as 
unattractive. 
A second alternative set of strategies would have eliminated or greatly reduced 
the role of military enforcement in promoting a new regime for Afghanistan. The 
heavy-handed American counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban earned 
considerable criticism from many observers. Rather than militarizing the attempt to 
bring stability to Afghanistan, the cooperation of local power-brokers and the Afghan 
population could have been pursued through cooptation – for instance, by radically 
decentralizing power in an effort to minimize center-periphery conflict and by seeking 
to expand regional trade so as to maximize opportunities outside of any “political-
economy of violence” (von Erffa 2002). Although some forms of federalism might 
make sense in the Afghan context, decentralization by itself offers no means of 
improving the quality of governance nor constrains local power-holders from seeking  
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to expand their fiefdoms at others’ expense. It is also difficult to imagine profitable 
trading in licit goods without a central authority to prevent ruinous “taxation” of trade 
by local warlords. It is thus difficult to imagine a sustainable political-economic order 
that could meet its citizens’ basic needs without creating a central authority, and the 
creation of a central authority inevitably involves conflict with armed regional power-
brokers. A non-military approach to Afghanistan, in short, would have had little 
likelihood of curbing the predatory behavior of multiple warlords or building workable 
state institutions, much less of routing out the terrorist organizations that were the 
original target of the American intervention. 
A final, more nuanced alternative strategy rejects neither the goal of producing 
a more representative and inclusive government, nor the use of military means, but 
rather would have reoriented the ways in which the United States and its coalition 
partners pursued their policies. In particular, more emphasis would have been placed 
on the disbursement of aid, the provision of security for ordinary Afghans, and the 
marginalization of warlords. There is nothing inherently wrong with any of these 
goals, and indeed the disbursement of additional aid would almost certainly have had 
positive effects in Afghanistan.
107 Whether troop-contributing countries could have 
deployed sufficient soldiers to provide greater security throughout Afghanistan 
without appearing to be an occupation force is less certain, although the relative 
success of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the expansion of ISAF 
beyond Kabul suggests that most observers were correct in believing that a larger 
security presence would have been advisable from the start. Most contentious of all is 
the notion that warlords were nothing more than “paper tigers” and that foreign troops 
could have enforced their political and economic marginalization without provoking 
wide scale resistance. There simply is not enough evidence to judge the merits of this 
                                                 
107 Few experts involved with Afghanistan believed that the country had come anywhere close to 
reaching its “absorption capacity” for foreign aid (Weinbaum 2006, 131).  
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argument, although the American debacle in Mogadishu stands as a warning not to 
underestimate the risks involved in confronting even relatively small and apparently 
weak militias. 
Other options were thus available to the United States and other coalition 
members than the ones they chose. The United States behaved according to 
predictions by seeking to promote some level of democracy and by adopting a highly 
militarized approach. Critics suggest that the U.S. could have done much more to 
promote democracy in Afghanistan, if that was indeed its aim. While this criticism is 
almost certainly true, it is mitigated by two factors: first, the United States in the end 
did more than any of the other coalition members (with the possible exception of 
Great Britain) to pursue a more participatory and inclusive political order in 
Afghanistan, and second, critics might perhaps be too quick to dismiss the risks 
inherent in a more intrusive approach to re-ordering Afghan politics than the one the 
U.S. adopted. Thus, none of the obvious counter-factual policy alternatives invalidates 
the primary conclusions of this study – namely, that the choice of intervention strategy 
derives from the perceptions and politics of intervening states rather than from any 
logic inherent to a given strategic situation, and that only committed, militarized, 
democratic interveners will pursue the policies necessary for promoting substantial 
change towards more representative and inclusive political orders. 
Contending Explanations and Criticisms 
Unlike in the cases of Bosnia and Tajikistan, there are few who believe that the 
political changes that have occurred in Afghanistan are attributable to anything other 
than the armed intervention of the United States and its coalition partners. Rather, 
critics generally contend that what democratization has occurred is largely illusory 
(Barakat 2004, 2-3) and that, if the United States and its allies had truly sought to  
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promote a more inclusive and representative government in Afghanistan, then they 
would have dedicated more resources to the project (Rubin 2004b).  
There is obviously a considerable degree of truth to both criticisms. As detailed 
in the narrative, the Bush administration clearly did not enter into Afghanistan with 
the intent of promoting strong, representative and inclusive political authority 
structures. It did, however, move in this direction, albeit less resolutely than most 
critics of the administration had hoped. The aid-to-population and intervening-soldier-
to-population ratios in Afghanistan never reached anywhere near the levels reached in 
small and tiny countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Troop levels did, 
however, eventually grow to roughly the size of the UN’s largest current operation, 
MONUC in the Congo (a country of similar size, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
underdevelopment as Afghanistan). Aid levels similarly never came close to those 
requested by the Afghan government or development workers, but they did reach into 
the billions of dollars per year. When viewed in terms of the absolute numbers 
eventually reached rather than ratios to Afghanistan’s (large) population, the only 
intervention that has been substantially larger is the American invasion of Iraq. 
Certainly the United States’ initial level of effort indicated a deep ambivalence about 
the more expansive project of promoting sustainable political change in Afghanistan, 
but by 2004 the situation had begun to change significantly in terms of soldiers 
deployed and military missions adopted, albeit less so in terms of civilian aid 
dispensed. 
Similarly, although Afghanistan did not make as much progress towards a 
sustainable, representative and inclusive political order as many critics would have 
liked, clearly it took several significant steps towards this end. It remains to be seen 
whether the level of international effort will be sufficient to continue assisting 
Afghanistan along this path, and whether the initial successes achieved can be  
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sustained in the face of the burgeoning opium economy and an insurgency that 
possesses safe havens and other forms of support abroad.  
Conclusion 
The theory presented in this study predicts the general direction of interveners’ 
policies and the overall trend in outcomes of interventions throughout the world. 
Afghanistan lies “off the curve” – that is, the United States committed much less 
strongly than might have been expected to promoting a strong, representative and 
inclusive government for Afghanistan, and Afghan political authority structures have 
thus far made only limited progress towards becoming a sustainable, relatively more 
democratic regime. Understanding the reasons for these outcomes are important for 
understanding interventions as a whole. 
Afghanistan is a “hard case” in nearly every way. The country itself is nearly 
as daunting an implementation environment as can be imagined: highly 
underdeveloped, ethnically heterogeneous, filled with a multitude of competing armed 
factions, ideally suited to the production and trafficking of narcotics, surrounded by 
hostile neighbors, possessing no history of democracy, and burdened by a legacy of 
decades-long civil war. The American invasion was not a humanitarian operation but a 
response to a devastating act of terrorism, it was launched by a president who had 
publicly and repeatedly voiced his opposition to nation-building, and it had to compete 
for resources with the much higher-stakes intervention in Iraq. In only one way can the 
resort to democracy-promotion be considered a likely outcome: The intervention 
occurred in the post-Cold War era, when the ostensible American “victory” over 
communism remained fresh in the minds of many American decision-makers and 
democracy has been enshrined as a global norm in any number of UN documents. Yet 
these factors had been inadequate to secure the commitment of the Bush  
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administration to democracy-promotion until after the September 11
th attacks, and 
even then it took two years before the administration shifted towards such a strategy in 
Afghanistan. Thus, from nearly every perspective, it appears surprising that the 
intervening coalition would adopt – albeit half-heartedly – such ambitious goals. 
In this sense Afghanistan provides powerful testimony to the tendency of 
intervening states to externalize their own norms of governance, even when nearly 
every possible argument suggests that they would not. Two factors led to the Bush 
administration’s shift towards providing more money and forces for “nation-building” 
in Afghanistan. First, the administration needed to show the American public a 
“success story” in order to garner support for its broader democracy-promotion agenda 
(specifically in Iraq). Second, American soldiers deployed to the country (and much of 
the American military more generally) “learned” a specific set of lessons from their 
failures in the first two years of the American intervention. Yet the American 
military’s reaction was not “learning” in the rationalist sense. When looking for 
solutions to the difficulties encountered in Afghanistan, the U.S. military returned to 
the American counter-insurgency thinking of the 1960s. Such thinking emphasized 
enhancing the legitimacy of the regime through elections and the provision of public 
services. The United States could instead have opted for alternative strategies more 
akin to Russia’s in Tajikistan. 
Despite the American turn towards greater nation-building, Afghanistan’s 
progress towards sustainable representative and inclusive political institutions remains 
both very partial and highly tenuous at this point. It is impossible to say whether this 
outcome is the result of Afghanistan’s unpromising environment for democracy 
promotion or whether it is because the American-led coalition in Afghanistan did 
much too little to achieve its goal. Most Western critics of U.S. policy in the country 
lambaste the Bush administration’s failure to provide human security throughout the  
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country by deploying more troops and dispensing more development aid. In all 
likelihood greater resources would have yielded more positive results. It is impossible, 
however, to exclude the alternative hypothetical outcome: A larger “footprint” might 
have presented the appearance of an occupying army, produced large distortions in the 
Afghan economy, and introduced large numbers of well-paid foreign workers 
advancing Western, liberal agendas antithetical to the traditional lifestyles of most 
Afghans. Given the past experience of foreign interveners in Afghanistan, concerns 
about these issues – which were hardly unique to the Bush administration – are 
certainly understandable. 
The “mediation” approach to intervention generally yields very partial results: 
Peace and some progress towards greater political inclusion are achieved, but often 
without the institutionalization of the mechanisms that would make such achievements 
self-sustaining. When resource constraints are low, militarized democracies tend to 
press for the more substantial results potentially achievable through the 
“transformation” approach. The American intervention in Afghanistan fits this general 
prediction, with the Bush administration having initially launched a minimalist state-
building project that approximated the mediation model before gravitating closer to 
the transformation model. Whether either model of intervention can yield a sustainable 
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Conclusion: Iraq and Beyond 
State-building military interventions are tremendously complex. Their 
dynamics are simultaneously shaped in three arenas: the domestic politics of the 
intervening state or states, the domestic politics of the target state, and the 
international politics that occur between members of an intervening coalition, neutral 
third parties, and neighbors of the target state. Within each of these arenas complex 
bargaining dynamics take place among myriad actors, and the preferences and 
capabilities of these actors differ from one context to another. Understanding 
interventions in all of their complexity is a daunting challenge. 
To simplify this task, this study has focused on the characteristics and 
constraints of intervening states and their concomitant ability to foster political change 
in the target state. Such simplification has its rewards. As the fuzzy-set analysis of 
Chapter 2 demonstrated, we can correctly predict the outcomes of more than 80 
percent of post-Cold War military interventions by focusing only on the conjunction 
of an intervener’s regime type, strategic culture, and national interests. Such a 
parsimonious framework, however, does not explain every case, including most 
importantly the invasion of Iraq. In order to make the complex analytical terrain more 
tractable, this study has largely bracketed two important issues that together do much 
to explain Iraq and other deviant cases: (i) the characteristics of the target state and 
their influence on rates of success in promoting political change, and (ii) the quality of 
intervention planning and implementation.  
This concluding chapter, therefore, seeks to explain not only what we have 
learned but also why Iraq appears to be such a peculiar case. The chapter will proceed 
in three parts. It begins with a review of the study’s findings, then examines the 
catastrophic invasion of Iraq, and finally assesses this study’s implications for the 
future of intervention after Iraq.  
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A Broad Brush-Stroke Review of Military Interventions 
When launching an intervention, interveners face a central dilemma. They can 
seek to promote their preferred form of governance, but only at the risk of violent 
confrontation with target-state actors who are adversely affected by the change. 
Alternatively, they can minimize the likelihood of confrontation, but in so doing they 
risk creating a fragile and ineffective powersharing government. Three models of 
intervention emerge from this dilemma: a proxy model in which an autocratic faction 
loyal to the intervener is supported, a mediation model in which all armed actors are 
brought into a government of national reconciliation, or a transformation model in 
which existing elites are subjected to some form (albeit imperfect) of democratic 
accountability.  
The conjunction of the intervener’s regime type, strategic culture, and resource 
constraints usually determines the strategy adopted and the extent of political change 
that is therefore likely to result. The analytical framework presented here accurately 
predicts political change in more than 80 percent of the cases of post-Cold War 
military intervention. Where democratic interveners possess a militarized strategic 
culture and intervene in situations where their national interests are directly engaged, 
they typically promote substantial democratic change. Moreover, in roughly half of 
these instances they have succeeded in assisting the target country to become at least 
an “illiberal democracy.” In contrast, in interventions which are not dominated by 
committed, militarized democracies, substantial democratic change almost never 
results (three cases out of 19). Finally, all four cases of autocratization resulted from 
the intervention of a committed, militarized autocracy.  
These results yield three important findings about military interventions. First, 
assuming one or more militarized democracies commits to anchoring an intervention, 
democracy promotion does indeed appear to be possible, although it is a dangerous  
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and expensive undertaking that should be attempted rarely. Second, the goal of 
promoting democracy through intervention is not the result of Manichean worldviews 
held by peculiar world powers but is rather a part of a much broader pattern of 
countries’ seeking to externalize their own domestic norms of governance in their 
relations with the wider world. Third, while externalizing domestic norms is common, 
resort to high-intensity uses of force is rare. There is likely to be much less 
international consensus in favor of strategies such as the proxy and transformation 
models that pursue more ambitious ends with concomitantly higher risks of military 
confrontation. Thus, although the mediation model commonly promotes fragile and 
relatively less effective governance, it is the one most likely to engender broad 
multilateral support, while the other models of intervention are more likely to spark 
international crises. 
Such findings are at odds with much of the extant literature on intervention, 
which has claimed that democracy promotion through armed intervention is 
impossible or nearly so, that no states – or only those with messianic tendencies – 
truly seek to promote democracy, or that military enforcement measures do not play 
an important role in promoting democracy. Much of this literature can be situated in 
one of the major schools of international relations thought – realism, liberalism, or 
constructivism. At some risk of oversimplification, these schools’ perspectives can be 
succinctly summarized. Realists commonly maintain that there is no advantage to be 
obtained by transforming the regime type of target states, but also that interveners 
seldom truly pursue such ends, adopting democracy promotion (if at all) only as a 
rhetorical ploy to disguise more realpolitik motivations. Liberals frequently argue that 
democracy promotion is a worthy end, but that it is best accomplished through 
multilateral cooperation and the minimal use of force (relying instead on economic 
cooptation and institutions to promote transparency). Constructivists often argue that  
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the liberal project of democratic state-building almost inevitably founders on the 
resilience of local cultures opposed to the imposition of alien institutions. Interveners’ 
attempts to export these institutions cannot therefore be explained by rational strategic 
calculations, but must instead be understood as the product of messianic identities or 
Manichean worldviews that are ignorant of or do not accept cultural differences. All of 
these schools of thought share the great advantage of internal consistency: If 
democracy promotion is desirable as a foreign policy goal, then it is also achievable 
without great risk or indefensible costs. If democracy promotion is not possible, then it 
is also not desirable – either because it does nothing to advance an intervener’s 
interests or because it is a contemporary form of colonial subjugation.  
The analytical perspective adopted in this study insists that reality is much 
“messier.” The promotion of democracy may well advance the interests of outside 
actors who desire to stabilize fragile regions of the world, but it is an inherently risky 
and costly activity because it gravely threatens the interests of some of the best 
organized, most heavily armed, and most highly motivated actors in the target states. 
In the face of such high levels of uncertainty, different actors in identical situations, all 
attempting to act rationally, will inevitably reach divergent conclusions about what the 
optimal policy is. Thus the analytical framework advanced here is “messy” in another 
way as well: It insists that state behavior can only be predicted by integrating 
rationalist and constructivist perspectives on international politics. 
Each of the three models of intervention has characteristic strengths and flaws, 
and both policymakers and academics have made arguments in favor of each. The 
greatest peril lies in not committing to one of these models – that is, in adopting the 
goals of one of the more ambitious and dangerous approaches (proxy or 
transformation) while only committing the resources sufficient for the less ambitious 
mediation model. Of the cases examined in depth in this study, the Russian  
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intervention in Tajikistan from 1993-1997 and at various points the Western 
intervention in Bosnia illustrate such dysfunctional mismatches of means and ends. In 
both cases the intervening states recalibrated either their resource commitments or 
their ambitions. More disastrous examples of ends-means mismatches include the 
UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, where the United States’ ambitions clearly exceeded 
its interests in the country, and, most catastrophically of all, the invasion of Iraq. 
Iraq 
The catastrophic failure of the American intervention in Iraq cannot be 
explained through the analytical framework presented here. As a highly militarized 
democracy facing relatively low resource constraints, the United States should have 
been able to impose considerably more democratic change. There are two major 
reasons why a few cases – and Iraq in particular – do not behave as predicted: (i) the 
difficulty of the target environment and (ii) the quality of intervention planning and 
implementation. It is hard to imagine a case in which both of these factors could 
exercise a more intensely negative influence on the outcome of an intervention than 
Iraq. Although a number of control variables were introduced in the fuzzy-set analysis 
to account for difficult intervention environments (level of development, ethnic 
heterogeneity, prior experience with democracy), none of these comes close to 
capturing the hubris required to believe that invading Iraq was anything less than an 
extraordinary gamble. Iraq is an enormous country. Its civil society had been crushed 
by decades of brutal dictatorship, leaving nothing but clerical hierarchies, the remnants 
of the Baathist party, and increasingly the newly created militias upon which to base a 
new political order. Its three major ethnic groups were divided by memories of near-
genocidal acts perpetrated by the former regime. Its citizens’ expectations of the 
wealth that should flow from its oil reserves in no way reflected the realities of the  
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country’s antiquated infrastructure and explosive population growth rate. These 
expectations combined with colonial legacies to fuel enormous suspicions of neo-
colonial expropriation of the country’s oil wealth. The United States faced 
considerable suspicion and hostility as the country which, more than any other, had 
insisted on economic sanctions which had contributed to a devastating economic 
decline over the 15 years before the invasion (Cordesman 2003; on Iraqi suspicions of 
U.S. motives, see Diamond 2005, 25-6). Moreover, the United States exponentially 
increased the difficulties of an already daunting task by failing to plan properly for the 
occupation of Iraq. The U.S. failed to provide for public order in the weeks and 
months after the invasion, failed to identify legitimate representatives of the major 
Iraqi political communities, and – perhaps most important of all – failed to heed one of 
the clearest lessons of post-conflict interventions, the need to incorporate former 
combatants (in this case, former Baathists) into the new political order. Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine a worse handling of nation-building (Bunce 2005; Diamond 2005; 
Phillips 2005). 
It is impossible to assess the relative weighting of these two factors, the 
implementation environment and the conduct of the occupation. Was the intervention 
doomed from the moment the invasion was launched? Or could a well-devised 
occupation strategy have produced a workable government? While it is impossible to 
answer these questions, the framework adopted in this study does offer some insights 
into the Iraq war. 
The Bush administration’s policy – or lack thereof – is deeply puzzling. At 
various points aspects of the intervention resembled the proxy, mediation, and 
transformation models. Indeed, this confusion may help to explain why the invasion 
has turned out so disastrously. Had the United States truly sought to promote 
democracy in Iraq, previous experience from the post-Cold War era clearly  
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demonstrated that violent resistance to this project would be almost certain and that a 
costly and highly intrusive intervention would be necessary to realize the desired ends. 
In adopting this model the administration should have also committed to the provision 
of public order, detailed plans for reconstruction (made in advance and accepted 
throughout the U.S. government), and larger numbers of deployed troops.
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Alternatively, the United States could have adopted the mediation model, in which 
case it would have needed to dedicate itself from the beginning to providing credible 
assurances that the interests of all armed actors – particularly Sunnis loyal to the prior 
regime but also newly emerging Shia militias – would be accommodated and 
protected in a new political order. The United States did neither, but neither did it 
commit itself to building a credible proxy force in the country. The analytical 
framework adopted for this study cannot explain why the Bush administration 
produced such an incoherent muddle, although it clearly suggests that failing to 
commit to one or another approach is likely to produce dysfunctional policies and 
disastrous outcomes. 
Beyond Iraq 
The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has thus far been a 
catastrophe, and there are few if any signs that it will improve in the foreseeable 
future. It has cost tens if not hundreds of thousands of lives, and it gives every 
indication of leaving the United States less secure than when it began. The Iraq 
debacle is likely to spark a backlash against ambitious attempts to promote democracy 
through interventions, at least in the near to medium term. Two alternatives are 
possible: non-intervention and proxy interventions. 
                                                 
108 Of course, it is not at all clear that the United States could have sustained the deployment of such 
large numbers of troops for an extended period of time, which should have cautioned policy-makers 
against the invasion in the first place.  
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State-building interventions have had a stormy history in the post-Cold War 
era. Various observers declared in turn that Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, then East Timor 
represented the “high water mark” of interventions and that the tide had turned away 
from intrusive efforts to remake foreign societies (for instance Chesterman 2002). Yet 
each time a new crisis arose and states again found themselves drawn into ambitious 
efforts to impose new political authority structures far from their own shores. High-
level international panels have grappled with the failures of past interventions, but for 
all their efforts they have neither produced a “silver bullet” solution nor have they 
ruled out the use of interventions. Rather, they have acknowledged that interventions 
are inherently difficult but that some circumstances may indeed demand them 
(“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” 2000, International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001).  
If the United States and other states do not abandon interventions entirely, 
what are the alternatives to democracy promotion? It is instructive to look the parallels 
between post-Iraq American foreign policy and the war in Vietnam and its aftermath. 
In response to the United States’ failed efforts at nation-building in Vietnam, President 
Nixon decreed what became known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” in which the United 
States would provide support to threatened allied governments but would insist that 
the manpower for any war come from the threatened state itself. Since such a policy 
depended on cooperating with the government in place at the time, and since the vast 
majority of developing countries (especially those facing insurgent threats) were not 
democracies, essentially the Nixon Doctrine was a public commitment to a policy 
resembling the proxy model of interventions. The United States might return to such 
an approach in the post-Cold War era. Three factors, however, suggest a high degree 
of caution is warranted. First, although the proxy model avoids many of the pitfalls of 
the transformation model, it has its own drawbacks. As the Russian intervention in  
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Tajikistan suggests, the proxy model in many ways makes the intervener hostage to 
the proxy. Because the proxy regime is autocratic rather than a broad-based, more 
democratic one, the intervener cannot abandon its partner without abandoning the 
regime to its enemies. When pursuing a more broad-based, democratic strategy, on the 
other hand, the intervener can abandon a troublesome partner and work more closely 
with another one without abandoning the intervention altogether. Thus, for instance, in 
Bosnia the United States worked closely with Biljana Plavsic when she was helpful in 
broadening the arena for intra-Serb political competition, but Washington was also 
willing to abandon her when she was indicted for war crimes. Moscow, in contrast, 
found it difficult to direct its proxy Rakhmonov towards greater cooperation with the 
United Tajik Opposition. The proxy model suffers from a second potential pitfall: In 
the proxy model the intervener often contributes enough to prevent its proxy from 
failing completely but is unable to secure its faction’s ultimate victory, thereby fueling 
perennial war. Such was Russia’s experience in Tajikistan until it invited the 
opposition into a government of national reconciliation. Finally, democracies often 
find it difficult to support in highly visible ways autocratic regimes engaged in bloody 
repression. Democracies often engage in less-visible activities that help keep autocrats 
in power: covert operations, the provision of military aid, diplomatic legitimation of 
repressive practices, and so on. But the Reagan administration’s experience in Central 
America in the 1980s, among other examples, suggests that domestic opposition 
frequently forms when such practices become large-scale and thus highly visible 
(Peceny 1995). In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the American president 
was able to transgress norms of traditionally accepted conduct with impunity. There 
are already signs, however, that such latitude of action will not be possible 
indefinitely. Thus, a renewed “Nixon Doctrine” and the proxy interventions it would 
entail is neither advisable nor sustainable.  
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If intervening states do continue to launch interventions which aim to promote 
more democratic governance, they should heed the lessons of past interventions. First, 
if the realization of their goals depends on the democratization of the target state, then 
they must be prepared to marginalize spoilers, which in turn requires a willingness to 
use force decisively. If interveners are unwilling to confront spoilers, then they should 
adopt much more minimalist goals for an intervention. Problems arise when would-be 
democracy-promoters adopt the goals of the transformation model while providing 
means sufficient only for implementing the mediation model. 
Second, choosing to promote democracy is a long-term commitment. If 
interveners commit only to short-term interventions, such as the European Union’s 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Pentagon’s initial vision of a 
short American presence in Iraq, then they must be aware that violent challenges to the 
new regime’s authority are likely to emerge in the immediate aftermath of the 
withdrawal of intervening troops. Such short-term interventions are less likely to 
provoke violence against the intervener, but it is extremely difficult to build an 
effective new regime capable of withstanding violent challengers in such a short 
period of time. Even once interveners withdraw their forces, they typically cannot end 
their commitments. The most successful interventions have been ones in which the 
intervening state or states not only established a functioning new regime but also 
provided both economic incentives and security guarantees to the fledgling 
government. In Bosnia the prospect of EU membership is a tremendous incentive to 
maintain progress towards democracy, while in East Timor Australian troops were 
forced to return to prevent a coup, and in Sierra Leone British over-the-horizon 
security guarantees have played an important role in stabilizing the new government.  
Finally, international comity is highly desirable for a great many reasons, but it 
is often extremely difficult to sustain when an intervention involves higher-intensity  
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uses of force. Multilateralism is not by itself sufficient to ensure that the non-use or 
minimal uses of force prevail, as the case of Bosnia demonstrates. Nor is it sufficient 
to ensure the protection of intervening agents, as has been demonstrated in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
elsewhere. When interveners believe that only the escalation of force will achieve their 
ends, as in Kosovo, frequently multilateral consensus must be abandoned. 
Interventions thus may force intervening states to choose between multilateral comity 
and the ends that they would pursue.  
Recognizing the dilemmas posed by interventions is the first step towards 
designing more coherent strategies for intervention and avoiding many potential 
interventions altogether. Interventions are tremendously daunting and should be 
seldom undertaken and then only with a healthy appreciation of the difficulties 
involved. Seldom, however, is not never. The empires and bipolar structures that 
formerly buttressed political authority structures in much of the world have both 
collapsed, leaving in their wake weak, failing, and failed states. Such states sometimes 
give rise to genocide, massive population displacements, transnational terrorism, or 
other activities that members of the international community will find either 
threatening or unacceptable. The past fifteen years of the post-Cold War era have 
demonstrated not only that interventions are difficult and dangerous, but also that 
members of the international community sometimes consider the consequences of 
non-intervention worse. In such instances would-be interveners are faced with 
strategic decisions, none of which are attractive. They can support a single faction in 
the target state to the exclusion of all others, but in so doing may produce an autocratic 
regime with a narrow base and propensity to violent repression of all potential 
challengers. They can promote a government of national reconciliation, bringing all 
armed factions into a powersharing structure that defuses violence but that tends to  
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promote political stagnation and often ultimately fragmentation. Or they can seek to 
compel the armed factions in the target state to act as democrats, hoping that such 
actions, however insincere, may over time create enough space for peaceful political 
pluralism and accountable government to emerge. While none of these alternatives is 
attractive, failing to commit to one or the other is typically disastrous. Decision-
makers must therefore understand the limitations and potential of each model, as well 
as the limitations imposed by their own domestic politics, before embarking on 




Rules for Inclusion, Scoring, and Aggregation 
Rules for Inclusion 
 
A use of force is included as a case if it meets the following five criteria: 
•  Sovereignty: Only instances in which the troops of a sovereign state are 
deployed on the territory of another recognized sovereign state may be 
included as cases. 
•  Overt Presence: Covert deployments of forces, such as those of Serbia-
Montenegro in Bosnia or Pakistan in Afghanistan, are not eligible to be 
included as cases. 
•  Personnel: At least 1000 armed troops must be deployed. 
•  Duration: Troops must have been deployed for at least two months; at least two 
months of the intervention must have taken place in the post-Cold War era (for 
convenience, this period is assumed to have begun on 1 January 1990); and the 
intervention must have begun no later than 1 January 2004. 
•  Mandate: Troops must have had a mandate to use force to ensure the success 
of the mission, and the mission must include a substantial governance (as 
opposed to purely humanitarian or military) component. For instance, a 
mission in which armed troops are used solely to deliver humanitarian aid or 
protect pockets of civilians, such as UNITAF or UNPROFOR, would not 
count, but a mission in which troops were authorized to use force to arrest any 
who seek to disrupt elections would count as a case. 
 
Rules for Scoring Democracy of Intervener 
 
The level of democracy of an intervening state was determined using the average of all 
Freedom House scores in the post-Cold War era (the years 1990 – 2004). These 
Freedom House scores were converted to fuzzy-set values based on the breakpoints 
provided below. As a check on robustness, all scores were also computed using Polity 
IV data and different fuzzy-set intervals (e.g., 4-, 5-, and 7-point intervals rather than 








1 – 1.55  1 
1.56 – 2.10  .9 
2.11 – 2.65  .8 
2.66 – 3.20  .7 
3.21 – 3.75  .6 
3.76 – 4.30  .5 
4.31 – 4.85  .4 
4.86 – 5.40  .3 
5.41 – 5.95  .2 
5.96 - 6.50  .1 
6.51 – 7.00  0 
 
Rules for Scoring Militarization of Intervener 
 
The extent to which an intervener’s strategic culture is militarized was determined 
using both defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP (as a proxy for the strength of 
the military and defense establishment in foreign-policy decisionmaking) and public 
responses to the World Values Survey (WVS) questions on defense issues. The fuzzy-
set scores for each WVS question were averaged to determine the public opinion 
component of an intervener’s militarization score, and the public opinion and defense 
expenditure components together were averaged to determine the overall militarization 
score. By combining these two measures we may hope to account for differences 
between public opinion and the strategic culture of the foreign policy elite. In those 
intervening countries in which the WVS was not conducted, only defense expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP were used. In these cases there likely are some misleading 
scores. Fortunately, most of the important intervening states participated in the WVS, 
and when less important states participate in multilateral interventions, the aggregation 
of the interveners’ scores renders the effect of absent public opinion data negligible. 
 
WVS Question 1: “People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should 
be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different 
people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, 
yourself, consider the most important?” (Data refer to the proportion of the population 
who agreed with the response, “Making sure this country has strong defence forces.”) 
 
WVS Question 2: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it 
were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” (Data refer to 
the proportion of the population who answered “yes.”) 
 
Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP: Figures were used from the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) The Military Balance, years 1991 – 2004. These 
figures vary from year to year as more data becomes available. Whenever there was a 


















8.6 – 10.5  .6 
6.6 – 8.5  .5 
5.1 – 6.5  .4 
4.1 – 5.0  .3 
3.1 – 4.0  .2 
2.1 – 3.0  .1 








































> 5.50  1 
4.41 – 5.50  .9 
3.61 – 4.40  .8 
3.01 – 3.60  .7 
2.56 – 3.00  .6 
2.26 – 2.55  .5 
2.01 – 2.25  .4 
1.76 – 2.00  .3 
1.51 – 1.75  .2 
1.26 – 1.50  .1 
≤ 1.25  0   
 
Rules for Scoring Resource Availability of Interveners 
 
Resources are understood as the political capital, financial commitments, troop 
deployments, and potential casualties that must be endured by an intervener in the 
course of an intervention. Available resources were scored on the basis of the realist 
assumption that countries will sacrifice resources in proportion to the importance of a 
given issue to the national interest. An intervener’s interest in a given intervention was 
scored on the five-point scale below. In practice, in the post-Cold War era whenever a 
country committed troops to an intervention, its resource availability score ranged 
among the three intermediate values. 
 
Importance of Intervention  Fuzzy-Set 
Scores 
Existential threat (e.g., total war)  1 
Direct threat (e.g., high-casualty terrorism)  .75 
Significant interest (e.g., potential refugee influx, 
alliance credibility, significant post-colonial relations) 
.5 
Minor interest (e.g., pure humanitarianism,  
UN subsidies for troop contributions) 
.25 
No interest  0 
 
Rules for Scoring Democratic Change in Target States 
 
Democratic change was measured using Freedom House data. (Because the Polity IV 
dataset does not score countries undergoing rapid transitions or interventions, a large 
percentage of target states did not have usable Polity IV scores.) Change was  
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measured as the difference in Freedom House scores from the last year before an 
intervention began to the last year an intervention took place (or the most recent year, 
2004, in cases of ongoing interventions). 
 




≥ 3.5  1 
3.0 .84 
2.5 .67 
1.5 – 2.0  .5 
1.0 .33 
0.5 .17 
≤ 0  0 
 
Rules for Scoring Autocratic Change in Target States 
 
Rules for scoring autocratic change are the same as those used for democratic change, 
except that negative movement on the Freedom House scale is measured. 
 




< -1.0  1 
-1.0 .67 
-0.5 .33 
≥ 0  0 
 
Rules for Scoring Level of Absolute Democracy in Target States 
 
Following the suggestion of Schedler (2002), I use a four-point scale to measure the 
absolute level of democracy in a target state, reflecting (from most to least democratic) 
the levels of liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and 






1 – 2.5  1 
3.0 – 4.0  .67 
4.5 – 5.5  .33 
6.0 – 7.0  0 
 
Rules for Aggregation 
 
In most cases in the post-Cold War era interventions are not conducted by a single 
intervening country but by a coalition of states. In such cases it is necessary to score 
the characteristics of the intervening coalition as a whole. I have adopted the 
conventions below for converting the characteristics of intervening states into those of 
the coalition. Again, as with all measures, these are simply approximations. In 
actuality, of course, different intervening states are likely to have varying degrees of 
influence on the intervention as a whole. Nonetheless, there are two reasons for  
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believing that the conventions of aggregation adopted here are reasonable 
approximations of the intervening coalitions. First, every troop contributing country 
(TCC) exercises influence on the manner in which an intervention is conducted in at 
least two ways: (i) national contingents on the ground are the ones actually 
implementing an intervention, and differences in training, rules of engagement, and 
aggressiveness in implementing a mandate can be highly consequential; and (ii) 
policymakers in a TCC’s capital may threaten to withdraw scarce troops unless their 
policy conditions are met. Second, usually the most powerful members of an 
intervening country formalize their position in command and control arrangements 
that are reflected in the rules of aggregation below. 
•  Lead-Nation Model: A multilateral intervention in which at least half of the 
troops are provided by a single troop contributing country (TCC) (lead-nation 
model) is assumed to reflect the characteristics (regime type, militarization, 
resource constraints) of the dominant TCC.  
•  Broad-Multilateralism Model: A multilateral intervention in which no one state 
contributes at least half of the troops (broad-multilateralism model) is assumed 
to reflect the average characteristics of the top five TCCs, with a minimum 
contribution of 400 armed soldiers
109 – roughly one minimum-strength 
battalion – necessary for inclusion. 
•  Concurrent and Consecutive Interventions: For those cases in which two 
operations are running concurrently (e.g., ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, Operation Licorne and UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire) or 
consecutively in an integrated hand-off of responsibilities (e.g., the hand-off 
from U.S. forces to UNMIH in Haiti), the characteristics of the interveners are 
derived by averaging the characteristics of the two operations. 
                                                 
109 Whenever possible the number of intervening troops reflects the maximum deployment. These 
numbers are in constant flux as units are rotated, and frequently accurate data is unavailable. Thus all 
figures are approximate.  
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Appendix 2: 
Interventions of the Post-Cold War Era 
  Target  Intervention Name(s)  Interveners  Dates 
1  Abkhazia    Russia  9/93 –  
2  Afghanistan  OEF, ISAF, UNAMA  US, Coalition, ISAF  10/01 –  
3 Albania  Operation  Alba; 
Multinational Protection 
Force (MPF) 
Italy, Coalition  4/97 – 8/97 
4  Angola  UNAVEM III  UN  2/95 – 6/97 
5  Bosnia   IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR  NATO, EU  12/95 –  
6  Cambodia  UNTAC  UN, Australia  2/92 – 9/93 
7  Central African Republic  MINURCA  UN  4/98 – 2/00 
8  Congo (Democratic 
Republic of) 
MONUC  UN  11/00 –  




ECOWAS, France, UN  2/03 –  
10  Cyprus (Northern)    Turkey  7/74 –  
11 East  Timor
111 INTERFET,  UNAMET, 
UNTAET, UNMISET  
Australia, UN  9/99 –  
12  Haiti   UNMIH, UNSMIH  UN, US   9/94 – 7/97 
13  Iraq  Iraq War  US, Coalition  3/03 –  
14  Kosovo (Serbia)  KFOR, UNMIK  NATO  7/99 –  
15  Lebanon  Post-Taif Lebanon  Syria  10/89 –  
16  Liberia 1  ECOMOG,  
“Operation Liberty” 
ECOWAS, Nigeria  8/90 – 10/99 
17 Liberia  2
112  UNMIL  UN  9/03 –  
18  Mozambique  ONUMOZ  UN  12/92 – 12/94 
19  Namibia  UNTAG  UN  4/89 – 3/90 
20  Panama  “Operation Just Cause”  US  12/90 – 1/91 
21  Sierra Leone 1  ECOMOG, UNOMSIL  ECOWAS, Nigeria; UN  7/97 – 11/99 
22  Sierra Leone 2  UNAMSIL  UN, UK  11/99 –  
23  Solomon Islands  RAMSI; HELPEM FREN  Australia, 
Pacific Islands Forum 
7/03 –  
24  Somalia  UNOSOM II  UN, US  3/93 – 3/95 
25  Tajikistan 1  CPKF, UNMOT  Russia, CIS  5/92 – 6/97  
26  Tajikistan 2  CPKF, UNMOT  Russia, CIS  6/97 –  
27  Transdniestr    Russia  7/92 –  
 
                                                 
110 ECOWAS’ ECOMICI first deployed on 26 October 2002 to observe a cease-fire agreement. 
France’s Operation Licorne first deployed on 6 February 2003 to police the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. 
The UN cooperated with the ECOWAS mission through its small political mission, MINUCI. The UN 
did not deploy its own peacekeeping operation, UNOCI, until 4 April 2004. The mission is taken to 
begin in February 2003 with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord.  
111 The international intervention in East Timor was actually a string of missions: first, INTERFET, an 
initial transition force dominated by Australia but with international participation and a UN mandate 
(September 1999 – February 2000); second, the primary nationbuilding mission, UNTAET (February 
2000 – May 2002); and third, a UN follow-on mission, UNMISET (May 2002 – present). 
112 Note that ECOWAS provided a transition force, ECOMIL, for the subsequent UN force, UNMIL. 









Survey – Q1 
Militarization: 
World Values 




















Australia  1.00  1  7.0  .5  74.8  .6  2.26  .5  .53 
Bangladesh  3.40  .7 10.4 .6 78.8 .7 1.65 .2  .43 
Belgium  1.20  1  2.8  .1  38.3  0  1.63  .2  .13 
Brazil  2.93  .7 13.1 .8 53.1 .2 1.85 .3  .40 
Burkina Faso  4.50  .4  -  -  -  -  2.42  .5  .50 
Canada  1.00  1  3.0  .1 66.4 .5 1.51 .2  .25 
Chad  5.60  .2  -  -  -  -  2.79  .6  .60 
Cote  d’Ivoire  5.73  .2  - - - -  1.11  0  0 
Egypt  5.70  .2  -  -  -  -  4.78  .9  .90 
Ethiopia  5.07  .3  - - - -  7.14  1  1.0 
Finland  1.00  1  5.6  .4  82.7  .8  1.67  .2  .40 
France  1.40  1  3.3  .2 56.9 .3 3.00 .6  .43 
Gabon  4.37  .4  -  -  -  -  2.35  .5  .50 
Germany  1.40  1  2.8 .1 43.1 0 1.86 .3  .18 
Ghana  3.57  .6  10.9  .7  92.6  1  1.13  0  .43 
Greece  1.80  .9  - - - -  4.97  .9  .90 
India  3.20  .7  21.2  1  84.0  .8  2.94  .6  .75 
Indonesia  4.96  .3  - - - -  1.69  .2  .20 
Italy  1.37  1  5.9  .4  32.4  0  1.98  .3  .25 
Japan  1.53  1  3.0 .1 25.9 0 1.00 0  .03 
Kenya  5.27  .2  -  -  -  -  2.73  .6  .60 
Korea  2.07  .9 10.8 .7 86.5 .9 3.29 .7  .75 
Malaysia  4.63  .3  -  -  -  -  3.85  .8  .80 
Morocco  4.83  .3  - - - -  4.13  .8  .80 
Namibia  2.50  .8  -  -  -  -  3.22  .7  .70 
Nepal  3.60  .6  - - - -  1.22  0  0 
Netherlands  1.00  1  1.5  0  65.2  .5  2.09  .4  .33 
New  Zealand  1.00  1 - - - -  1.58  .2  .20 
Niger  4.60  .4  -  -  -  -  1.24  0  0 
Nigeria  5.06  .3 17.0 .9 74.9 .6 2.45 .5  .63 
Pakistan  4.80  .3  35.8  1  -  -  6.08  1  1.0 
Poland  1.63  .9 8.9 .6  81.5  .8  2.31  .5  .60 
Portugal  1.03  1  3.6  .2  68.1  .5  2.53  .5  .43 
Russia  4.17  .4 11.4 .7 75.8 .7 7.43 1  .85 
Senegal  3.63  .6  -  -  -  -  1.73  .2  .20 
South  Africa  2.37  .8 13.3 .8 58.8 .3 2.43 .5  .53 
Sweden  1.00  1  3.3  .2  86.9  .9  2.45  .5  .53 
Syria  7.00  0 - - - -  9.11  1  1.0 
Thailand  3.07  .7  -  -  -  -  2.23  .4  .40 
Togo  5.47  .2  - - - -  2.31  .5  .50 
Turkey  4.00  .5  9.7  .6  94.0  1  4.42  .9  .85 
UK  1.40  1  7.5  .5 72.1 .6 3.16 .7  .63 
US  1.00  1  14.5  .8  77.5  .7  3.92  .8  .78 
Uruguay  1.43  1  3.8  .2 48.1 .1 2.26 .5  .33 
Zambia  4.07  .4  -  -  -  -  1.98  .3  .30 





  Intervention  Interveners  Independent Variables 








      Raw  FS  Raw  FS  Raw  FS 
1  Abkhazia (Georgia)  Russia (1)  .40  .40  .85  .85  -  .50 















.53  -  .75 
3  Albania  Italy  (1)  1.0 1.0 .25 .25  -  .50 












.58  -  .25 









.61 - .50 















.64  -  .25 
7 Central  African 
Republic 
Egypt (.15) 
Cote d’Ivoire (.15) 



















.46 - .25 
8  Congo, DR  Bangladesh (.2) 
Nepal (.2) 
Pakistan (.2) 












.46  -  .25 


















.48 - .25 
10  Cyprus (Northern)  Turkey (1)  .50  .50  .85  .85  -  .75 
11  East Timor  Australia (.6) 














.52 - .50 















.64  -  .50 
13  Iraq  US  (1)  1.0 1.0 .78 .78  -  .75 















.45  -  .50 
15 Lebanon  Syria  (1)  0  0  1.0  1.0  -  .75 
16  Liberia 1  Nigeria (1)  .30  .30  .63  .63  -  .50 









.75 - .25  
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.41 - .25 












.60  -  .25 
20  Panama  US  (1)  1.0 1.0 .78 .78  -  .50 
21  Sierra Leone 1  Nigeria (1)  .30  .30  .63  .63  -  .50 


















.63 - .25 
23  Solomon Islands  Australia (1)  1.0  1.0  .53  .53  -  .25 


















.68 - .25 
25  Tajikistan 1  Russia (1)  .40  .40  .85  .85  -  .50 
26  Tajikistan 2  Russia (1)  .40  .40  .85  .85  -  .50 
27  Transdniestr 
(Moldova) 





  Intervention  Interveners  Dependent Variables 










      Raw  FS  Raw  FS  Raw  FS  Raw  FS 
1 Abkhazia 
(Georgia) 
Russia  (1)  -1.0  1 0 0  5.5  .33  - 0 





0  0  +1.5  .50 
 
5.5  .33  -  .33 
3  Albania  Italy  (1)  0 0 0 0  4.0  .33  - 0 




0  0  +1.0  .33 
 
6.0  0  -  0 
5 Bosnia  France  (.33) 
UK (.33) 
US (.33) 
0 0  +2.5  .67 
 
3.5 .67  -  .67 





0  0  +1.5  .50 
 
4.5  .33  -  .33 











0 0  +0.5  .17 
 
3.5 .67  -  .17 
8  Congo, DR  Bangladesh (.2) 
Nepal (.2) 
Pakistan (.2) 
South Africa (.2) 
Uruguay (.2) 
0  0  +0.5  .17 
 
6.0  0  -  0 






0 0 0 0  6.0  0 - 0 
10  Cyprus 
(Northern) 
Turkey (1)  0  0  +0.5  .17  2.0  1.0  -  .17 






0 0  +2.0  .50 
 
3.0 .67  -  .50 





0  0  +2.5  .67 
 
4.5  .33  -  .33 
13  Iraq  US  (1)  0 0  +1.0  .33  6.0  0 - 0 





0  0  +1.5  .50 
 
5.5  .33  -  .33  
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  Intervention  Interveners  Dependent Variables 










      Raw  FS  Raw  FS  Raw  FS  Raw  FS 
15 Lebanon  Syria  (1)  xx  1  0  0*  5.5  .33  -  0 
16  Liberia 1  Nigeria (1)  0  1  +1.0  .33  4.5  .33  -  .33 





0 0  +1.5  .50 
 
4.5 .33  -  .33 





0 0  +1.0  .33 
 
4.0 .33  -  .33 




0  0  +2.0  .50 
 
3.5  .67  -  .50 
20 Panama  US  (1)  0  0  +3.5  1 
 
3.0 .67  -  .67 
21  Sierra Leone 1  Nigeria (1)  0  0  +0.5  .17 
 
4.0  .33  -  .17 






0 0  +0.5  .17 
 
3.5 .67  -  .17 
23  Solomon 
Islands 
Australia (1)  0  0  0  0  3.0  .67  -  0 







0 0 0 0  7.0  0 - 0 
25  Tajikistan 1  Russia (1)  -3.0  1  0  0  6.0  0  -  0 
26  Tajikistan 2  Russia (1)  0  0  +0.5  .17  5.5  .33  -  .17 
27  Transdniestr 
(Moldova) 
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